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The common interpretation about Sartre's ontology is that 
it is not phénoménologieslly based, rather it is an a priori 
theory, with a rigid dualism between consciousness and material 
object.
It has been attempted to establish in the first chapter that 
Sartre tried to found his ontology on phenomenological studies of 
experience. With that end in view it is pointed out how Sartre's 
use of phenomenology differs from Husserl's and Heidegger's.
Though Sartre is influenced by both of them, he goes beyond them 
to discover a new tool. Sartre's method has also been compared 
and contrasted with the phenomenological method of Merleau-Ponty 
as well as that of Linguistic Analysis. These studies only 
prepare us to establish that his phenomenological studies have 
led him to the ontological conclusions.
Sartre's dualism between Being-for-itself and Being-in- 
itself is then traced to the phenomenological investigations.
But it is also pointed out that such dualism is not a rigid 
one of absolute separation. Rather, they are abstractions, 
while the fundamental reality is Being-in-the-world.
The next thing is an analysis of Sartre's theory of con­
sciousness. This has been done in three chapters. First, Sartre's 
conception of consciousness, its differences from Husserl's, the 
different stages, the modes in which consciousness exists are 
analyzed. An examination of Sartre's definition of consciousness 
as what it is not and is not what it is, is done in relation to the 
major forms of conscious existence. Secondly, it is shown how 
Sartre's theory of consciousness is basically temporal. This is 
done by comparing Sartre's theory with Husserl's notion of time 
consciousness, Heidegger's notion of temporality, and Merleau- 
Ponty's idea of time. Thirdly, Sartre's idea of consciousness 
as freedom is analyzed and discussed. Here an attempt to remove 
a basic misunderstanding about Sartre's notion has been done.
The last chapter is devoted to a critical examination of Sartre's 
phenomenological studies. Without changing the major standpoint 
it is pointed out that in many cases Sartre has not followed the 
phenomenological investigations to their logical conclusions. We 
have tried to raise our objections in all the major areas of Sartre's 
investigation. Lastly, an analysis of the different senses of 
nothingness has been undertaken. In the concluding pages a com­
parative study between Sartre's ontology and the ontological theories
of some of the major schools of Indian philosophy has been done.
A comprehensive bibliography including the major publications 
by Sartre and on Sartre has been added at the end of the dissertation.
PREFACE
In this dissertation on Sartre, I have mainly con­
fined myself to the examination of his theory of conscious­
ness. In doing that, I have tried to make two points clear. 
First, Sartre's ontology of consciousness, as I would call 
it, has a definite phenomenological basis. Often it has 
been maintained by critics like Hartman, Natanson, etc. 
that Sartre's ontology is some sort of apriori theory, to 
which he has afterwards tried to graft some form of pheno­
menological analysis. I have attempted to establish that 
this is not a true explanation of Sartre's theory of con­
sciousness and the world. Second, critics like Merleau- 
Ponty are of the opinion that Sartre's ontology is dualistic 
which makes an incommunicable cleavage between consciousness 
and the material world. My point is to formulate that 
Sartre's philosophical investigations give us more of the 
idea that Being-in-the-worid is the fundamental reality, 
while For-itself and In-itself are mere abstractions. The 
whole world in which man lives is a dialectical development 
between the two as two aspects of Being-in-the-world. I 
have made an attempt to understand Sartre's theory of con-
iii
sciousness in the context of such ideas and have felt that 
in this way much misunderstanding about Sartre can be re­
moved .
I have included in my discussion the main ideas of 
Sartre's theory of consciousness, for which a clear under­
standing of Sartre's notions of temporality and freedom is 
essential. As Sartre understands the nature of conscious­
ness, consciousness is to be what it is not. Thus the pre­
sent is to be changed so that consciousness can be what it 
is not. But consciousness cannot" negate the present unless 
consciousness is freedom. It may be expressed following the 
language of Sartre that one is not first consciousness and 
then free, but to be conscious and to be free are a. the two 
modes of the same form of existence. So I have tried to 
discuss the notions of temporality and freedom as thoroughly 
as possible, sometimes in comparison with other thinkers, 
especially, in the case of temporality. In the case of 
freedom, my main task has been to find out what Sartre means 
by absolute freedom, and so I have taken pains to analyze 
his main arguments in connection with freedom, as discussed 
in Being and Nothingness. I have pointed out the different 
senses in which Sartre uses the word freedom since critics 
often make mistakes in not keeping these different senses 
straight. It is also true that Sartre himself often does 
not remember the different senses. I have tried to represent
iv
Sartre's arguments as faithfully as possible, before 
raising criticisms.
Though I think S a rtre’s ideas are phenomenologically 
based, in many cases, he has not been able to carry out the 
phenomenological implications to the full. For that I do 
not think Sartre's rationalism is responsible. On the other 
hand, my feeling is that his existentialist bias has in most 
cases influenced his phenomenological decisions.
In Being and Nothingness Sartre has tried to be honest 
to what is phénoménologieally given to the lonely, cast-out 
individual in the hostile world. I have criticized Sartre 
for neglecting the phenomenologically given in the most gen­
eral sense of the term. But still, I think Sartre has a 
point to make, and that is to draw the picture of the indivi­
dual in the world of suffering and sadness. This may be a 
sad tale of human life, but it may not be untrue.
I have not drawn much of a parallel between Sartre the 
Novelist, the Playwright, and the Philosopher. I have often 
felt that Philosophers who indulge in literature are never 
taken seriously by the so-called Academicians of Philosophy. 
For this reason, I have tried to present Sartre's philosophi­
cal arguments without any help from his literature. It is 
not that I regard his literature unimportant from the point 
of view of philosophy. I think that his literature gives 
us a practical demonstration of his philosophical ideas,
V
because he is a philosopher of lived experience.
I have mainly given references to the English trans­
lations of Sartre's works. Only where the English trans­
lation is not available, have I given the reference to the 
French works. But I have always consulted the French texts. 
Sometimes, I have drawn the references from the original 
French, because I have felt the French to be more appropriate 
in those cases, or I might have thought the French to be 
more beautiful. I have also tried to keep very close to 
the text in my exposition of Sartre's ideas.
The bibliography which I have added at the end of the 
dissertation is a compilation from many different sources.
I have arranged Sartre's writings chronologically, after 
Manser, while the works about Sartre are arranged alphabet­
ically. I have included Sartre's writings until January,
1970. In my work of compiling bibliography, I have derived, 
perhaps, the most unforgettable help from Dr. R.W. Shahan's 
personal collection of bibliography on Sartre. I express 
my deep gratitude to him for letting me use his collection.
I am most grateful to my teachers and friends who spent 
much of their valuable time in reading the dissertation.
Their suggestions about the improvement of the content and 
the style of writing have been most helpful. I express my 
deepest gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee. 
Dr. K.R. Merrill, Dr. J.N. Mohanty, Dr. R.W. Shahan, Dr. W.
vi
Horosz, Department of Philosophy, O.U., and Dr. M. Toison, 
Department of French, O.U. for their kind guidance. It 
would not have been possible to give my ideas a definite 
satisfactory shape without their help.
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1. Need for a Method
Sartre calls his major philosophical work Being 
and Nothingness "Phenomenological O n t o l o g y . T h e  sub­
title of the book shows that his most important concern 
is ontology. But it is an ontology of human existence, 
not of some ultimate being. This type of ontology needs 
an analysis of human life or reality, in all its various 
aspects, like man's experience, perception, imagination, 
emotion, and the varieties of mental life. It is not 
possible to know human existence in all its significa­
tions, unless a detailed study of what a human being 
experiences or how he behaves is possible.
^J.P. Sartre, L'Être et Néant; essai d 'Ontologie 
Phénoménologique (Gallimard, 1943). English Transla­
tion. Barnes, H., Being and Nothingness (New York, 
Philosophical Library, 1956; London, Methuen, 1957).
The earlier works of Sartre, like The Transcendence 
of the Ego,^ Imagination,^ Psychology of Imagination,^
ë . II I
Sketch for a Theory of the Emotion, and his first novel, 
is Nausea,® are examples of exploration into the diverse 
aspects of human experience and existence. These p r e ­
pared Sartre to reach his fundamental ontological conclu­
sions. Like every philosopher, Sartre is also aware of 
the fact that ontological theories have to be established 
on the basis of a philosophical method.
^J.P. Sartre, La Transcendance de l'ego; Esquisse 
d'une description phénoménologique (Recherches Philo­
sophiques, 6, 1936-37, p. 85-123) English translation - 
Ward R. Kirkpatrick, Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday 
Press, New York, 1969.
^J.P. Sartre, L'Imagination ; etude critique 
(Felix Alcan, 1936) English Translation - Williams, F ., 
Imagination; A psychological critique (Ann Arbor, Mich.,
University of Michigan Press, 1962).
^J.P. Sartre, L'Imaginaire : psychologie phénoméno­
logique de 1'imagination (Gallimard, 1940) English Trans­
lation - B. Frecht, The Psychology of Imagination (Lon­
don , Rider, 1949) .
5j.p. Sartre, Esquisse d'une théorie des emotions, 
(Actualités Scientific Industrielles, no. 834, Herman, 
1939). English Translation - B. Frechtman, Outlines of
a Theory of the emotions (New York, Philosophical
Library, 1948); P. Mairet, Sketch for a theory of the 
emotions, Methuen, 1964,
^J.P. Sartre, La Nausee (Gallimard, 1938) English 
Translation - L. Alexander, The Diary of Antoine 
Roguentine (London, John Leman, 1949).
Ontology is generally understood as the theory of 
Being. It tries to understand the relationships between 
beings as they are grounded in B e ing. Also, it seeks to 
understand beings as manifestations of Being. Heidegger 
understands the ordinary objects of the world as beings, 
but why they are beings can be properly understood only 
if we can realize how they reveal B e ing. Sartre does not 
make a formal distinction between beings and B eing. He 
talks of human consciousness and material objects. Each 
of them displays its own distinctive existence. So each 
can be said to have its way of b e ing. Ontology has to 
take into account the different ways of being. As Being 
is revealed in the things of experience and as they are 
given in phenomena, we can understand the nature of Being 
only through phenomenological investigations. Husserl 
thinks that by phenomenological study we can reveal the 
structure of beings of different regions. Thus there can 
be different regional ontologies. In that case, the task 
of phenomenology is to lay b a r e ,the structure of beings or 
of Being. Sartre, as a thinker of the Husserlian-Heideg- 
gerian tradition, begins with an analysis of conscious 
experience in which consciousness is always conscious of 
something. Sartre thinks that the analysis of the given 
in experience will lead to two aspects of Being - for-
itself and in-itself. The analysis of the given makes 
us understand the phenomenological foundation of ontology.
Sartre's phenomenology is not exactly the same method 
followed by Husserl. His method is also different from 
Heidegger's. But though he shares with Husserl and 
Heidegger the basic ideas of phenomenology, he has de­
veloped his own method in a unique way.
In understanding the richness of human experience, 
Sartre has carried his investigation into all the r e ­
gions of experience. He tried to give some idea of his 
phenomenological method in a paper before the Société de 
Français in 1947, entitled Conscience de Soi et Connai­
ssance de Soi (which was published in the Bulletin of the 
Society, vol. X L I I , no. 3 April - June, 1948). But the 
idea, as Spiegelberg says, is rather confusing^. Actually 
Sartre has never given any clear systematic exposition 
of his method. He has simply employed the method, and an 
understanding of the different aspects of the method is 
possible only through an examination of the application 
of his philosophical method. It is not necessary to make 
a detailed examination of how Sartre applies his method
^Spiegelberg, ., The Phenomenological Movement, 
Vol. II (Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1960), p. 454. 
Spiegelberg writes that Sartre proposed '-a synthesis of 
Husserl's contemplative and non-dialectical conscious­
ness ... with the activity of the dialectical but non­
consciousness and hence unfounded project that we find in 
Heidegger, where we discover that the primary element is 
transcendence."
in all the philosophical and literary works; for, while 
the sphere of application may be different, the prin­
ciples of application are everywhere the same. We can 
understand Sartre's phenomenological method with reference 
to his analysis of human experience like imagination and 
emotion better. In these cases he makes some explicit 
comments on what he means by phenomenological method.
2. Opinion about Sartre's Method 
Different, commentators offer different opinions about 
Sartre's philosophical method. Varet has identified him 
as a phenomenologist of the Husserlian group®, while 
Spiegelberg calls him a French Heidegger®, even though 
he notices the difference between Heidegger and Sartre.
There are other commentators like Natanson^®, Hartmann^^,
12and George Kline who do not want to recognize Sartre 
as a phenomenologist. Their idea is that Sartre has tried
®G. Varet, L 'Ontology de Sartre (Presses Univer­
sitaires de France, Paris, 1948), p. 23. "... en fin
de compte la p h é n o m ^ o g i e  est-elle vraiment pour Sartre 
le procède d 'investigation critique de portée universelle 
qu'elle est d'abord pour Husserl."
®H. Spiegelberg, Ibid. , p. 454.
Natanson, A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's 
Ontology (University of Nebraska Studies, March, 1951,
New Series, No. 6) p. 69, 73.
l^K. Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology (Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston, 1966) p. 133-34.
l ^ G . Kline, "The Existential Rediscovery of Hegel and
to combine Husserl's phenomenology with H e g e l ’s dialectic,
but has ended in failure. George Kline has gone to the
X 3extent of saying that he is a "truncated dialectician 
Merleau-Ponty also agrees with him. Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
raises the same charge against Sartre and points out that 
Sartre belongs to the same school of European rationalism 
to which Descartes and Husserl belonged. Such rationalism 
wants to judge the concrete phenomena of life in terms of 
apriori categories'^. We have to understand Sartre's 
philosophical method in the face of these criticisms.
It will be clear, as we go farther in our analysis, that 
these criticisms are unjustifiable, as these are based on 
an inadequate understanding of Sartre's conception of reason,
M a r x " in Phenomenology and Existentialism, edited by 
Edwards, Lee and M. Mandelbaum (The John Hopkins Uni­
versity Press; Baltimore, 1967) p. 124.
l^H. Spiegelberg, Ibid. , p. 521. It is mentioned 
here that in 1946, in an article on Existentialism in 
Hegel (Sens et No n - s e n s , p. 137f) Merleau-Ponty had ex­
pressed the view that whereas Hegel converts death into 
higher life and passes from the individual to history, for 
Sartre the contradiction between the self and others is 
beyond remedy and hence his dialectics is truncated, 
(trunque'e )
Kline, Ibid., p. 125.
^^M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968), p. 86. 
"... beyond the visible one trusts entirely in what we 
think under the terms of being and nothingness, one 
practices an 'essentialist' thought which refers to signi-
It is curious to note that Sartre's first philoso­
phical treatise, The Transcendence of the E g o , and his 
phenomenological critical study of the different theories 
of image, Imagination, were published in the same year.
We learn from Simone de Beauvoir's autobiography that 
Imagination is the first part of Sartre's detailed inves­
tigation of the nature of imagination, the second part
of which consists of a phenomenological analysis of the 
16nature of image . It is quite evident that Sartre was 
exploring the ontological region of consciousness together 
with a phenomenological study of imagination. It may 
be asked why Sartre chose the area imagination and not 
any other.
3. The Early Stage of Sartre's Phenomenology
The question which we raised in the previous para­
graph may be answered in this way. It may be that to 
Sartre the character of consciousness as nothingness be­
comes more clearly experienced in an image, as it can 
posit an object as non-existent and/or existing else-
►ficance beyond experience and thus one conducts our 
relations with the world."
^®S. di e Beauvoir, The Prime of Life (Trans, by 
Green, P., New.York; The World Publishing Company, 
1962) , p. 168-171.
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where; it can also neutralize itself, that is, not posit 
the object as existing. We should point out that in 
The Transcendence of the E g o , Sartre was trying to under­
stand the nature of consciousness for the sake of onto­
logical clarification. He was trying to grasp the nature 
of consciousness as it is. But the ontological study of 
consciousness can be established on a secure foundation 
on the basis of some concrete illustrations. That con­
sciousness is experienced as nothing is clear from Sartre's 
acceptance of the theory of intentionality. According 
to it, consciousness always points to an object external 
to itself. It may be asked how Sartre comes to establish 
consciousness as nothing from intentionality. We can 
say that intentionality gives us the idea that conscious­
ness is not an object, from which reflection on the nature 
of consciousness can establish that consciousness is 
nothing. Sartre argues that consciousness has no con­
tent. It is transparent. It directs us to objects.
This is what is known as intentionality. All physical, 
psycho-physical and psychic objects, all truths, all 
values are outside consciousness. So consciousness is 
nothing. One of the most important conclusions of 
Sartre in The Transcendence of the Ego is that consciousness 
is nothing, as it is consciousness of objects, of the
17world . It may be said that Sartre starts with the 
presupposition of the intentional character of con­
sciousness. If sOy then the Husserlian idea of inten­
tionality becomes a presupposition. But that is far 
from being true, for Husserl had accepted the idea of 
intentionality from the phenomenological datum of ex ­
perience, as he would accept only that which was given 
to consciousness. So what Sartre is doing in Imagination 
and Psychology of the Imagination is that he is applying 
the principle of intentionality to specific cases of 
experience. He establishes the ontological nature of 
consciousness from the phenomenological analysis of thé 
different aspects of conscious experience. But the phe­
nomenological studies are more detailed in his works 
on imagination or emotion. In The Transcendence of the 
Ego or Being and Nothingness, both ontological theorizing 
and phenomenological investigation go together, for 
there are brilliant examples of the phenomenological 
analysis in Being and Nothingness, such as "bad faith", 
"relations with the other", e t c . But even then, the 
ontological interest is more predominant. In The Trans­
cendence of the Ego ontology is concealed under pheno­
menological studies. But there are clear indications of
^^J.P. Sartre, T.E., p. 193
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phenomenological investigations, without which Sartre's 
ontological conclusions would be meaningless. So it 
would be more correct to say that Sartre tries to re^ch 
his ontological conclusions with his phenomenological 
method. But sometimes he has been interested either in 
the ontological field or the phenomenological field.
In each case , phenomenological study has served the on­
tological purpose. In his phenomenological study of 
emotion or imagination, he is more interested in what 
the investigations lead to, about the nature of conscious­
ness or freedom or man's relation within the world.
4. Difference from Husserl
Sartre tries to understand the nature of conscious­
ness, in The Transcendence of the E g o , from what is 
phénoménologieally given. The transcendental "I" is 
not given in our pre-reflective experience. If we take 
into account only what is given immediately to our ex­
perience, then we have to reject the transcendental ego. 
It is, in other words, called the "phenomenological 
reduction". Husserl accepted the principle of epoché^ 
with the idea of a thorough-going phenomenological 
reduction, but, unlike Sartre, he did not carry the de-
y . 18mand of the epoche to its logical conclusion
^®Ibid., p. 36.
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In this respect Sartre can be compared with Hume, 
who carried out the logical implications of empiricism 
by denying a substantial ego. Husserl understands by 
the phenomenological epoche^the bracketing of all p r e ­
suppositions, including our belief in the reality of 
the world. Husserl's phenomenological epoche is not 
accepted by Sartre in the sense it is understood by 
Husserl. But Sartre too, wants to accept only what is 
given in immediate experience. If Sartre thinks that 
only that which is given in immediate experience can be 
accepted, then Husserlian notions like the transcendental 
ego cannot be accepted and belief in the existence of 
the world can not be suspended. Sartre would not object 
to bracketing off the presuppositions, but he thinks 
that the existence of the given can hot be bracketed, for 
it is the most immediately given. So Sartre accepts the 
phenomenological epoch'e in a modified sense, as he says 
in his Psychology of Imagination, "So, we shall ignore 
theories" (p. 4). In that sense we not only experience 
the facts given to us, but we also experience them as 
existent in the external world. In fact, this is also 
the logical implication of Husserl's theory of intentiona­
lity. He points out there that Husserl has liberated us
12
19from the "inward life" and restored to us the reality 
of the world of objects. But though consciousness of an 
object points to the object in the world, Husserl did not 
remain true to this experience of the given, as he kept 
the existent world in suspense. Sartre thinks that once 
the being of the world is bracketed, it is difficult to 
return from the phenomenological epoche to the world.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty also points out that a complete 
bracketing is impossible, for experience is achieved 
through a bodily perspective and that canhot be bracketed 
off.21.
Sartre's phenomenological method starts with:
1. intentionality of consciousness;
2. phenomenological epoche in the sense 
that nothing that is not immediately 
given in experience is accepted, and
3. rejection of Husserl's bracketing 
the world, as intentionality of 
consciousness implies that we are 
aware of objects as existent in 
the world.
5. Relation to Heidegger
5>eigelberg pointa out that Sartre is more Hus- 
serlian in the th o earlier works (viz, his books on imagi-
l^J.P. Sartre, "Une Idg*e Fondamentale de la 
phénoménologie de Husserl: . L ' intentionali të̂ ' in 
Situations I , p. 31-35 (Gallimard, Paris, 1947).
20 H. Spiegelberg, Ibid., p. 452.
21j. E d i e , Phenomenology as a Rigorous Science in
13
nation and The Transcendence of the Ego) , but that he
becomes more inclined to Heidegger's interpretation of
phenomenology in his later works beginning with his
2 2Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, . We have to see 
whether this statement about Sartre is true; and to judge 
it better we must mention the chief characteristics of 
Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology.
6. Husserl's Method
Husserl's phenomenology developed through three 
stages :
1. descriptive phenomenology
2. transcendental phenomenology, and
3. phenomenology of The Lebenswelt.
In the first phase, Husserl was mainly concerned 
with intuiting the essences through phenomenological 
elucidation and description of the given. Though there 
were other changes in his later phenomenological method, 
phenomenological description has been the constant 
feature. In the period of Logical Investigations Hus­
serl was interested in the knowledge of the essences which 
he felt, could be arrived at only through phenomenological 
description of the given. As yet, phenomenological re­
duction had not assumed any importance. Only when it
^^H. Spiegelberg, Ibid., p. 464,
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dawned on Husserl that phenomenological description can 
not give us the absolutely evident so long we remain con­
fined to the naturalistic standpoint, did he introduce 
the principle of phenomenological epoch^. Under the epochë", 
belief in the reality of world is suspended, and only what 
is transcendentally reduced is accepted as evident. Thus, 
according to Husserl, the phenomena given to transcendental 
consciousness are the pure given. Husserl, then, de­
velops his idea of phenomenological constitution by which 
the givens are gathered together to give rise to the 
meaning of the world. The givens are synthesized in 
such a way that consciousness understands the meaning of 
the world. It becomes clear that the world as meant is 
constituted by consciousness. In the second phase of 
Husserl's philosophical development, phenomenological 
epoche', transcendental reduction and phenomenological 
constitution are the most important elements, though pheno­
menological description continues to be the most impor­
tant step in connection with the transcendental reduction. 
But above all, intentionality of consciousness is the 
starting point for Husserl.
Towards the end of his life Husserl spoke of a 
different phenomenology which should be conducted prior 
to the transcendental-phenomenological investigations.
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The world in which we live and which we believe to be real 
is mixed up with the scientific categories that we have 
taken for granted without a clear examination into their 
structure and origin. These scientific categories, in 
terms of which we understand the world, have their origin 
in the immediate facts of experience. In such experience, 
first, there is no subject-object distinction or mind- 
body dualism. These scientific concepts are born of the 
power of abstraction by intellect. So the first task of 
phenomenology is to bracket off the abstract categories 
of science so that it can be clearly shown how these con­
cepts of the natural world have their origin. Once the cate­
gories are understood in terms of immediate experience, a sec­
ond reduction, this time a transcendental reduction, takes 
place to show how the structures of the Lebenswelt are the 
achievements of a 'functioning intentionality.' Husserl 
developed his theory of the Lebenswelt in his Die Krisis 
der europaischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale 
Phanomenoloqie, in which his investigations range over 
three completely different levels:
1. the mundane phenomena of the Lebenswelt 
itself ;
2. the realm of the objectivism of the 
sciences which remain presupposed in 
the real existing world; and
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3. the subjectivity of the transcendental life of 
consciousness which precedes and constitutes 
the world23.
But the phenomenological investigation of the 
Lebenswelt, even though it brackets off the scientific 
categories, does not deny the life-world in which man 
receives his experiences.
7. Heidegger's Method
Heidegger understands 'phenomenology' as a method.
It, rather, expresses a maxim which can be formulated 
as "To the things themselves" in contrast to all the 
unsupported constructions, the accidental findings, the 
blind acceptance of concepts verified merely in appear­
ance, and the pseudo-questions which often for generations 
strut about as problems^^. "Phenomenon" for him means 
something "which shows itself" or "what shows itself in 
person" or "what is manifest." Heidegger does not accept 
Husserl's eidetic reduction, because the meaning of Being 
in which he is interested is not some general essence , 
but is something fundamentally individualized, particularly 
in the case of human being. He rejects the phenomeno­
logical reduction also in the form of bracketing existence.
2 3J.J. Kockelmans, A First Introduction to Husserl's 
Phenomenology (Duquesne University Press, 1967), p. 311.
Spiegelberg, Ibid., p. 320.
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for the suspension of the being of phenomenon cannot 
be of any help in exploring the nature of Being. Thus, 
for Heidegger, eidetic and transcendental phenomenology 
were useless, "at worst falsifying, when existence and 
being were at stake." Heidegger distinguishes the 
"phenomenological concept of phenomenon" from the "phe­
nomenon" in the ordinary sense. The ordinary concept 
understands "phenomenon as that which shows itself in 
itself." The phenomenological concept refers to that which 
is encountered through that which shows itself. Heidegger 
gives the illustration of the "symptoms of a disease." The 
symptoms show themselves. But in showing themselves, they 
indicate something which does not show itself. Heidegger 
thinks that the example gives us an idea of "appearance."
But it announces something else. Thus it is a "phenomenon." 
Taking the "phenomenon" and "logos" together Heidegger's 
phenomenology means a method of making us see what is other­
wise concealed, "of taking the hidden out of the hiding and 
of detecting it as "unhidden," i.e., as truth or (a-letheia). 
It is the method of uncovering the hiding or "interpreta­
tion" which Heidegger also calls the "methodical meaning of 
the phenomenological description." Heidegger defines philo­
sophy as "universal phenomenological ontology based on 
the hermeneutics of human b e i n g . F o r  him, phenomenology
^^H. Spiegelberg, Ibid., p. 322.
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is the one and the only philosophical method. Heidegger's 
phenomenology is also called hermeneutics or hermeneutical 
phenomenology. Hermeneutics tries to study the relation 
between man's actions and the goal of his life.
We have seen that in the later writings of Husserl 
the concept of Lebenswelt occupies an important place. 
According to him, we must return to the world as it 
manifests itself in pure experience of the Lebenswelt. 
Prior to the phenomenological investigation, the pheno­
menological reduction, and the constitutive analysis, we 
have to find the guiding clues by means of a new reduction 
which takes us from the cultural world as well as the 
scientific world to the original Lebenswelt. According 
to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is the fundamental 
structure of Dasein* . His main task is to show the ori­
ginal relation between Dasein and the world and to show 
"how D a sein, properly speaking, is mundane and how it 
has a w o r l d ."
* The word Dasein means "being t^ere." Heidegger 
uses this technical term to refer to human 
being. Man is a being with a distinctive 
mode of existence, because man has a possibi­
lity and an awareness of Being in his own 
existence. Heidegger wants to analyze the 
nature of Dasein with a view to clarifying 
the nature of Being.
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8. Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger
From the foregoing analysis of Husserl's and 
Heidegger's method it is clear that Sartre's method 
contains elements from both of them. Still, it would 
be a mistake to say that Sartre simply combines the 
elements arbitrarily. On the contrary, he has effected 
a novel synthesis due to which it is possible to have 
a deeper understanding of human reality. Husserl's 
phenomenological method is mainly concerned with the 
analysis of the structures of consciousness that constitute 
the world. But he does not show how that consciousness 
is connected with the main purpose of life. Heidegger 
shows how human life and purpose reveal the meaning 
of Being, for Dasein is a manifestation of Being. But 
though Heidegger speaks of human purpose, goal, and 
possibility, he never shows that human being can have a 
purpose because of the spontaneous nature of consciousness. 
Heidegger starts with the purposive nature of D a s e i n .
Dasein can have a meaning, because it has consciousness, 
or because it is consciousness. Only through such 
consciousness, can the different layers of meaning that 
are hidden be uncovered. Sartre truly points out that 
it is the nature of consciousness to be intentional, 
to point to other things that are not conscious, but of 
which it is conscious. By understanding the nature of
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consciousness, we can realize what human reality is.
Sartre reveals the structures of consciousness with 
reference to the final purposes of life that gives meaning 
to all those structures. He shows also the develop­
ment of consciousness in relation to the environment 
and to the ultimate possibility which can be understood 
through phenomenological investigations.
It is not necessary in all these cases always to be 
restricted to the given or just the phenomena. The 
given may carry a meaning within itself, and such mean­
ing is to be uncovered with reference to the purpose 
of life. The purpose originates in consciousness and 
though it may not yet be present as an actuality, yet 
consciousness is aware of its presence as a possibility. 
Purpose cannot be present like an ordinary object. It 
rather works like an attraction towards which the indi­
vidual is pulled. Consciousness feels its presence even 
in the given phenomena. When Sartre defines self as 
the goal^^ or the value, towards which the consciousness 
is striving, he means that the given can be understood 
with reference to the goal of life. Thus the given 
manifests to some extent its relation to purpose. Hei­
degger does not establish how Dasein can have a purpose.
27 J.P. Sartre, B.N., p. 92,
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because he never analyzes the structure of consciousness 
which alone can explain relation to the purpose of life.
These statements about Sartre can be clearly under­
stood, if we try to give some examples of the appli­
cation of Sartre's phenomenological method. We can, 
however, distinguish the following elements in Sartre's 
m e thod.
1. The notion of intentionality
2. Phenomenological epochd' in a modified sense, 
according to which only that which is 
given in experience is to be accepted.
3. Phenomenological description
4. Idea of human reality
5. Hermeneutics, in order to understand
what the phenomena signify or how 
they are related to the meaning
of life.
(A note has been added at the end of 
the chapter to point out the sense 
in which we can talk of hermeneutics in 
Sartre as distinguished from Heidegger's 
and Dilthey's .)
6. Phenomenological understanding of 
the development of conscious human 
reality through different aspects 
of life and environment towards the 
final goal.
A form of such phenomenological understanding is 
found in Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis, which tries 
to establish the authentic human existence with refer­
ence to the ultimate goal of life. This existential 
psychoanalysis furnishes an adequate understanding of 
the relation between consciousness and object or for-
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itself and in-itself, consciousness and other human 
beings, their relations and conflicts. These relations 
according to many commentators, show the dialectical 
relationship of the Hegelian triads. So they think that 
in understanding these relationships Sartre is applying 
some form of Hegelian dialectic, but such interpreta­
tion, we hope to show, is misdirected.
9. Hegelian Interpretation of Sartre
The relations which Sartre describes in his Exis­
tential Psychoanalysis may reveal dialectic, but it is 
an existential dialectic. The idea of existential dia­
lectic can be understood if we take into account Kier-
2 8kegaard's criticism of Hegel. Kierkegaard suggests 
that one cannot enter a different existential plane with 
merely the help of logical contradictions. The ethical 
plane may be opposed to the aesthetic plane, but one 
does not understand it simply by the rules of logic.
One has to live in the level of aesthetic existence to 
know that it can not give one a fulfilled sense of 
existence. One enters a different plane of existence by 
a leap of faith, as Kierkegaard would say. Similarly, 
Sartre can say that the individual experiences different
28 R. Bretall (ed.) , Concluding Unscientific Post- 
script in A Kierkegaardian Anthology, Modern Library, 
N.Y., 1936, p. 196.
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types of contradictions, such as the conflict between 
individuals, the incomplete sense of existence in the 
form of for-itself, the constant interplay between 
authentic and inauthentic existence, etc. Such experiences 
as these produce in the life of the individual a dia­
lectic. It may be said that it has a similarity to 
logical dialectic, as all dialectic is a case of contra­
diction or an opposition between different poles, whether 
that is logical or actual. Actual dialectic can give 
us formulations of a logical shape, but actuality can 
not be generated from logical dialectic. Sartre shows 
how the dialectical relationships of the different forms 
of existence can be understood through phenomenological 
investigations. His uniqueness consists in giving a 
phenomenological account of the dynamic and spontaneous 
development of human reality towards the ultimate possi­
bility.
We have made these comments about Sartre, without 
establishing them with reference to Sartre's application 
of his method. We can point out the validity of these 
statements, if we take into account some examples of 
Sartre's phenomenological investigations.
Sartre states in the beginning of his Psychology 
of the Imagination that there is a basic difference 
between describing an image and drawing conclusions
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regarding its nature. The first duty of the psychologist
is to formulate into concepts what is immediate and
certain. He has to ignore theories. We have to know
nothing about the image but only what analysis can teach
us. The method is simple;
"We shall produce images, reflect upon 
them, describe them; that is, attempt 
to determine and to classify their 
distinctive characteristics."29
This method, by which Sartre analyzes the image-conscious- 
n e s s , also accepts the intentionality of consciousness. 
Sartre describes the characteristics of image by pheno­
menological description of what is immediately given.
In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre points 
out that emotion cannot be understood apart from its 
signification. He says that emotion signifies, in its 
own way, the whole of human consciousness or human 
reality. But human reality is not considered in ab­
straction from the world. Psychology of emotion is 
interested in man in situations. Phenomenology to which 
psychology is subordinate, can give us a positive study 
of man in situations. It can elucidate the notions of
O Qman, world, and being in the world. Sartre's study of
29j.p. Sartre, Psychology of the Imagination, 
p . 4 . __________________________________
^^J.P. Sartre, Emotions, p. 18.
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emotion shows how it can be definitely understood, if
we know the purpose the emotion is going to serve.
Emotion is a transformation of the world,
"When the paths traced out become difficult 
or when we see no path, we can no longer 
live in so urgent and difficult a world.
All the ways are barred. However, we must 
act. So we try to change the world, that 
is, to live as if the connection between 
things and their potentialities were 
not ruled by the deterministic processes, 
but by magic."
This shows that the behavioral phenomena in an emotion 
may be truly given elements, but we cannot understand 
them unless we realize what they signify. The signi­
fication is hidden in the phenomena, but they are pointed 
to by the behavioral phenomena. This shows that Sartre 
is not using "phenomenology" in the strict Husserlian 
sense. Rather, his main idea is to show how human 
reality can be properly grasped. He thinks that such 
an understanding is possible, by laying bare the purpose.
In Being and Nothingness, many cases are found 
where Sartre is following the hermeneutical method.
When he analyzes the structure of consciousness as some­
thing which is not what it i s , he tries to explain his 
statement by pointing out that consciousness is not a 
material thing. So it cannot be what it is. At the same
31ibid., p. 58-59,
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time he states that consciousness is what it is not, 
because it has a possibility. The nature of consciousness 
cannot be understood, if we do not try to grasp the 
nature of this possibility or purpose. This possibility 
is concealed by the given phenomena, but it is also 
signified by the given.
We can understand Sartre's phenomenology, if we 
follow his account of the relations of consciousness and 
the world. This can be called dynamic phenomenology, 
because Sartre is concerned to show how the authentic 
project of human life and its development can be under­
stood through man's relation with the world and other 
human beings. Though the world is independent of con­
sciousness, the world as such has no meaning for the 
individual. It is the purpose of the individual which 
creates a world for him. Though the individual has to 
accept the facticity of the objective world, man can
construct a situation out of the objective factors.
3 2It is the situation in which man lives. It cannot 
be denied that the facticity of the world has some influ­
ence over consciousness, but Sartre would always say 
that man's freedom has the power to reorganize the situ­
ation. The facts that we know in our experience are
, p. 461.
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not objective phenomena as such, but are to be under­
stood in terms of human purpose. The phenomena obtained 
in our experience lead us to understand the situation, 
but the situation can be fully grasped only in terms of 
the project. It shows that Sartre is concerned with the 
phenomenology of the existential human being insofar as 
he tries to establish his relation with the world. This 
is something novel in the history of phenomenology, for 
here phenomenology is applied to the sphere of the dy­
namic activities of life.
In Sartre's consideration of the problem of the 
relations with the other, the dynamism of his phenomeno­
logy is evident. His phenomenological study reveals to 
us the various attitudes the individual displays towards 
the other. Such attitudes cannot be properly interpreted, 
unless the individual's activities are analyzed with 
reference to the individual's situation or existence.
The idea of a dynamic phenomenology is best illus­
trated in Sartre's conception of existential psychoanalysis 
To understand the individual for-itself, we have to realize
the fundamental project, which is, to possess the world
3 3which the for-itself is lacking. Because the for-itself 
is always on the move and always changing, it does not
^^Ibid., p. 565.
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have the totality that will give it peace and tranquility. 
Thus the for-itself feels a lack; it cannot reach the 
totality towards which it is striving. The for-itself 
wants a unification with the world, and it may be that 
the attempt towards unification can be apprehended through 
a particular contingent object. flow the for-itself 
wants to realize the fundamental project, how the ulti­
mate project can illuminate the whole of individual's 
life, and how it is to be understood in synthetic connec­
tion with other subordinate projects - these are the most 
important aspects of dynamic phenomenology. Sartre is 
exploring all these aspects in his existential psycho­
analysis. He wants to discover the fundamental project 
of the for-itself. As such discovery is possible, only 
by a phenomenological analysis of the nature of desire 
for a particular object, analysis of desire is a major 
theme in his theory of psychoanalysis.^^ The discovery 
of the various desires in man's life leads to the under­
standing of the fundamental project. But at the same 
time, the various desires are the phenomenological data 
that signify the ultimate project in the light of which 
subordinate projects are fully grasped.
We have termed Sartre's phenomenology a dynamic 
one, for it tries to understand the nature of human life
S^ibid., p. 564.
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in its development to realize the ultimate projects of 
life. Husserl's interest is understanding the nature of 
essences through the analysis of consciousness. Hei­
degger is interested in the nature of B e i n g , for which 
a preliminary analysis of Dasein is necessary. But 
Sartre tries to understand the role of consciousness 
in life and the world phenomenologically.
An examination of some of these examples from 
Sartre's major philosophical work Being and Nothingness 
would show clearly, we hope, that Sartre's phenomeno­
logical method, though inherited from Husserl and Hei­
degger, advances beyond both of them to establish a 
dynamic phenomenology. In it the individual's relations 
with the world, other human beings and realization of the 
fundamental project are phenomenologically studied.
We have already tried to show that the phenomena are to 
be taken into account, not only as they are given in 
experience, but also as signifying what they really point 
towards, along with the dynamic development of the indi­
vidual's life. We have also tried to establish that 
the so-called dialectical relations of the individual 
with the different aspects of life are not abstract and 
logical, but existential. Sartre's study appears to be 
dialectical for another reason, namely, that 
the life of consciousness is dialectical; but that it is
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not a dialectic of logic in which every contradiction is 
resolved in a synthesis. Perhaps, the contradictions of 
an individual's life are never resolved. This is what 
a phenomenological study of consciousness shows. So 
it would be a mistake to call Sartre's dialectic of the 
for-itself and in-itself which moves through the concrete 
experiences of life a form of Hegelian dialectic. Sartre 
has been criticized for introducing many concepts that 
have no phenomenological basis. Let us try to see if 
such a criticism is just.
Natanson's criticism is that Sartre cannot derive 
Being from phenomenological analysis, for he does not 
make any phenomenological epoche^^S we may point out 
that if an epoche is to be made, then Being itself has 
to be bracketed. But even Husserl in his theory of 
Lebenswelt does not make any epoche^of the being of the 
world in which we live and have our experience. Rather, 
he wants to understand how the world has its origin in 
experience. In transcendental phenomenology, he speaks 
of a bracketing of the natural world to show how the 
structures of such a world are constituted in conscious­
ness. But Natanson nowhere discusses the Lebenswelt of 
Husserl. Though he claims that Sartre's idea of Being 
is not derived phenomenologically, he himself states.
35 Natanson, Critique, p. 70.
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"We are able to have knowledge of this trans- 
phenomenality of Being, since it is co­
extensive with the phenomenon of Being 
and makes itself known to us by 'over­
flowing' ."36
Does not this statement make it clear that Being is 
derived phenomenologically? Natanson rejects Sartre's 
"ontological argument," though it is based on Husserl's 
theory of intentionality, as Sartre has not adopted 
transcendental reduction. But it seems that inten­
tionality has nothing to do with reduction, for Husserl 
first accepts intentionality, which shows that conscious­
ness is always consciousness of an object, and then 
tries to show how the intended object is constituted by 
the transcendental consciousness. Natanson rejects 
Sartre's conception of the existence of the other, for 
"... the other is encountered, but not constituted by 
the ego." But the existence of the other can be explained 
on the basis of intentionality which makes it clear that 
when I encounter the other, I encounter him as existent 
because I am conscious of him. Natanson calls Sartre's 
method quasi-phenomenological, but he never explains 
what he means by that term, for according to him, 
nothing can be called phenomenology if it does not con­
form to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.
36ibid., p. 70.
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The view of Natanson is also accepted by Hartmann, 
who points out the parallels between Hegel's pheno­
menology and Sartre's phenomenological method citing 
specific illustrations. His main argument is that Sartre 
borrows the terms like "nothingness," "for-itself," 
"in-itself," "the other" from Hegel. But while Hegel 
reaches a satisfactory solution through his logical
dialectic, Sartre fails to achieve a perfect harmony
37of the conflicting terms. This remark seems to be
based on a misunderstanding of the existential outlook
of Sartre, for Sartre wants to reveal to us what the
phenomena of experience show, and he is not interested
in an abstract logical synthesis. George L. Kline has
shown that Sartre's categories are nothing but the
3 8French translations of the German terms. But this 
list of parallel concepts does not prove that Sartre is 
a Hegelian. The concepts have assumed a concrete dimen­
sion in the hands of Sartre. It is their phenomenolo­
gically derived concrete nature in which Sartre is inter­
ested. Sartre has shown this in his treatment of the 
Hegelian concept of nothingness. He points out that 
according to Hegel, being because of its empty nature
3 7Hartman, Sartre's Ontology, p. 135
3 8Kline, Rediscovery, p. 125.
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implies negation?^ But for Sartre, nothingness is an
experienced phenomenon and this can be explained against
the background of expectation which is also an experienced 
40fact. This is because in expectation what is expected, 
negates the present situation or there is a denial of 
the expected. In both cases, there is an experience of 
nothingness. All the alleged Hegelian parallels in 
Sartre's philosophy can be explained with reference to 
the concrete experiences of phenomena.
10. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Sartre
Merleau-Ponty points out that Sartre tries to
explain every thing in the world with the help of
his dualism between the for-itself and the in-itself.
Though Sartre speaks of the concrete nature of experience,
this sharp dualism on which Sartre's ontology is based
is abstract and false, for in life, the for-itself and
the in-itself are intermixed. All our experiences are
affected by this internal relation between consciousness 
41and body. Against Merleau-Ponty, it can be pointed 
out that Sartre, although he analyzes the for-itself and
39 Sartre, B .N . , p. 13. 
4°Ibid. , p. 24. 
^^Sartre, I b i d ., p . 3.
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the in-itself separately, does not think of the separa­
tion as rigid. Man himself is an embodied consciousness, 
and Sartre wants to consider man as being-in-the-world.^^ 
Now it may be true that man's experiences are influenced 
by his nature as an embodied subject. But at the same 
time it cannot be denied that consciousness is not 
whollybody for it can overcome the influence of the body 
and establish new relations, taking into account the 
facticity of the body. Merleau-Ponty gives body too 
much importance, as a consequence of which, conscious­
ness lacks an independence of its own. In this respect, 
Sartre's point of view seems to be nearer 
to experience. Consciousness, Sartre would say, makes 
use of the body, though the body is the center through 
which consciousness can operate. The charge that Sartre 
is a rationalist of the Cartesian type (as he is inter­
preting all aspects of life with the help of an apriori 
dualistic ontology) is also false. Sartre does not 
accept "for-itself" and "in-itself" as Cartesian innate 
ideas; rather, he accepts them to be true, because these 
are revealed by our experience.
We have tried to establish that Sartre is a pheno- 
menologist, though he differs greatly from Husserl and
^^J.P. Sartre, Ibid., p. 3.
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Heidegger. At the same time he has accepted some of their 
basic ideas to develop a dynamic phenomenology of human 
reality. Though Sartre does not mention Husserl's 
Lebenswelt, he speaks of Heidegger's Being-in-the-world, 
and in the chapter 'Body' in Being and Nothingness, he 
speaks of the lived experience of the body in which 
consciousness lives the body. It appears certain that 
he agrees more with the mundane phenomenology of Husserl. 
Sartre's position can, perhaps, be more clearly understood, 
if we try to show the parallels between his phenomenology 
and another mundane phenomenology, that of Merleau-Ponty.
In contemporary philosophical studies, linguistic analysis 
is another philosophical method and perhaps, a study of 
contrast with that method can throw some light on Sartre's 
phenomenological method. In the concluding pages of this 
chapter, we will try to show how Sartre's method compares 
with that of Merleau-Ponty and Linguistic Philosophy.
11. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Linguistic Analysis
Merleau-Ponty follows the phenomenological tradi­
tion of Husserl's last phase. He was inspired very much 
by the publication of Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology in the new international 
magazine Philosophie (Belgrade) in 1936. He studied also 
Husserl's later unpublished manuscripts, to which he
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refers extensively in his second work. Phénoménologie 
de la Perception. Merleau-Ponty differs from Sartre 
in the fact that he rejects the letter's dualism between 
man and the "things" or between the free cogito and 
Being-in-itself. According to him, Sartre's phenomeno­
logy suppresses the world of perception in its unity.
He rejects Sartre's theory of hostility between the 
individuals, for he believes that the relations are not 
of those of head-on collisions between two consciousnesses, 
but the "dove-tailing into one another of two experiences 
which, without ever coinciding, stem from one and the 
same w o r l d . S a r t r e  accepts the Being-in-itself as 
something opaque, the meaning of which depends entirely 
on human freedom. Merleau-Ponty thinks that meaning is 
born in the interplay of the human subject and the 
objective world, with which the subject is inherently 
related. He speaks of a very intimate connection with 
which the body participates in the world. The objective 
world itself is indeterminate and ambiguous, but it 
assumes a meaning through the interaction between the 
subject and the world. In Sartre's thought, Being-in- 
itself being as it is, does not have the capacity to 
effect a meaning. Meaning, according to Sartre, would
43 H. Spiegelberg, Ibid. , p. 521.
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always be definite, while Merleau-Ponty would say, the 
world being indeterminate, the meaning that arises out 
of the joint co-operation between the subject and the 
object has always a tendency to be ambiguous. These 
are the differences between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, 
as revealed by the letter's criticism of Sartre, in 
Les Aventures de la dialectique and le Visible et 
L'invisible.
It can be pointed out against Merleau-Ponty that 
Sartre does not deny the role of the objective world in 
the determination of meaning. The human purpose creates 
a situation on the basis of the factually given. It 
is also true that the situation does not have a permanent 
meaning. Human freedom can have a new choice and under 
the influence of choice, the same fact or phenomenon 
can have a different meaning. Of course, it is true 
that Merleau-Ponty gives greater importance to the role 
of the indeterminate Being. He surely does not want to 
say that Being-in-itself alone will give rise to meaning. 
Nor does Sartre say that meanings are creations of human 
freedom, without any objective basis. Merleau-Ponty 
has given the objective world a more important place, 
though he speaks of the inseparability of the subject 
and object. Sartre, on the other hand, gives consciousness 
a more important place, though he, too, accepts the
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theory of Being-in-the-world. It is difficult to say 
which is really more important in the determination 
of meaning.
Merleau-Ponty gives an account of his phenomeno­
logical method in the preface to the Phénoménologie de 
la perception in which he uses the principles of Husserl 
in a rather novel way. He talks of phenomenological 
description, which for Husserl, meant a scientifically 
rigorous account of the phenomena. But it is understood 
by Merleau-Ponty to be a return to the Lebenswelt, the 
world as met in lived experience. But he refuses to 
trace back this life-world to its roots in the subject. 
By phenomenological reduction, Merleau-Ponty means the 
abandonment of the habitual ties and scientific pre­
judices. He thinks that such attitude will lead us to 
the spontaneity of the lived world. In his concept of 
eidetic reduction, he wants to show the living relations 
of experience that establish the reality of essences 
in their intrinsic connection with the existent fact. 
Merleau-Ponty broadens the concept of intentionality 
which makes all relations of the embodied subject to the 
world and other human beings intentional. Lastly, he 
denounces the phenomenology of subjectivity and establi­
shes in its place a phenomenology of the subject that 
is 'etre-au-monde' (Being-in-the-world) .
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If we contrast these basic ideas of Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology with those of Sartre, we find that there 
are some fundamental similarities. Both accept the idea 
of Being-in-the-world, though it may not be true to say 
that both got the idea from the same source. It is 
more likely that Sartre borrowed the idea of Being-in- 
the-world from Heidegger, who was influenced by Husserl. 
At least, Sartre mentions the name of Heidegger in 
connection with the concept of Being-in-the-world, while 
Merleau-Ponty refers to Husserl's Lebenswelt. Both 
accept Husserl's phenomenological description.
By its help, Merleau-Ponty wants to uncover the struc­
ture of the Lebenswelt. But it is not clear whether 
Sartre refers to the Lebenswelt. Of course, Sartre 
speaks of the description of the phenomena as they are 
given, but it is not clear whether the given are to 
be studied in the context of the presupposed natural 
world of the scientific belief. But in The Transcendence 
of the E g o , where Sartre rejects the transcendental ego, 
as it is not given in pre-reflective experience, it seems 
probable that he wants to accept only those that are 
immediately given, and not the scientific presupposi­
tions. Merleau-Ponty's concept of eidetic reduction is 
some sort of reversal of Husserl's eidetic reduction.
It manifests one of Sartre's basic ideas common with
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other existentialist thinkers, "Existence precedes
essence" . Sartre calls essence the principle of the
series of the phenomena which shows the essence as some-
45thing to be understood in terms of concrete experience. 
When Sartre speaks of consciousness striving towards the 
ultimate goal, it seems that he also is using inten­
tionality in a broad sense. His idea of consciousness is 
to be what it is not, of which it is conscious. These 
similarities between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are not 
intended to tone down the differences which have already 
been noted. Only it is to be remembered that Merleau- 
Ponty gives a systematic and definitive exposition of the 
new idea of phenomenology which both seem to accept.
But Sartre is more inclined to analyze the structures 
of consciousness, for even though consciousness is in 
the world, all experiences are present to the conscious­
ness .
Though Merleau-Ponty analyzed the principles of 
phenomenology, in his earlier books, he was not quite 
ready to establish an ontology. On the other hand, he 
was examining the traditional metaphysical assumptions 
to show whether they can be based on the phenomenology 
of perception of the subject who is in the world.
^^Sartre, Ibid., p. xlvi
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Whether all this subject-object participation leads to 
some Being which can be discovered through the pheno­
menological explorations is not very clear in the Ph^no- 
m Œnologie de la perception. In his unfinished work,
Le Visible et l'invisible, he reaches a theory of Being 
through his phenomenological investigations of the re­
versibility of tactual and visual perception. But 
though he gives us an idea of the subject-object Being, he 
never clarifies the differences between subject and 
object clearly, because, for him, there is a reversibi­
lity between the two. Sartre has, on the other hand, 
given a clear picture of the sjfcructure of the subject and 
the world, as Being-in-the-world.
It is really difficult to find a common meeting 
ground between Sartre and Linguistic philosophers, for 
linguistic philosophy believes that philosophical pro­
blems have their origin in misuse of words. But for 
Sartre, philosophical problems are far deeper. They 
cannot be dissolved just by pointing out the right use 
of words. Even when we are aware that ordinary language 
conceals the differences between the uses of words 
and we are shown the contextual distinctions, our philo­
sophical questioning is not satisfied. Sartre would 
rather say that philosophical problems are connected 
with the very absurd existence of man. Man is thrown
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into a world where his goals are always threatened with 
destruction. But the linguistic philosopher returns 
to the concrete uses of the words that are supposed to 
give rise to philosophical problems. Such a philosopher 
is not concerned with the abstract meanings, but the 
concrete situations of life in which the words are used.
An analysis of the concrete cases of the application of 
words resembles phenomenological description. Perhaps,' 
this has led Austin to claim in his A Plea for Excuses 
linguistic method as "Linguistic Phenomenology."
This love for the concrete and rejection of the abstract 
and unexamined presuppositions are some of the common 
features between linguistic philosophy and phenomeno­
logy. As Sartre belongs to the phenomenological group, 
he shares them in common with the linguistic philosophers.
But both Sartre's basic terms 'Being' and 'Nothing- 
ness' have been criticized by the linguistic philosophers.
Carnap and Ayer have criticized Heidegger's and Sartre's
46conceptions respectively. In spite of their criticism 
that terms like "Being" and "Nothing" represent uncon­
ventional uses of language, it remains a fact that Sartre 
is interested in the ontology of human existence, which 
is Being-within-the-world. As such, he wants to analyze
^®A.J. Ayer, Novelist-Philosophers in Horizon, 
x i i , p. 18.
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the structures of Being and the nature of Nothingness.
But Sartre also believes that language has an ambiguity 
which can generate philosophical problems. He likes, 
however, to see that the problems are traced back to the 
problem of existence and purpose, which create the 
ambiguity in the use of words.
We have, thus, tried to give an idea of Sartre's 
philosophical outlook regarding his method until the 
publication of Critique of Dialectical Reason. In the 
latter book, he is concerned with the role of man in 
society, which is more of a problem for social philo­
sophy than of ontology. The method which he follows there 
can be called "Existential dialectical method with a 
phenomenological concreteness." It is called by Sartre
"the method of totalization" or "the progressive-regress- 
47ive method." in our discussion we will be mainly 
be concerned with the phenomenological method as used 
in the earlier works, though we will try to show that 
the earlier method is an implicit framework of the later 
developments.
12. Remarks on Hermeneutics
We mentioned something about hermeneutical elements 
in Sartre's method earlier. In this section, we are trying 
to clarify the notion of hermeneutics as found in Dilthey
47 J.P. Sartre, Search for a Method (Trans. Hazel 
Barnes, Vintage, 1968), p.— 85.
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and Heidegger. Also, we want to see in what sense the 
notion can applied to Sartre's method.
Dilthey begins his hermeneutic method by a criticism 
of Schleirmacher. Schleirmacher thinks that the indivi­
dual is an embodiment of the eternity of God. Dilthey 
believes that the meaning of the individual is to be 
discovered in his activities. We can understand the
unity of life, as the unity of a work of art. The factors
which affect the character of human life may come as well 
from without as from within. The final unity crystalizes, 
through the development of life. Dilthey is interested 
in the relations between the inner life of the mind and 
its outward expression in a visible form. The inner 
unity of an individual's mind can be built on its outward 
expressions. All interpretation involves the understanding 
of the parts with reference to the whole and vice versa.
In understanding a literary work, we have to know the 
language of the work, the circumstances, the ideas, and 
the customs and the kind of society in which the artist 
thought and lived. But the literary work differs from a 
datum of natural science. In a work of art, we have to 
understand the relation between the expressions and the 
expressed. The meanings of words are specifically deter­
mined only by the context. The parts of a work of art
give us a preliminary sense of the whole, and the signi­
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ficance of the whole helps determine precisely the sense 
of the parts. Understanding then, proceeds to the crea­
tive mind; the particular work has to be seen in relation 
to the life, outlook, and circumstances of the author. In 
that case, the work appears no longer as a self-contained 
unit, but as one moment in the living process which is 
the history of art. Again, as understanding is not the 
work of logical reflection, it is free from the limitations 
of logical reflection and operates with the same creative 
imagination from which the literary work originally pro­
ceeded. It can relive factors which were not present 
to the explicit consciousness of the writer himself. As 
Dilthey points out, "... at the root of every poem is an 
idea; not, of course, a concept or set of propositions 
consciously held by the writer and deliberately embodied 
in his work, but a form of unity in experience, which his
creative imagination has brought without reflecting upon
48it and proceeds, still without reflection, to express."
"The idea (not as an abstract concept, but) in the sense 
of an unconscious system, active in the organization of 
the work and understood from its inner life is really 
present; a poet need not be or rather never will entirely 
be conscious of it; the interpreter elicits it, and
A OH.A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) p. 141,
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that is perhaps the highest triumph of hermeneutics."^®
Dilthey's idea of hermeneutics is clearly connected 
with his conception of lived experience. "Erlebnis 
denotes a part of the life-process ... which, teleologi- 
cally regarded has a unity by virtue of structural relations 
among its parts and especially the "presentness" of the 
earlier of them in the l a t t e r . A  compound lived 
experience cannot be apprehended as a whole without a 
conscious recognition that some part of what is appre­
hended, is not present. Even a simple lived experience 
may include some application of both of the past and 
of the future.
Heidegger's hermeneutics is concerned with the 
apprehension of Being. The given phenomena are studied 
in relation to what they conceal, for that which is hidden 
constitutes the meaning of what appears. The perfect 
understanding depends on the relation between the given 
and the uncovered truth about Being. In that respect, 
the true nature of man is given, not in so far as the 
life he lives, but in its openness to Being. Dilthey 
is more interested in discovering the unity of human life
49 Ibid. p. 142, 
S ° I b i d . p. 40.
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that is expressed through the different aspects of 
life. But he speaks also of the hidden idea that is not 
revealed to the creator of the work of art, but can be 
apprehended through reliving his lived experience through 
imagination. Thus, both Heidegger and Dilthey emphasize 
on the purpose of the life which is not always clear, but 
which is to be understood through the given phenomena. 
Dilthey uses the word "phenomenology" in his own sense 
which he calls "reflections on the self" in order to 
understand the unity of purpose in life. Heidegger 
uses "Husserl's phenomenological description," but he 
is not limited to mere description. Rather the descrip­
tion is subordinate to interpretation, for the phenomena 
point to a hidden truth which cannot be understood with­
out a hermeneutic method.
Sartre does not speak of any revelation of Being 
in Heidegger's sense. But his studies in Emotion and 
Existential Psycho-analysis point out that any action of 
the individual is to realize a project. Many such pro­
jects are constituted in a hierarchial order in relation 
to the ultimate project, which gives unity to the whole 
life. Sartre does not say that the ultimate project is 
totally hidden from us, but he could say that we do not 
have a clear consciousness of it. So, it is to be 
grasped from a study of the individual projects which.
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again, can be understood better in relation to the 
fundamental project. What are expressions to Dilthey is 
the individual project to Sartre, and the unity of the 
expressions is equal to the ultimate project. As in 
Heidegger, the phenomena indicate the way to Being which 
can be phenomenologically studied, the particular p r o ­
jects lead us to the ultimate project. Perhaps, in 
this sense, we can talk of hermeneutic method in Sartre.
CHAPTER 2 
SARTRE'S BASIC NOTIONS
1. The Order of Investigation and the Main Question
Sartre develops his ontology through phenomenological 
investigations, as we have tried to show in the last chapter. 
His ontology gets a definite shape in Being and Nothingness. 
But the concepts he finally arrives at in this book have 
already been indicated in the earlier works.
We think that Sartre's basic conception is "Being-in- 
the-world." Man as an existential being finds himself in 
the world. In this respect, his Transcendence of the ego 
and Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions are more important 
for us from the point of view of ontological understand­
ing, than his Imagination works. It is in these two first 
mentioned books that Sartre emphasizes the idea that con­
sciousness is in the world. If the ego is to be found any­
where, it is to be discovered in the world and not in the 
hidden transcendental center of consciousness. The book 
on Emotion also emphasizes the idea that consciousness 
wants to realize a project in the concrete situations of 
the world. But in Being and Nothingness, Sartre tries to
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understand Being-in-the-world (as it seems to us) with re­
ference to the different aspects of Being. The question 
may arise here: are Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself 
two aspects of Being, or are they two different regions of 
Being, or are they two different kinds of Being? We will 
try to answer these questions in the concluding section 
of this chapter. Though Sartre discusses them separately, 
giving the impression that they are ultimately separate, 
he does not in fact think them to be so. His main concern 
is to show how consciousness and the world can be really 
related to each other. This is the question which he 
raises at the end of the introduction to Being and Nothing­
ness . Gilbert Varet in his L'ontologie de Sartre points 
out, "Ainsi, 1'etre-en-soi et 1'être-pour-soi ne sont plus 
coupes l'un de l'autre. Ils ne le sont pa davantage que 
le phênomenone et la chose? en réalité", ils sont consternent 
corrélatifs, l'un étant la dimension de transcendance de 
1'autre." (p.21)
The questions about the relation between the two 
modes of Being are the most important ones in Sartre's 
whole philosophy. Consciousness may be related to the 
world, yet consciousness lacks the properties of Being- 
in-itself. So, consciousness is existentially separate 
from the world, though consciousness has a relation with
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the world. This existential separation gives rise to two 
different regions of Being, and the efforts of Sartre are 
directed to reach an existential harmony that would 
establish that both are included in Being-in-the-world. 
Sartre's ontology is existentially oriented, and the 
ontological question can not be studied apart from the 
existential problem. It should be pointed out that 
Sartre's Being and Nothingness can be better called an 
existential ontology than a phenomenological ontology; for 
though phenomenological investigations have prepared the 
way for Sartre's ontological theories, the latter are 
established as existential structures. Existentially, 
consciousness and the world are separate. So they, though 
being related to each other in concrete reality, are thought 
as two ontological regions, in spite of the fact that 
there is a living unity between them. Their ontological 
unity can be understood only when it is realized that 
behind their existential estrangement they have a living 
bond. Sartre's existential concern has not led him in 
that direction, even though he understands the real, 
intimate conection of consciousness with the world. Thus, 
though Being-in-the-world is, for Sartre, the point from 
which he starts, he erects an ontological structure on 
the existential experience of consciousness and the 
world. He develops an ontology of Being-for-itself and
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Being-in-itself. If we have to understand Sartre's 
ontology, we have to see how these two basic concepts 
are arrived at by him. It is not necessary to mention 
that these concepts are established by phenomenological 
investigations of the existential structures. In giving 
an exposition of these concepts, we will be mainly con­
cerned with Sartre's treatment in the introduction to 
Being and Nothingness, though occasionally we will make 
references to the earlier phemenological studies, where 
some of the ideas related to the basic notions had 
their rudimentary formations. We have tried to discuss 
whether the criticism that he has grafted a preconceived 
ontology on phenomenological analysis is valid. We have 
also tried to show that Sartre's ideas are phenomeno­
logically based. This was one of the main tasks that 
we preformed in the first chapter. But if we forget 
that these phenomenological studies emanate from an 
existential basis, many of the notions of Sartre may 
appear to be empty. It will be our main task in this 
chapter to show that it is Sartre's existential pheno­
menology and not some preconceived theory which has 
given rise to his ontology. Another thing we shall try 
to point out is that Sartre's dualism has to be under­
stood with reference to his basic concept of Being-in- 
the-world, which is the more fundamental entity, while 
the dualistic concepts are mere abstractions, if we
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forget their relation to the ultimate notion of Being- 
i n - the-wor1 d .
2. Rejection of the traditional dualism
Before establishing consciousness and objects as 
the two ontological realms, Sartre is examining the dif­
ferent types of dualism held in philosophy. He wants to 
determine whether all of these dualisms can be reduced to 
one fundamental type.
Sartre says that modern thought has tried to reduce 
existence to a series of appearances that manifest it.
The aim has been to replace a certain number of dualisms 
"by the monism of phenomenon."^ The question arises: Has 
the attempt been successful? The dualism between the inter­
ior and the exterior of the object is, of course, eliminated, 
for "the appearances which manifest the existence are 
neither interior nor exterior: they are all equal, they 
all refer to other appearances and none of them is privileged." 
Force was previously supposed to be a metaphysical entity 
behind its effects. But actually, it is the totality of 
effects. An electric current is "nothing but the unity of 
the physical-chemical actions which manifest it. It is 
true that one of the actions alone does not sufficiently
^B . N . , p.xiv 
2Ibid., p.xlv
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reveal it. But it refers to the total series of actions
3and nothing behind them."
Thus, the dualism between appearance and being no 
longer holds logical status within philosophy. Appearance 
refers to the total series of appearances, and not to a 
hidden reality. For so long, appearance was thought to be 
illusion and error or rather something which is not. But 
once we reject the idea of being-behind-the-appearances, 
appearances become full positively, and being is measured 
in terms of appearances. The being of an existent is 
exactly what it appears to be. Thus, we arrive at the 
conception of the phenomenon such as is found in the 
"phenomenology" of Husserl or Heidegger. The phenomenon 
is relative-absolute - relative because it appears to some­
body and absolute because it reveals itself, as it is.
After rejecting the dualism between being and appear­
ances, Sartre proceeds to show the problems that occur if 
we accept the dualism between potency and act. Act is 
everything, as for example, the genius of Proust is "the
work, considered as the totality of the manifestations of 
4
the person. Similarly, the dualism of appearance and 
essence can be rejected. Essence is not something that is 
hidden in the existent; it is the manifest law which
^I b i d ., p.xivi 
4I b i d ., p.xivi
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presides over the succession of the appearances. Though 
essence is nothing apart from the appearances, essence is 
not just an appearance. It is the principle of the series 
and as such the 'concatenation of the series'. Essence 
being something manifested in the appearances, it is 
possible to have an intuition of essences. Thus, Phenomen­
ology is different from Nominalism, as it accepts essence,
but essence being, "nothing but the well-connected series
5
of its manifestation," rejects the dualism between essence 
and appearance. Even though Sartre speaks here of the in­
tuition of essence, it is certain that he does not mean by 
it Husserlian rational or pure intuition of essence. What 
he means is this, that in perception we are given the 
particulars, or the appearances, which reveal to us 
directly the nature of what is given in perception. If 
Sartre means the rational perception of essence, he has 
to say that essences have a different sort of being. That 
means essence has no relevant connection with existence.
From this, perhaps, an opposite conclusion other than that 
which is accepted by Sartre can be drawn, such as, "Essence 
is prior to existence." Sartre understands essence to be 
the principle of the series of the appearances. Now, appear­
ances are known by perception. If essence is known by some­
thing else, it becomes more important than appearances.
^Ibid., p.xivi
56
It may then, be thought that essence determines the appear­
ances. But Sartre wants to establish that appearances in 
their unity constitute essence.
3. Dualism of the finite and the infinite
Though the dualisms - dualisms between being and
appearance, potency and act, and essence and appearance -
are rejected, a new dualism appears. It is that of "finite 
6and infinite." It is not possible to reduce the existent 
to a number of finite series of manifestations, since the 
existent can have constantly changing relations with the 
subject. There can be an infinite number of Abschattungen. 
Sartre understands by phenomenon Abschattung. As he says, 
"Let us assume that our theory of the phenomenon has re­
placed the reality of the thing by the objectivity of the
phenomenon and that it has based this on an appeal to 
7infinity." The object is real and is not in me. This
means that the series of the appearances is bound up by
a principle and has nothing to do with me. The appearances
8without reference to the "series of which it was a part" 
would be a subjective feeling. The phenomenon reveals 
something transcendent, and the subject himself transcends
^ Ibid., p.xlvii




appearance toward the total series. He may have an impres­
sion of red, but through it he seizes Red as something real. 
If the object is transcendent and causes the appearances 
which are to be transcended always to grasp the object, the 
series of the appearance would be infinite. Appearances 
are infinite in number but are to be understood, "as
9an appearance of that which appears." These indicate an 
infinite series.
What thus appears is an aspect of the object, and 
the object, though present in that aspect, is also outside 
of it. It is within the appearance, as it manifests itself 
in that aspect; but it is also outside, for the series of 
the appearances can never be exhausted. This inexhausti­
bility implies a transcendence and a reference to the in­
finite. This new dualism, between the 'finite and the 
10infinite,' replaces the dualism of being and appearance.
Sartre now raises a new problem: if the essence 
of the appearance is an "appearing," which is no longer 
opposed to any being, there arises a legitimate problem 
concerning the being of appearing.
Let us try to see if this idea of the object as an 





and Nothingness. Actually, this is found much earlier
in the Psychology of Imagination, where Sartre is examining
the nature of images. He says that both in perception and
in image, "the object presents itself in profiles, in
projections, in what the Germans designate by the apt
12term, 'Abschattungen.'" In the world of perception every 
"thing" bears an infinite number of relationships. There 
is always, at each and every moment, infinitely more 
than what we see. The wealth of my actual perception 
cannot be exhausted, for that would require an infinite 
time. In the Psychology of Imagination, Sartre is mainly 
concerned with the phenomenological principles of Husserl 
which he is applying to the understanding of images. The 
ideas of object add appearances he presents there are 
similiar to those of Husserl, though Sartre does not 
accept Husserl's positing of noematic correlates as 
intermediate entities.
4. Dualism of the being and phenomenon
The first ontological question that is raised by 
Sartre is: what is the being of the appearance? 1^ is 
clear that the phenomenon is what manifests itself, and 
as being manifests itself to all in some way, there must
^^Psychology of Imagination, p . 10
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be a phenomenon of being, which can be described as such. 
Being is disclosed to us in some experiences such as 
boredom, nausea, etc., and ontology will be a description 
of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself. But 
is the being which appears of the same nature as the 
being of the existents which appear? Husserl speaks of 
the concrete phenomenon from which it is possible to 
pass towards the essence of the phenomenon. Heidegger 
also speaks of the ontic phenomenon of human reality 
from which it is possible to pass towards ontological 
B e i n g . In both cases, the passage is from the homogeneous. 
But the passage from the existent to the phenomenon of being 
is not the same as the passage beyond the particular towards 
its essence.
In a particular object one can always apprehend 
qualities, and they imply an essence as their meaning.
The essence is the meaning of the object, the principle 
of the series of appearances which disclose it. But 
being is neither one of the object's qualities, nor is 
it a meaning of the object. The object does not refer to 
being as to a signification, nor does it posses being, 
nor is its existence a participation in being. The object 
is. It does not hide being, for it is useless to push 
aside certain qualities of the existent to discover 
being behind them, for being belongs to them equally.
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The object does not reveal being, for we do not apprehend 
being, while we see an object. The existent is a pheno­
menon, and it expresses itself in an organized totality 
of qualities. It does not designate being, for being 
is simply the condition of all qualities. When an object 
reveals itself to me as a phenomenon, I can surely 
pass beyond the phenomenon and raise the question of the 
being of the phenomenon. In that stage, we concentrate 
on the phenomenon of being, but that is also as appear­
ance and needs in turn a being on the basis of which.it 
can reveal itself.
This analysis shows that the being of the pheno­
menon is not resolved in a phenomenon of being, but we 
cannot say anything about being without considering 
the phenomenon of being. For this reason, the exact 
relation between the phenomenon of being and the being 
of the phenomenon must be determined first. Sartre 
comes to the conclusion that knowledge can not give an 
account of being; that is, it is not possible to reduce 
the being of the phenomenon to the phenomenon of being.
The previous discussions show that the being of the pheno­
menon is co-extensive with the phenomenon, but it is not 
subject to phenomenal conditions. The phenomenon of being 
makes an appeal to being and it requires a foundation 
which is transphenomenal. Thus, "it surpasses the know­
ledge which we have of it and provides the basis for
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13such knowledge."
5. Attempt to reduce being to percipi and perclpere
It may be pointed out that all we know about the 
being of the appearance is that it appears. We have know­
ledge of the phenomena only and we can only say that the 
phenomena are those that appear. So, if appearance has any 
being at all, it must consist in appearing. This, in fact, 
is nothing but the new formulation of the old Berkeyian 
thesis that "esse est percipi." Sartre thinks that Husserl 
is guilty of idealism, because of phenomenological reduction. 
He has robbed us of the reality of things, and the noema 
being phenomenon does not possess the reality of things.
As the phenomena consist in appearing to the subject, their 
esse is percipi. But the being of the phenomenon can­
not be reduced to the nature of percipi, and to prove his 
point, Sartre offers two reasons, one which concerns the 
percipi, the other percipere.
Idealism may be intent on reducing being to knowledge, 
but the knowledge itself must have some kind of being. If 
it is said that the knowledge is given and that it is not 
necessary to establish a basis for its being, then the 
"totality percieved-perception" lacks a relation to being 
and is reduced to nothingness. The being of knowledge can­
13B.N., p .1
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not be reduced to percipi. So, the being of the percipiere 
and percipi must be transphenomenal. It can be said that 
the percipi refers to a being that is not subject to the 
laws of appearance, but it may still be held that such 
a being is the being of the subject. Thus what is known 
refers to knowledge and knowledge to the knower or con­
sciousness. This consciousness, according to Husserl,
"is the dimension of transphenomenal being in the subject. 
But consciousness is the knowing being in the capacity as 
being. It is true that consciousness can know and know 
itself. But it is itself something with a being other than 
knowledge turned upon itself.
In his lecture before the Société^ Français de philo­
sophie, Conscience de Soi et Connaissance de Soi, Sartre 
considers the same question in the following terms. It 
may be said that knowledge is the measure of being, but 
knowledge itself is. So, the question arises: what is 
the being of knowledge? But if being is reduced to know­
ledge, or if it is said that the"totality of things which 
are said to be or exist are dissolved into the totality of 
intellectual operations which we perform in order to know 
them or to bind them together, it is to presume without
l^ibid., p.li
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saying it that there is a being of knowledge.
6. Intentionality
As Husserl has shown, "all consciousness is con­
sciousness of something." Every consciousness posits 
a transcendent object. Thus, all consciousness is posi­
tional in that it transcends itself in order to reach 
an object. All the intentions of consciousness are direc­
ted outside itself. If there is anything as knowing 
consciousness, it can be knowledge only of the object.
But for knowledge to be possible, every consciousness 
must be conscious of itself as being that knowledge.
If consciousness of the table is not also a consciousness 
of being conscious of the consciousness of the table, 
then it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself.
The fact of being conscious of being conscious of the 
table makes it possible for me to be conscious of the 
table.
This consciousness of consciousness is not a know­
ledge of consciousness. Knowledge of the consciousness 
of consciousness would be a case of positional conscious­
ness of consciousness, just like the positional conscious­
ness directed towards an object. Only in this case, in­
stead of an object, consciousness itself is the object.
^^J.P. Sartre, Conscience de soi et connassaince
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Consciousness posits an object which it is not, and it 
transcends itself to be exhausted in the object toward 
which it is directed. When consciousness knows con­
sciousness, or if consciousness of consciousness is 
knowledge of consciousness, consciousness becomes the 
object of consciousness.
But Sartre does not accept the interpretation 
of consciousness of consciousness as knowledge of 
consciousness. If consciousness is reduced to knowledge, 
the subject-object distinction which is typical of 
knowledge enters into it. Then the knower-known dyad 
is introduced, and the knower is to be known by a 
third term. Thus, a dilemma arises:
"Either we stop at any one term of the 
series - the known, the knower known, 
the knower known by the knower, etc.
In this case the totality of the p he­
nomenon falls into the unknown; that is, 
we always bump up against a non-self- 
conscious reflection and a final term.
Or else we affirm the necessity of an 
infinite regress (idea ideae ideae, etc.), 
which is absurd."16
But consciousness of self does not have this duality.
There is an "immediate, non-cognitive relation of the
self to itself.
de soi, trans. by Mary Ellen and N. Lawrence in 
Readings in Existential Phenomenology, edited by 
Lawrence and O'Connor, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 120,
l ^ Ibid. , p. liii.
17 Ibid., p . l iii.
65
7. Two Levels of Consciousness
This consciousness is termed by Sartre the non- 
positional consciousness of itself. In the case of 
counting the cigarettes in a case, consciousness discloses 
an objective property of the cigarettes, such as they 
are a dozen. I do not have a positional consciousness 
of counting them. But at the moment the cigarettes 
are known as a dozen, I have a non-positional con­
sciousness of counting the cigarettes. This conscious­
ness is known by reflective consciousness, but it is 
not the reflection which reveals consciousness reflected- 
on to itself. On the other hand, the non-positional 
consciousness which is also non-reflective makes the 
reflection possible. Sartre calls the reflective con­
sciousness the same as the Cartesian ego, and the Car­
tesian ego is possible by the pre-reflective cognito.
This pre-reflective consciousness must be present to 
itself as something that is revealed in revealing.
This leads Sartre to the idea that every con­
sciousness of consciousness is a consciousness of exis­
ting, for in it consciousness does not know anything, 
but exists as a consciousness. Thus this conscious­
ness is not different from positional consciousness; 
rather at the same time, it is perception of object 
and consciousness (of) perception. Consciousness of 
self may be used to indicate this type of consciousness.
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but such consciousness does not mean knowledge. It
only means consciousness as existing which is present
in the case of consciousness of something.
It is not necessary to say that this idea of
consciousness has been established by Sartre in his
Transcendence of the Ego. Consciousness is pre-reflec-
tive in the stage of consciousness of consciousness.
As he points out,
"There is consciousness of the street- 
car-having-to-be-overtaken, etc. and 
non-positional consciousness of con­
sciousness . " 18
Sartre denies that this non-thetic consciousness is 
a quality of consciousness which is positional. In 
that case, consciousness as knowledge would be more 
fundamental. Moreover, that would make the psychic 
event a thing of which consciousness is a quality. In 
fact, pleasure and consciousness of pleasure are in­
dissoluble. Consciousness (of) pleasure constitutes 
pleasure. There cannot be any pleasure before conscious­
ness of pleasure. Again, pleasure should not be de­
fined by consciousness which we have of it. This would 
lead to idealism in which, again, the primacy of 
knowledge would be asserted. There is not first a
l^T.E., p. 49.
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consciousness which afterwards receives the 'affect'
pleasure. Pleasure and consciousness constitute an
indissoluble being, and that being is existence. As
Sartre makes the statement, "Pleasure is the being of
self-consciousness and this self-consciousness is the
19law of being of pleasure." Sartre refers to Heidegger 
and points out that consciousness creates and establishes 
its essence through its own possibility, because it 
is conceived in terms of its existence.
This points out the fact that consciousness has 
a being the existence of which implies its essence.
It is not that consciousness has its existence deduced 
from an abstract possibility. Consciousness does not 
owe its being to any other thing, but to itself. If 
we have to limit consciousness, this has also to be 
done by consciousness; for consciousness to be limited, 
it is necessary to be consciousness of that by which 
it is limited. Consciousness being a "plenum" of exis­
tence, this determination of consciousness by itself is 
an essential characteristic of consciousness. Conscious­
ness is derived only from itself. If it is said that 
consciousness comes from something else, this can only 
mean that consciousness can be derived from the physio-
19 B . N . , p. Iv
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logical state or from the unconscious. The difficulty 
which, then,arises is this; that the physiological 
state or unconscious being passive can not explain its 
own existence and so, it remains inexplicable how 
something passive can produce consciousness which is 
completely opposed to passive object.
Sartre considers consciousness as an absolute, 
but not a substantial absolute. The rationalists of 
the seventeenth century like Descartes and Spinoza 
thought consciousness to be a substance that acted as 
the ground of knowledge. But Sartre considers con­
sciousness as the subject of most concrete experiences. 
But the subject is experience itself, not something 
which is subordinate to the non-experiencing subject.
So, consciousness is a non-substantial absolute. The 
seventeenth century rationalists could not see that 
the absolute is to be defined by the primacy of existence 
over essence. Spinoza's notion of substance proceeds 
by the definition that the essence of substance is to 
exist. Whatever does not satisfy the essence of sub­
stance as independence does not exist. According to 
Sartre, consciousness exists to the degree to which it 
appears and so consciousness is appearance. As con­
sciousness has in it the total identity between appear­
ance and existence, it can be considered as absolute.
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Sartre thinks, that he has reached the goal of 
his inquiry. First, he has reduced things to the united 
totality of their appearances. Second, it has also been 
established that the appearances refer to a being which 
is no longer itself an appearance. Sartre calls such 
a being subjectivity, which is not subject to knowledge, 
but which founds knowledge. But Sartre asks now: Is
consciousness sufficient to provide the foundation for 
the appearance as appearance?
8. Being of Consciousness 
and Being of the Perceived
As there is a being of the consciousness that 
perceives, similarly, there is a being of the thing 
perceived. I may try to reduce the table which I per­
ceive to a series of subjective impressions, but still 
there remains something which is the "transcendent limit" 
of the synthesis, which is the reason for the table.
The table exists prior to knowledge and cannot be iden­
tified with the knowledge of the table, for then, there 
would be its immanence in consciousness and it would 
disappear as a table. The table cannot be identical 
with the synthesis of subjective impressions with which 
I know the table. The object cannot be a synthetic 
activity of the mind. The known thus cannot be reabsorbed
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into the knowing. It has a being of its own. As the
table cannot be reduced to a series of impressions or
representations, similarly, "... the being of the percipi
cannot be reduced to that of the percipiens - i.e.
20to consciousness." Of course, the being of the percipi 
is relative to the percipiens, in the sense that the 
percipi can be manifested only to a perceiver.
The mode of the percipi is passive. It is not 
only passive, but also relative. Passivity implies the 
state of being modified, of which the thing itself is 
not the origin. I am passive, when I am affected by 
something of which I am not the source. But to sup­
port this mode of being, I have to exist and to remain 
active. "If I am to be for always 'the-one-who-has- 
been-offended,' I must persevere in my being; that is,
I myself assume my existence. I cease to be passive
21in relation to it." Here is a choice of alternatives 
- either I am not passive, in which case I have to be 
the foundation of my affections, or my being is a received 
being, and it falls into nothingness. Passivity is thus 
a double relation, relative to the "activity of the one
2°l b i d . , p. Iviii 
Z^I bid. , p. Iviii
71
2 2who acts and to the existence of the one who suffers."
It is a relation of one being to another. Thus it is
not possible that "the percipere affects the perceptum
of a being, for in order for the perceptum to be affected,
it would of necessity have to be already given in some
23way and exist before having received being." We can 
understand a type of creation in which the created being 
tears itself away from the creator to assume its own 
existence; it is in this sense that a book has a dis­
tinct existence from its author. If, on the other hand, 
creation means an indefinite support of the created being, 
then the creature is absorbed in the creator. There is
no true transcendence, and "the creator cannot have an
24illusion of getting out of his subjectivity."
The passivity of the recipient, at the same time, 
demands an equal passivity on the part of the agent.
This is known as the principle of action and reaction, 
for my hand can crush or grasp, because it can be 
crushed or grasped. All knowledge is spontaneity.
Nothing can act on consciousness, because nothing can 
get a grip on it. If the principle Esse est percipi
22 I b i d ., p. Iviii 
Z^I bid., p. Iviii 
^'^Ibid. , p. Iviii
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is to be accepted as correct, then it has to give being 
to some transcendent object, which because of its depen­
dence on consciousness becomes nothing, and at the same 
time, it has to maintain its state of nothingness.
Husserl has introduced the hyle into consciousness, 
which is supposed to be passive. But these so-called 
contents of consciousness remain unintelligible. These 
could not belong to consciousness, for then they would 
disappear in the translucency of consciousness. If 
these do not belong to consciousness, from where do they 
derive their opacity? It is not clear how hyle preserves 
the opacity of its nature, and subjectivity of thought.
Its ease cannot come from a percipi, since it is not 
even perceived, for consciousness goes beyond it toward 
the objects. But if it is self-derived, we have the 
insoluble^problem of the connection of existents inde­
pendent of it. Husserl gives hyle both the characteristics 
of a thing and consciousness, and in doing so, he thought 
he had an easy transition from one to the other. But
what resulted is a hybrid being, "which consciousness
25rejects and which cannot be a part of the world."
25lbid., p. lix
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9. Transparency of Consciousness
Here Sartre's idea of consciousness is the same 
as what he had established in Transcendence of the E g o .
For him, consciousness is mere revelation and is pure 
spontaneity. It has nothing in itself, for it is not 
a substratum. It cannot have any '.opacity in it, for ' 
there is no transcendental ego in consciousness; nor 
can there exist in consciousness noematic representa­
tions, which are not conscious, yet at the same time 
seem to be bound up with consciousness. This unholy 
combination is something absurd, for consciousness wholly 
transcends toward the things. Sartre has expressed this 
idea of consciousness very poetically in Situations I 
where he says,
"Du même coup la conscience s'est puri­
fiée, elle est claire comme grand v e n t , 
il n'ya plus rien en elle, sauf un mouve­
ment pour se fuir, un glissement horse 
de soi; si, par impossible, vous entriez 
"dans" une conscience, vous seriez saisi 
par un tourbillion et rejeté au dehors, 
près de l'arbre, en pleine poussier 
car la conscience n'a pas de "dedans ;" 
elle n'est rien que le dehors d'elle-meme 
et c'est cette fuite absolue, ce refus 
d'être substance qui la constiuent comme 
une conscience."
The percipi implies that the perceptum has a relative 
being. Is the being of the thing known relative to know­
^^J.P. Sartre, Situations, Vol. I, Gallimard, Paris,
1947, p. 31-32.
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ledge? Relativity, of being means that the existent 
has its own being in something other than itself. The 
perceived being is relative to consciousness. But con­
sciousness and the thing perceived are cut off from each 
other. To be perceived, a thing has to stand in relation 
to consciousness. But the b e i n g  of the perceived is 
separated from consciousness.
These determinations of relativity and passity 
do not apply to being. The being of a phenomenon does 
not consist in its being perceived. The transphenomenal 
being of consciousness cannot provide for the trans­
phenomenal being of the phenomena. Or in other words, 
the being of consciousness is not the same as that of 
the being of the phenomenon. The phenomenalists are 
mistaken when they identify the being of the object 
with the succession of the connected series of the 
appearances.
The being of the phenomenon is understood in 
terms of an "ontological proof," which is derived from 
the pre-reflective being of the percipiens.
10. Ontological Argument - A Version of 
Intentionality
Sartre takes Husserl's principle of intentionality 
that all consciousness is consciousness of something and
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he understands it to mean either that consciousness is
27constitutive "of the being of its object," or that 
consciousness is relative to a transcendent being.
Sartre does not accept the first sense because the ob­
ject which appears in phenomena has a being of its own.
He accepts the view that "to be consciousness of some­
thing is to be confronted with a concrete and full
2 8presence which is not consciousness." The being of 
the phenomenon can, however, depend on consciousness, 
as being distinguished from consciousness, by not 
being consciousness. The object can be understood as 
an infinite series of negations of consciousness. In­
finite totality of the series of appearances constitutes 
the object, for the being of the appearances is differ­
ent from consciousness which has to go beyond its subjec­
tive appearance to be confronted with the object. When 
consciousness intends its object, it is directed towards 
this infinity of appearances, all of which are not given 
at the same time. The impressions of an object, if 
all of them were present before consciousness, may make 
one think that they are subjective. There are impressions 
which are absent, and it is these absent impressions which
, p. Ix.
O Q
I b i d ., p . I x . 
^^Ibid., p . Ix.
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have an objective being, because of the absence. Thus
the being of the object is pure non-being or a lack.
It is never given as a whole, but as that which escapes
consciousness and is offered only in "fleeting and sue-
2 Qcessive profiles."
But if this interpretation is accepted, then non-
being becomes the foundation of being. It is true that
things are given in profiles, or by appearance, each of
which refers to the other appearances, whether present
or absent. If this is all that we have of the object,
we have to remain confined to appearance. This infinite
series of appearances may be a transcendence, but that
is "a transcendence in immanence." Actually, each of
the appearances is already in itself alone a transcendent
30being, "not a subjective material of impressions."
"It is a plenitude of being, not a lack, a presence,
31not an absence." Sartre is repeating here the same
assertion which he has made earlier that "the objective
will never come out of the subjective, nor the transcen-





Husserl makes consciousness transcendent, he makes of 
the noema an unreal correlate of the hoesis, a noema 
whose being is to be perceived, and thus he becomes un­
faithful to his principle.
Intentionality consists of the character of the 
transcendence of consciousness. For Sartre, inten­
tionality and transcendence are same, and transcendence 
is the "constitutive character of consciousness." Con­
sciousness always refers to something which is not it­
self. There cannot be any consciousness without refer­
ence to a real being. Sartre calls this characteristic 
of consciousness his ontological proof, though we will 
point out later that this has very little to do with 
the classical ontological proof. Consciousness demands 
that there be something of which it is conscious. Though 
the demand itself does not imply that it ought to be 
satisfied, this is what intentionality actually means. 
Though Husserl misunderstood the nature of consciousness, 
he realized that
"for consciousness there is no being 
outside of that precise obligation to 
be a revealing intuition of something,
i.e., of a transcendent being."
There can be pure subjectivity, when consciousness is 
(of) consciousness. But for consciousness (of) conscious­
ness to be possible, there must be consciousness as a
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revealing intuition of something; otherwise it is nothing. 
The revealing intuition points out that there must be 
something which is revealed. The subjectivity of con­
sciousness can have meaning only, "in the face of some-
O Othing revealed." Sartre does not establish the being 
of object against consciousness as a case of knowing.
He does not show like Kant that "the phenomena of inner 
sense imply the existence of spatial p h e n o m e n a b u t  
that the being of consciousness implies in its being "a 
non-conscious and transphenomenal b e i n g . F o r  Sartre, 
this is not an epistemological problem, but rather an 
ontological conclusion. When it is said that conscious­
ness is consciousness of something, what is meant is 
that it is a revealed-revelation of a being which is not 
it and which is already existing, when it is revealed 
by consciousness.
Thus, Sartre reaches the reality of both conscious­
ness and being, which are different in character. Con­
sciousness does not have any established essence, but 
it realizes its essence. On the other hand, being is 
already something with an essence, which suggests that
S^ ibid. , p. Ixi. 
^ ^ Ibid. , p. Ixi. 
^ ^ Ibid. , p. Ixi.
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because there is a being, there will be such and such 
phenomena. Being is something that is the condition of 
phenomena, each of which lays claim to existence. In 
the case of consciousness, it is found that it is a 
Dasein whose being is not definite, but is always going 
beyond what it is or its being is always in question. 
Sartre gives a definition of consciousness which retains 
this indefinite character of consciousness. "Conscious­
ness is a being such that in its being, its being is in 
question insofar as this being implies a being other than 
itself."36
This being which consciousness implies is the 
transphenomenal being of phenomena. It is the being of 
the whole world which transcends the appearances and 
exists in itself and for itself.
Sartre's ontological argument has often been the 
object of attack by critics, because he has made no real 
use of the classical argument. The classical argument 
seeks to establish the existence of God on the basis of 
the inconceivability of the non-existence of the being 
greater than which nothing can be conceived. Sartre's 
problem is not the existence of God, but the existence 
of a being other than consciousness. If it were just 
an epistemological problem, then he could have said that
36 I b i d . , p . Ixi.
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consciousness of an object implies that there is something 
other than consciousness; otherwise consciousness cannot 
strictly be called knowing. Now, that something is known 
does not imply the independent existence of that which 
is known. It may be that what is known is dependent for 
its being on consciousness, even though in the case of 
knowing, it appears to be different from consciousness.
In that case, Kant's intuition of inner phenomena can 
only imply that unless phenomena are experienced to be 
in outer space, we cannot have any experience of subjective 
impressions. Though experience of things in outer space 
is a necessary proof of things actually being in the 
outside world, it is not a sufficient proof. It is' 
also not always clear from Kant whether he means that 
things exist in space or that things are perceived to be 
so. Sartre wants to show that things are not only known 
to be existing, but that they are actually independent of 
consciousness. For this reason he needs the ontological 
argument which can establish that inconceivability of the 
non-existence of a thing other than consciousness, for 
consciousness cannot come into being unless there is al­
ready something pre-existing. The parallels between the 
ontological argument of St. Anselm and Sartre are neither 
very clear nor very close, but not unimportant. Sartre 
founds the being of object on something other than conscious-
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n e s s / as it is difficult to cut the circle of subjectivity 
in consciousness. He has to establish the being of the 
object on the basis of the inconceivability of the non-ex­
istence of à being other than consciousness.
It may be pointed out against Sartre that by doing 
away with noema, he is making the complex phenomenon of 
knowledge simple. Actually Sartre does not find the neces­
sity of a third entity between the Abschantungen of the 
object and consciousness. The object is nothing but an 
infinite totality of the series of Abs chantungen, as pointed 
out by Sartre in Introduction to Being and Nothingness. If 
anybody likes, he can call them noema, for, to Sartre, it 
seems that noema and Abschantungen are the same. Husserl 
had to accept the noema as distinct from the object, because 
he had bracketed the reality of the world. In Husserl's 
thought Abschantungen are the various perspectives of the 
noematic correlate which constitute the noematic unity.
But the object is the phenomenological object; it may be 
the same as the object before the e p o c h ^  or it may not be 
the same. The question does not arise for Husserl, for he 
is not concerned with the real existence of the object.
In the case of Sartre, the appearances are the real aspects 
of the object. The infinite synthesis of the aspects of 
the object gives rise to the real object. He thinks that 
consciousness being in immediate touch with objective reality.
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the status of noematic correlates which are neither 
states of consciousness nor parts of the object, remains 
a problem. Sartre believes that consciousness is ac ­
quainted with the perspectival aspects of the object.
But this idea raises the problem: which aspects of the
infinite series of appearances constitute what we 
ordinarily call real object, because the real object 
which we experience is a finite-infinite series of the 
totality of the aspects. Sartre is silent on the p ro­
blem, perhaps, because he is not interested in the epis­
temological question. But Merleau-Ponty's theory of
objects constituted by the practical or "horizontal 
37synthesis" of the aspects is similar to Sartre's. 
Merleau-Ponty solved the problem by the practical stan­
dards dependent upon the context of the observer. Thus 
Sartre does not argue against the principle of noematic 
correlates from the point of view of the principle of 
economy or Occam's razor, rather from the different 
standpoint of accepting intentionality without epochs.
Sartre's ontological theory is apparently duali- 
stic, because he believes in the reality of both con­
sciousness and object. This may give rise to the charge 
of "Ghost in the machine," or it can be said that he
37M. Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, 
Northwestern University Press, 1968, p. 15.
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is bringing back the ghost of consciousness alive. It 
is very difficult to say whether Sartre can really be 
accused of the charge, because he does not believe like 
Descartes in the existence of a substantial ego. His 
consciousness is not a plenitude of being, but is not 
the objects. If we have to describe it we can do so 
with reference to objects of which it is conscious and 
from which it is distinguished. Consciousness in the 
philosophy of Sartre is in a paradoxical position. It 
is the objects of which conscious experience is possible, 
but it is also not the objects. Consciousness does not 
have the privileged access, for consciousness is directed 
to the objects. Sartre says in the Transcendence of 
the E g o . "But if the ^  becomes a transcendent, it parti­
cipates in all the vicissitudes of the world. It is no 
absolute; it has not created the universe; it falls 
like other existences at the stroke of the epoche; and 
solipsism becomes unthinkable from the moment that the ^ 
no longer has a privileged status ... My ly in effect, 
is no more certain for consciousness than the ^  of other 
men. It is only more intimate." (p. 104). Ryle may deny 
the ghost in the machine, but surely he would not deny 
the difference between being conscious of an object and 
the object. Sartre is making a distinction like that, 
even though for him, consciousness ultimately takes on
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an ontological status. Sartre believes in the reality of 
consciousness as distinguished from object, and there he 
can be accused of the dualism which he tries to reconcile 
in his Be in g-i n-it s e1 f-fo rr i t s e1f . But so long we remain 
confined to the aspect of experience, Sartre cannot be 
accused of the evils of dualism. For him, experience of 
perception consists of the object in relation to a parti­
cular standpoint of consciousness, while the same object 
in a different relation is an object of memory or imagi­
nation. As we have already seen, he banishes the noema 
which introduces a third entity in consciousness, producing 
epistemological dualism. His rejection of Husserlian 
hyle is also for the same reasons. When Sartre talks of 
emotion, he explains it as a sort of adjustment of the 
individual to the environment.
The point of this discussion is not to establish 
whether Sartre's dualism can be defended or not. It 
is only to point out that Sartre brings consciousness in the 
world of objects. Nothingness is the character of con­
sciousness, or its mode of being. But consciousness 
being a non-substantial absolute and the existing in the 
midst of objects, does not have the same difficulties, 
as Descartes' theory of substantial ego had to face.
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11. Phenomenon of Being and the 
Theory of Being
Sartre now reaches some definite conclusions about 
the phenomenon of being. Consciousness reveals things 
that exist, and in revealing them, reveals itself.
Existents have a being independent of consciousness and 
they appear before consciousness. But the existent is 
never completely revealed. Consciousness can never seize 
the being of the existent, but it can grasp the meaning 
of being. The meaning as it is revealed to consciousness 
is the phenomenon of being. But the meaning itself has 
a being. The phenomenon of being indicates being, and this 
is justified by the ontological proof. Such a phenomenon 
is revealed to consciousness. We have, what Heidegger 
calls a pre-ontological comprehension of this phenomenon, 
even though it is not elucidated in terms of concepts.
The elucidation of being in terms of concepts is possible 
in the case of the being of the existents, but not in 
the case of the being of consciousness, since conscious­
ness has a radically different type of being.
There are two absolutely separated regions of being: 
the being of the pre-reflective ego and the being of the 
phenomenon. Though there is the division in the concept 
of being, we cannot truly grasp the meaning of either one, 
until we understand their connection with the notion of 
being in general and the relations which unite them.
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The realistic conception of the relations between 
the phenomena and consciousness holds that consciousness 
completely depends upon the outward objects. Sartre 
has proved the existence of the non-positional conscious­
ness which is not at all affected by the being of the 
phenomenon. It has also been shown by him that conscious­
ness does not get out of its subjectivity and that it 
does not act upon the transcendent being. Nor can it 
be said that the passive elements of consciousness give 
rise to a transcendent being. Thus, the idealist solution 
of the problem is also rejected. Consciousness is reduced 
to objective phenomena by the realist school, while the 
idealist school reduces the objective world to the p r o ­
ducts of consciousness. Sartre wishes to avoid these two 
extreme by accepting the fact that both consciousness 
and the transcendent being are real, but it now seems 
that these are two closed totalities without any communi­
cation between them. But it is not necessary that the 
solution must be realistic or idealistic. It may be some­
thing else.
Sartre denies that the transcendent being is 
created, for then it has no separated being apart from 
divine subjectivity. Being is neither active nor passive. 
These categories can be applied only within the human
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context. Activity and passivity are understood in terms 
of means and ends, as the human mind is active, and the 
means he uses are passive. Being does not have any such 
end, for to talk of an end of being is just meaningless.
Affirmation and negation are categories that do
not apply to being. In all cases of affirmation, the
thing affirmed must be distinguished from the affirming.
But such a distinction is not possible in the case of
being, because being is full plenitude. "It is" as
38Sartre puts it, "noema in the noesis." Being is imma­
nence, but that cannot be realized, for in it there does 
not exist that slight withdrawal, which is necessary for 
the realization! It is an affirmation which cannot 
affirm itself, an activity which does not act, because 
it is glued to itself. Being is itself.
It does not mean that it has to refer to itself, 
just as in the case of self-consciousness. In fact, 
being is filled with itself, which can be expressed by 
saying that being is what it is. The statement may look 
like an analytical statement, but as the question here 
is of a regional principle^it is synthetical. "Being is 
what it is." Sartre points out that the word "is" has 
a special meaning. Beings have to be what they are. But
3 8B . N . , p. Ixv.
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the fact of being what they are is not an axiomatic 
characteristic; it is a contingent principle of being- 
in-itself. The in-itself is solid. It is the most 
indissoluble of all; the synthesis of itself with it­
self.
The question of transition, becoming, etc. does 
not occur in the case of being. But being is beyond 
becoming and by itself it cannot even be what it is 
not; it does not encompass any negation. It is what it 
is and full positivity. It has no temporal character. 
The character of temporality arises on the basis of 
lack, but being has no lack.
The first characteristic of being-in-itself is 
that it does not have either necessity or possibility.
It simply is. Necessity holds between ideal existants, 
but being is contingent. Neither can it be derived from 
a possibility. The possible is a structure of the for- 
itself, and it belongs to the other region of being.
The question of possibility does not arise in the case 
of being-in-itself. Being is "thus uncreated, without 
reason for being, without any connection with another
39being ... it is the de trop for eternity."
^^Ibid., p. Ixvi.
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The characteristics that are revealed about Being- 
in-itself are:
1. Being is,
2. Being is in-itself, and
3. Being is what it is.
The examination of appearances has led progressively to
point to two types of being - the in-itself and for-
itself or consciousness. The questions which arise in
this connection are;
"1. What is the ultimate meaning of these 
two types of being?
2. For what reasons do they both belong 
to being in general?
3. What is the meaning of that being which
includes within itself these two 
radically separated regions of
being?
4. If idealism and realism both fail 
to explain the relations which in
fact unite these regions which in
theory are without communication, 
what other solution can we find for 
this problem?
5. And how can the being of the
phenomenon be transphenomenal?"40
These are the questions which Sartre says, he is interested 
to answer in Being and Nothingness.
Whether Sartre has really been able to answer all
of these questions is another issue. But we have to
examine here if the dualism which Sartre discerns be­
tween being and consciousness is phenomenologically 
justifiable.
40 Ibid., p. Ixvii.
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12. The Question of Dualism and its 
Phenomenological Basis
The general opinion about Sartre's ontology is 
that he is a dualist, as he speaks of two regions of 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself. This seems to be 
evident from the fact that Sartre starts from the con­
sciousness of an object. We have tried to indicate that 
for Sartre, being-in-the-world is the ultimate being of 
which the for-itself and the in-itself are aspects, and 
so each independent of the other is an abstraction.
Against this it may be replied that consciousness can 
exist within the world, but that does not prevent it 
from being established as an independent reality. Whether 
this is Sartre's intention, we have to see that. We 
have also tried to hint that there is an idea of "lived 
reality" in Sartre. Though Sartre is more explicit 
about "lived reality" in his later writings, we hope 
to discover its rudiments in Being and Nothingness. Our 
contention is this: the for-itself and the in-itself
are abstractions; and being-in-the-world is the fundamental 
reality. We will try to show that the development of 
the concepts of for-itself and in-itself has a pheno­
menological basis in that they arise from the concrete 
experience of the world. But at the same time, we have
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to remember that their so-called independence is an 
abstraction, which may be due to the activity of reflec­
tion. We are mainly choosing two illustrations from 
Sartre's Being and Nothingness.
1. His analysis of the situation in
which the human being works, and
2. his analysis of the body.
These two will make it clear that the idea of for-itself 
and in-itself as completely independent are abstractions. 
We may sometimes refer to Sartre's later work Critigue 
of Dialectical Reason to show how the implicit ideas of 
Being and Nothingness have been made more concrete and 
explicit there.
Sartre expresses the relation between for-itself 
and in-itself by stating that consciousness can exist 
only as engaged in this being which surrounds it on all 
sides and which practically paralyzes it by its phantom 
presence. This being is not posited through and before 
consciousness. As the being is identified with conscious­
ness, there is no separate consciousness of being and 
Sartre expresses this in his metaphorical language,
"... there is no consciousness of this being since it 
haunts non-thetic self-consciousness."^^ This being 
points to consciousness as the meaning of its being,
^^B.N., p. 90.
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and consciousness is no more aware of it than of itself. 
But as consciousness enjoys being a consciousness of 
being, this being is there. Without this being, conscious­
ness would not be consciousness - i.e., lack. On the 
other hand, consciousness derives for itself its meaning 
as consciousness from this being. This being comes 
into the world along with consciousness, at once in its 
heart and outside it; its absolute transcendence in ab­
solute immanence. It has no priority over consciousness, 
and consciousness has no priority over it. This being 
could not exist without the for-itself, but neither could 
the for-itself exist without it. As Sartre tries to 
elucidate this relation, he says, "Consciousness in 
relation to this being stands in the mode of this being, 
for this being is consciousness, but as a being which 
consciousness cannot be. It is consciousness itself, 
in the heart of consciousness and yet out of i t .
This passage from Sartre's Being and Nothingness is 
not very clear about the relation between consciousness 
and in-itself, but one thing is definite; namely, that 
consciousness and being are related to each other in 
an inseparable relation and that consciousness at the
42lbid., p. 91.
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same time is both this being and not this being. Per­
haps that is why Sartre says that it is in the heart of 
consciousness and yet outside it.
Let us try to see how this idea of inseparable 
relation is most explicit in Critique of Dialectical 
Reason. In this book Sartre is more concerned with the 
relations between the individual and the collective, and 
he wants to show that man works in a situation to work 
out his project. The tendency to analyze human project 
in terms of the environmental factors alone is called 
by Sartre a wrong o n e , as it does not take into account 
the human factor. On the other hand, the human factor 
alone is not enough, for the instruments applied by the 
human being and the conditions in which he works become 
a part of the human situation. Thus a dialectic goes on 
between the human being and the social and cultural 
environment; and a clear understanding of the human role 
is possible by what Sartre calls a progressive-regressive 
method. In it the objective conditions are laid bare 
only to show that these conditions are significant in 
terms of the human project. As Hazel Barnes points out, 
according to Sartre, man's way of being is his way of 
relating himself to the world. There can be no relation 
without the free consciousness which assumes a point of 
view on the world. But man himself would be equally 
unable to have any connection with matter, if he himself 
did not possess materiality. Sartre defines human work
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as follows:
"The meaning of human work is the fact that man 
reduces himself to organic materiality in 
order to act materially upon matter and to 
change his material life. By transub- 
tantiation, the project, which by means 
of our body is inserted into the thing 
takes on substantial characteristics of 
that thing without entirely losing its 
original qualities."^3
In any human activity in the world there is an interchange. 
The person endows the thing with human significance, but 
in return, his action, by becoming objectified in the 
realm of matter, is at least in part reified, made into 
a thing. Sartre states here that men are things to the 
exact degree that things are human. It is only through 
this "transubstantiation" that we can speak of a future 
for either man or things.
This relation between material environment and 
consciousness has its root in the passage we have quoted 
from Being and Nothingness, though there Sartre is not 
so clear about the relation. The dialectic between con­
sciousness and material reality is covered by his meta­
phorical language. But it is possible to determine the 
idea that man is in an inseparable relation with his 
body, and man-in-the-situation is ontologically ultimate.
43 Search for a Method, Introduction, p. xi
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Perhaps a better understanding of this relation 
is possible if we try to state how Sartre analyzes situ­
ation in Being and Nothingness. Sartre points out that 
although brute things (what Heidegger calls brute existent) 
can from the start limit freedom of action, it is our 
freedom itself which must constitute the framework, the 
technique and the ends in relation to which they will 
appear as limits. But even th&n we can think of an 
unnamable and unthinkable residuum, but this residue is 
far from being originally a limit for freedom. In fact, 
it is thanks to this residue - that is, to the brute in- 
itself as such - that freedom arises as freedom. The 
situation is a common product of the contingency of the 
in-itself and of freedom and it is "an ambiguous phenomenon 
in which it is impossible for the for-itself to dis­
tinguish the contribution of freedom from that of the
44
brute existent." Just as the freedom is an escape from 
a contingency which it has to be in order to escape it, 
so the situation is the free co-ordination and the free 
qualification of a brute given, which does not allow it­
self to be qualified in any way at all. If a rock appears 
to me as "not scalable," it is presented to me in the 
light of a projected scaling - a secondary project which 
finds its meaning in terms of an initial project which is 
my being-in-the-world. The rock is carved out on the
4*8.N., p. 488.
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ground of the world by the effect of the Initial choice 
of my freedom. On the other hand, what my freedom can 
not determine is whether the rock "to be scaled" will 
or will not lend itself to scaling. This is part of the 
brute being of rock. Sartre thinks, thus, that it is 
impossible to determine in each particular case what comes 
from freedom and what comes from the brute being of the 
in-itself. The given in-itself as resistance or as 
aid is revealed only in the light of the projecting 
freedom. But the freedom organizes the instruments such 
that the in-itself is revealed by it as it is (i.e. 
resisting or favorable). This shows that it is impossible 
to determine apriori what comes from the brute existent 
and what from freedom in the character of this or that 
particular existent functioning as an absolute. The 
paradox of freedom thus lies in this, that this freedom 
is possible only in a situation and there is a situation 
only through freedom. Human reality everywhere encounters 
resistance and obstacles which it did not create, but 
these resistances and obstacles have meaning only in 
and through the choice which human reality is.
This is compatible with the point of view Sartre 
adopts in the CRITIQUE where he says that history might 
be said to be the story of how human praxis has inscribed
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itself in the pratico-inerte (Sarte's term for material 
circumstances). The two terms, as Hazel Barnes suggests, 
are not to be equated with being-for-itself and being- 
in-itself , but there is a sense in which they hold 
equivalent positions in the later work. Praxis is 
any meaningful or purposeful human activity, an act which 
is not mere random undirected motion. The pratico-inerte 
is more than just matter, though it certainly includes 
the material environment. It includes all things which 
go to make man's experience of finitude. This pratico- 
inerte can also impose on my actions a "counter finality" 
which is the end result of human action and at the same 
time is opposed to that and which the agent had intended. 
The pratico-inerte is thus something more than the situ­
ation, because the situation is a meaningful organization 
of the given in terms of the human project. Sartre does 
not speak of "counter finality" in relation to the situ­
ation, though he seems to say that what resists or frus­
trates the end depends on its relation to the end. In 
his later work too, Sartre recognizes that praxis is at 
the start and also at the end. In the CRITIQUE Sartre 
speaks of a dialectic between the subjective and the 
objective. There is, as he says, a joint necessity of 
the "internalization of the external" and "the externali­
sation of the internal." Praxis, indeed, is a passage
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from objective to objective through internalization. The 
project is the subjective surpassing of objectivity toward 
objectivity and as "stretched between the objective con­
ditions of the environment and the objective structures of 
the field of possibles represents in itself the moving 
unity of subjectivity and objectivity, those cardinal de­
terminants of activity.
If the material conditions which govern human relations 
are to become real conditions of praxis, they must be lived 
in the particularity of the particular situation. As Sartre 
states, "In the lived experience, the subjectivity turns 
back upon itself and wrenches itself from despair by means 
of objectification. Thus the subjective contains within 
itself the objective, which it denies and which it surpasses 
toward a new objectivity and this new objectivity by virtue 
of objectification externalizes the internality of the pro­
ject as an objectified subjectivity. This means both that 
the lived as such finds its place in the result and that 
the projected meaning of the action appears in the reality 
of the world that it may get its truth in the process of 
totalization."^^ This dialectic between the praxis and the 
pratico-inerte can also be vaguely determined in the rela­
tion between freedom and situation.
45 Search, p . 97-98 
^^Search, p . 98
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Another important aspect of existence in which con­
sciousness is found in a relation of unified lived experi­
ence is body. Sartre states that my body as I live it is 
not a thing among other things in the world. I can touch 
my body touching or see it seeing. "Either it is a thing
among things or else it is that by which things are revealed 
47to me." From the point of view of the body-for-me, to 
touch my body is to surpass towards my possibilities. But 
if I percieve it as an object, then it is no longer my- 
body-as-lived. As I objectify it, my possibilities are no 
longer real, but dead possibilities. When my body is ob­
jectified, then its being is transformed. It is an object 
as a revelation of its being, but only its being-for-other. 
Thus, the study of the body must conform to the order of 
being - being-for-itself and being-for-others. These are 
genuinely ontological dimensions of the body and must not be 
confused, as they are confused in Cartesian Philosophy.
"Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it 
must be wholly consciousness; it cannot be 
united with a body. Similarly, being-for-others 
is wholly body; there are no psychic phenomena 
there to be united with the body. There is 
nothing behind the body. But the body is 
wholly 'psychic'."
For Sartre, thus, insofar as consciousness is for-it­
self, it is its own body; insofar as it is for-others, it
*^B.N . , p . 304 
48ibid., p . 305
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is likewise its own body, but now in a different ontological 
dimension.
Sartre thinks that Descartes was led to distinguish 
in a radical manner between mind and body, as he thought 
"mind is easier to know than the body." He discovered the 
ideas which he thought were signs to indicate the body.
But the division between mind and body led to the consequence 
that the body as it is experienced by consciousness was 
suppressed. The separation of consciousness and body gave 
rise to the pseudo-problem of re-uniting them. On the 
other hand, the last dimension of the body can be recovered 
in the primordial thrust of consciousness for-itself as 
being-in-the-world. We think a consideration of the body- 
as-for-itself will disclose to us the inescapable bond be­
tween body and consciousness: consciousness and body in 
the lived relation of being-in-the-world.
The for-itself is by essence a relation to the world, 
as it makes there be a world, which it is not and by sur­
passing towards its possibilities, it reveals the 'thises' 
of the world, the instrumental things. The things and the 
relations that are in things are relative to "our first
engagement in the world." "Man and the world are relative
49beings and the principle of their being is the relation."
49 Ibid., p . 308
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Thus, to be engaged in the world is to be there. Though 
it is necessary that the Pour-soi be there, it is contingent 
that it be there at all. It is also contingent that it be 
'here', rather than 'over there'. But this two-fold con­
tingency constitutes the facticity of the Pour-soi, and it 
is the fundamental stratum of the body-for-itself, i.e. the 
body, as it is experienced concretely. I cannot take my 
body-for-itself as object, as I am it. Thus my body-as 
lived, in so far as it is my point of view, is always what 
is surpassed toward my possibilities. I am involved in 
the world by means of my body. The world appears as an 
order univocally referring back to my placement, to me as 
embodied here. But while it is necessary that there be 
some order it is again contingent that it is this rather 
than that one.
My body-for-itself is the total system and center of 
reference of things. Accordingly, to Sartre, objects are 
what they are, only within a nexus of actual and possible 
actions on them. Sartre maintains that perception is in no 
way distinguished from the practical organizations of ex­
istants in the world. The characteristics which make a 
hammer a hammer are disclosed, not in a conceptual con­
sciousness, but rather in a practical-using consciousness. 
For only in the latter does the hammer refer to the nails, 
to the board to be hammered into place and to the ultimate
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project-at-hand. Only as such is the hammer a hammer. 
Similarly, the space in which I live is not geometrical, 
it is 'hodological' - furrowed with paths, places, routes, 
ways of going and coming and the like. Thus, the world 
for Pour-soi in its upsurge is constituted as a concate­
nated texture of intermediaries. Acts refer to other 
acts, point to other tools, to purposes for which they 
were made, to others and so on. The world is thus conceived 
as the correlate of my possible actions, the system of 
possibilities which I am. The world is the skeleton of 
my possible action, the outline which my actions fill in. 
Perception is naturally surpassed towards action. My body 
is a tool objectively defined by the instrumental fields 
referring to it as the center, but a tool I can not use, 
since ,
"... We should thus be referred to infinity.
We do not use this instrument, for we are it.
It is given to us in no other way than by the 
instrumental order of the world, by hodological 
space ... but it cannot be given to my action.
I do not have to adapt myself to it nor to
adopt another tool to it, but it is my very
adaptation to tools, the adaptation which I am.
The body is the instrument which I can not use in the way
I use any other instrument. It is the point of view on
which I can no longer take a point of view. I can not
take a point of view on my body without a reference to
5°Ibid., p.324
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infinity. Therefore, the body can not be for me trans­
cendent and known; the spontaneous, unreflective conscious­
ness is no longer the consciousness of the body.
"It would be best to say, using, 'exist' as a 
transitive verb - that consciousness exists 
its body. Thus the relation between the body- 
as-point-of view and things is an objective 
relation, and the relation of consciousness 
to the body is an existential relation."51
This means that consciousness can exist its body only as 
consciousness. The body belongs to the structure of the 
non-thetic self-consciousness. But it can not be identified 
with pure and simple non-thetic consciousness as the free 
project toward a possibility which is its own; that is, in 
so far as it is the foundation of its own nothingness. 
Non-positional consciousness is consciousness (of) the 
body as being that which it nihilates by making itself 
consciousness - i.e., as being something which conscious­
ness is without having to be it and which it passes over 
in order to be what it has to be. In other words, con­
sciousness of the body is the neglected and yet the body 
is what this consciousness is; "... it is not even any-
5 2thing except body. The rest is nothingness and silence." 
Consciousness of the body cannot be compared to the 
consciousness of a sign. The sign leads us to the 




and retrospective consciousness" of what consciousness 
is. But consciousness does not have to be body. Con­
sciousness (of) the body is a non-thetic consciousness 
of the manner in which it is affected.
Thus, this relation of the body as a relation to
the world and as a center of the instrumental complexes
can be described as the intentionality of the body,
for the body is a point of view which is to be surpassed 
towards my possibilities. As Sartre says, "The body 
is not a screen between things and ourselves; it mani­
fests only the individuality and the contingency of our
53original relation to the instrumental things." But 
the body is in no way apprehended for itself; it is a 
point of view and a point of departure. It is a non- 
thetic project of the for-itself. Sartre points out 
that nowhere else shall we come closer to touching 
that nihilation of the in-itself by the for-itself and 
that apprehension of the for-itself by the in-itself 
which nourishes the nihilation. Sartre in this way 
recognizes a dialectic between body and consciousness, 
as the for-itself lives its body. As he says, "To have 
a body is to be the foundation of one's own nothing­
ness and not to be the foundation of one's being; I am
^^Ibid., p. 325.
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my body to the extent that I am; I am not my body to 
the extent I am not what I a m ."^^
These considerations lead us to conclude that 
phenomenologically Sartre starts with a lived experience 
in which human reality is engaged in a concrete situation; 
consciousness and in-itself form a dyad so that one is 
an abstraction without the other, and the body as lived 
is the same as consciousness. At the same time, Sartre 
indicates the dialectic that occurs in all these cases, 
and it appears that in discussing the dialectic, Sartre 
has presented the two entities, as if they are separate. 
Thus, the separation is a product of reflection, while 
in actuality, human-reality-in-the-world is the only real 
entity.
Sartre develops his idea of 'lived reality' in his 
later writings, beginning with the CRITIQUE. We have 
tried to indicate that there is some evidence of his 
postulating "lived reality" or "lived experience" in 
Being and Nothingness. The only difference is this that 
in his earlier works, Sartre never made any explicit 
statement about it. He mentions being-in-the-world, 
but he does not always show clearly how for-itself and 
in-itself can be deduced from the primary being, that 
is being-in-the-world, though it cannot be denied that
54 I b i d . , p . 326.
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the examples we have given above, like the situation 
or the body, are genuine cases of lived reality. In 
these cases, the distinctive separation of each of the 
realities is not so prominent. What we shall attempt 
below is some sort of hypothetical deduction of the for- 
itself and in-itself from the lived reality of being-in- 
the-world, and we hope that it is not incompatible 
with Sartre's main thesis.
Sartre begins his philosophical discussion with 
a dualism, because he inquires into the epistemological 
question first. If, instead, he had raised the question; 
how is consciousness situated or where does it exist, 
he would have come to state that consciousness arises 
in the world or that consciousness is in the world. He 
asserts something like this afterwards when he says that 
consciousness cannot exist without the world or the 
world without consciousness. But if we try to analyze 
consciousness as it knows something, we have already 
adopted a mode of distinction between the knower and the 
known. This relation between consciousness and object 
being intentional, it is said that consciousness implies 
the existence of something of which it is conscious.
What Sartre is doing here is establishing his ontology 
on the epistemological inquiry, just as Descartes did in 
his Meditations. But for Sartre, this epistemological
107
study is the process of an abstraction, for he seems 
to forget what he will mention afterwards that con­
sciousness is in the world. Sartre's ontology could 
be established on this phenomenological insight^ and it 
could be shown that his epistemological theory is mainly 
a limited idea of what actually is the case. What we 
want to emphasize is that Sartre's dualism is a consequence 
of his epistemological approach and that this is something 
due to his reflection on the knowledge situation. We 
hold that his phenomenological insight is not irrécon­
ciliable with his dualism of some type, but this appears 
to have been lost, when he considers the two sides of 
the epistemological situation as if they are fundamen­
tally incommunicable. In his concluding chapter, Sartre 
tries to restore the unity to some extent, but through­
out the whole book, except in the discussion on body 
and situation, the dualism is so predominant that intu­
itions of the intimate relation between the for-itself 
and the in-itself are often ignored. The phenomeno­
logically given has a justification for a dualism of 
a relative type to allow the dialectical relation to oper­
ate; but a strict dualism between the for-itself and in- 
itself is not phenomenologically justifiable, as it 
goes against the "lived reality" or "being-in-the-world."
CHAPTER III 
CONSCIOUSNESS, NEGATION, AND HUMAN REALITY
1. The Ontological nature of Consciousness
Sartre understands consciousness as being in ques­
tion, which, perhaps, means that consciousness is always 
trying to reach some state of finality, but is never able 
to reach it. The nature of consciousness is persistent 
striving. The initial difference between consciousness 
and object is that consciousness is not an object.
Our experience shows that consciousness is different 
from object, and the difference consists in the never- 
ending possibility of consciousness. But an object has 
no such possibility. Object cannot have any choice. 
Consciousness wants to become what it is not, and as such, 
it is a project, a task. Therefore, consciousness is always 
in question. If these two aspects of consciousness 
(namely, that consciousness is always consciousness of 
an object and that consciousness is in question all the 
time) are treated as a whole, we get what Sartre means 
when he says, "Consciousness is a being such that in its
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being, its being is in question in so far as this being
implies a being other than itself.
Consciousness is described by Sartre as nothingness.
What does this mean? This can be understood if we keep
2in mind the idea that consciousness is a possibility.
It is to realize a possibility that consciousness has to 
be what it is not. The negative character of conscious­
ness can explain, Sartre thinks, the negative facts that 
we experience in our everyday life. Negation, according 
to Sartre is not a logical category, as with Hegel,^ nor 
an ontological correlative principle with Being, as with 
H e i d e g g e r , 4 but is rather something which we experience 
as real. But even then, Being-in-itself can not explain 
negation, for what is, purely is and can not explain how 
negation arrives in the world. So, Sartre says,
"The Being by which nothingness arrives in 
is a being such that in its Being the nothing­
ness of its Being is in q u e s t i o n . "5
It is true that by negation some actual being is
denied or rejected, but this denial or rejection is possible
.N., p.lxii 
^ibid, , p.99 
^Ibid., p p.12-16 
'̂ I bid. , pp.16-21 
^ I b i d ., p .5
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only because some consciousness wanted to realize a 
possibility. Interrogation, destruction, and negative 
judgment are the basic examples of negatit^s. In inter­
rogation, we ask a question and this presupposes ignorance. 
It is a non-being. The answer to the question may be 
either affirmative or negative. In the affirmative 
answer what we know is known as not being some other 
thing.^ If somebody answers my question, "Is he rich?" 
"Yes, he is rich," I know it as "he is not poor," not 
as something positive. If the answer is negative, it is 
clear that we appear before some non-being. Destruction 
implies that a thing loses its present state. But that 
change can have meaning only before a witnessing conscious­
ness. Negative judgment implies the expectation of some­
thing which is not fulfilled. Pierre absent in the cafe 
does not signify the rejection of his presence, unless 
somebody is there to look for him. This capacity of 
introducing negation in the world gives rise to another 
dimension of consciousness - consciousness is nothingness. 
It is what it is not and is not what it is. Consciousness 
is a lack. All these descriptions of consciousness are 
implied with one another.
Gibid., p.8
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We can understand consciousness as nothingness 
if we try to explain Sartre's puzzling description of 
consciousness as a being which is what it is not and
7which is not what it is. This is the recurring theme 
in the whole of Being and Nothingness, and Sartre has 
tried to interpret it in different ways; viz., in 
relation to:
1. object




We must distinguish these different interpretations and
try to discover what Sartre really means by these apparently
self-contradictory statements. Naess, however, points
out that there is really no contradiction here. As he says,
"It is not impossible to produce expressions 
related to - consciousness is what is not 
and is not what is - in which 'is' can mean 
the same in each of its occurrences: but such 
expressions are not necessarily such as break 
the law of identity: 'Consciousness is as
for-itself, that which it is not as in-itself 
and is not, as for-itself what it is as in- 
itself. 'Consciousness (of) my cowardice 
is consciousness (of) this cowardice which it 
is not and consciousness (of) my cowardice 
is not the cowardice which it is not.8
1. Sartre holds, first of all, that consciousness
is. not to be identified with an object. Yet when
^I b i d ., p . 87
® N a e s s , Four Modern Philosophers, University of 
Chicago, 1968, p . 318
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consciousness knows an object, consciousness seems 
to be identified with the object, for nothing 
separates the consciousness from the object. But 
really, consciousness is not an object. So con­
sciousness is an object first, but it is not really 
that. This is what Sartre means when he says that 
consciousness is what it is not (what-it-is-not) 
or object. But consciousness is also realized as 
separate from the object, and it is understood to 
be not what it is, in which case it may mean that 
though consciousness appears to be an object, it 
is not that.
Or we may interpret in the way of Naess. Then 
the first part may mean that consciousness as con­
sciousness is consciousness which is not an object;
i.e., that consciousness is not an in-itself. But 
then the second part practically seems to say the 
same thing as the first in a different formulation, 
because the latter says that consciousness is not 
what it is. If we understand by the word."it is" 
en-soi (because Sartre's definition of en-soi is that 
it i s ) , it also means that consciousness is not an 
object. We may wonder if Sartre is saying the same 
thing in two ways or pointing out the two aspects
113
of consciousness that it is and is not.
2. Sartre introduces his description of conscious­
ness as it is what it is not and is not what it is in 
connection with human reality or the basic nature 
of temporality, which he, after Heidegger, calls 
ek-stasy. Human reality is a project, and it lives 
in the present by negating the past so that what 
will be can come only by not being what it is. Pro­
ject transcends toward future and the future is not 
yet. But consciousness can only be what it is in 
future, or what is not yet. Therefore, conscious­
ness is future realization of possibility, or it is 
what it is not yet. But the present is not the nat­
ure of consciousness, nor is it the past. Conscious­
ness cannot be confined to what it is. It has to 
go beyond the present. So, consciousness is not
what it is or something which remains fixed, perman­
ent, without a possibility. Thus consciousness is 
the future of not yet and is not the past for the
gpresent. As Sartre says,
"The past which I am, I have to be with­
out possibility. Yet I cannot be anything
other than it. On the other hand, I am 
not my past. The truth is that I have 
to be it in order not to be it and I have
^B.N., p. 116.
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not to be it in order to be it.^®
About the present he says,
"The for-itself is present to being in the 
form of flight ... the present is a p er­
petual flight in the face of being."11
About the future Sartre remarks,
"The future qua future does not have to be.
It is not in-itself and neither is it in 
the mode of being of the for-itself, since 
it is the meaning of the for-itself. The 
future is not, it is possibllized.12
As in the previous interpretation, this meaning
of consciousness can be explained in a different
way. Consciousness as present is not the unchanging
mass of the pa.st or the present in its flight, and
it is what it is not. Again, consciousness is not
the past or the present, because consciousness is
not what it is.
3. When the look of the other petrifies me into
an object, consciousness becomes an object, but it 
is not the nature of consciousness to be an object.
So, consciousness is an object in the eyes of the
other, but in itself it is not an object. Thus,
first, it is what it is as an object transformed into
that condition by the look of the other. But it
l°Ibi d ., pp.117-119 
lll b i d ., p.125 
^^Ibid., p.126
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can regain its true nature by snatching away its 
freedom from the others Then it is not what it is.
As Sartre points out,
"Moreover, I cannot truly define myself 
as being in a situation; first, because 
I am not a positional consciousness of 
myself; second, I am my own nothingness.
In this sense, ... and since I am what 
I am not and since I am not what I am,
I can not even truly define myself as 
truly in the process of listening to 
the doors.13
A second interpretation may be applied as in the 
earlier cases which will show that consciousness is
not the object of the other.
4. In the case of freedom Sartre tries to describe
consciousness in his puzzling language in the same 
way. In fact, freedom designates the true nature 
of consciousness, according to Sartre, for freedom 
is never at rest. Sartre speaks of freedom as follows
"This implies for consciousness the per­
manent possibility of effecting a rupture 
with its own past, of wrenching itself 
away from its own past so as to be able 
to consider it in the light of a non-being."1^
In freedom, consciousness has to be its negation
and thus it is what it is not. At the same time,




or with the past, because it has to wrench itself 
away from the past. In Sartre's language,
"Human reality is free because it is not 
enough. It is free because it is per­
petually wrenched away from itself from 
the past, and because it has been separated 
by a nothingness from what it is and from 
what will b e .
5. About body Sartre says that the for-itself lives
the body; and so, consciousness may be the body, but 
it is also not the body. Thus consciousness;is body 
which is what it is not, but at the same time, con­
sciousness is not body which it is. Being-for-itself, 
as Sartre says, must be wholly body and must be 
wholly consciousness; it can not be united with a 
b o d y .
Consciousness is the body in so far as the 
body is not distinct from the situation of the for- 
itself. The for-itself"to exist and to be situated" 
are one and the same. But the for-itself nihilates 
the body, for body is "the in-itself which is sur- 
pased by the annihilating for-itself. It is the fact 
... that I am nothing without having to be what I am 
and in so far as I have to be what I am, I am with­
out having to be."^^
ISl b i d ., p.453 




We can mention here also the alternative 
interpretation as in other cases. Consciousness 
is that which it is not as a body, and conscious­
ness is not a body if we understand the two parts 
of the statement about consciousness in a different 
way. Which of these interpretations is acceptable, 
perhaps, depends on emphasis. But Sartre says 
something about the body which may point out the 
adequacy of the first interpretation. He says,
"I am my body to the extent that I am;
I am not my body to the extent I am 
not what I am."18
Because the for-itself is a possibility, it 
is a nothingness, it is a lack. It wants to be 
something which is not yet realized. And this 
unrealized totality is the in-itself which the for- 
itself is not. As Sartre remarks, "The for-itself 
is perpetually determining itself not to be the 
in-itself."
But this in-itself is what consciousness lacks. 
Being-in-itself is what has no lack, for it is full 
positivity.
"It is only in the human world that there 
can be lack. A lack presupposes a trin­
ity; that which is missing, or 'lacking' 
that which misses, what is lacking or the
Ibid., p . 326
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'existing' and a totality which has been 
broken by the lacking and which would be 
restored by the synthesis of the 'lacking' 
or the 'existing'. This is the lacked.^9
Sartre illustrates the lack with the example of
the crescent moon. That the crescent moon lacks 
something can be understood only with reference to 
the full moon, which can be grasped by the human 
consciousness as the foundation which will recon­
stitute the synthetic totality of the lacked. Again, 
the existence of desire proves that human reality 
is a lack.
"Desire is a lack of being. It is haunted 
in its inmost being by the being of which 
it is the desire. Thus, it bears witness
to the existence of lack in the being of
human reality."^0
The for-itself denies or nihilates itself so 
that it can be for-itself. The meaning of human 
reality is constituted by this nihilation. Thus, 
the self-as-being-itself is what human reality 
lacks and what makes its meaning. As Sartre states,
:?Human reality is its own surpassing to­
ward what it lacks; it surpasses itself 
toward the particular being which it would 
be, if it were what it is ... it exists 
first as a lack and in immediate synthetic 
connection with what it lacks ... In its
, p . 86
2°Ibid., p . 88
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coming into existence, human reality 
grasps itself as an incomplete b e i n g . "^1
This lack of what the for-itself is lacking is
value, or what Sartre calls self.
2. Consciousness and Ego
The question may arise whether all these aspects of 
consciousness are true of the pre-reflective or the reflec­
tive consciousness. The question as such is meaning­
less, for there is no intrinsic difference between the 
two. It is the same consciousness looked at from two 
different points of view. But all the aspects of con­
sciousness are revealed to us as a result of phenomenolog­
ical analysis, which is the stage of reflection. It does 
not mean that these aspects of consciousness were not 
present in the pre-reflective consciousness, but are 
subsequently produced by a reflective gaze. Once we 
remember this, it becomes clear to us that Sartre is using 
"consciousness", "for-itself" and "human reality" to 
designate the same being. In the very nature of con­
sciousness, there is a fissure, and this Sartre explains 
with reference to the stage of reflection where con­
sciousness tries to realize its identity with what it is 
conscious of. Belief is consciousness (of) belief and
Z l l b i d . , p . 8 9
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so, even if belief is possible without consciousness, if 
we try to identify belief with consciousness, we find that 
a duality has appeared. If we want to understand what be­
lief is, we have to refer to consciousness and if we want 
to understand what consciousness is, we have to refer to 
belief. We may try to grasp the two in one identity; but 
in our attempt to do so, consciousness vanishes. This is 
the fundamental difference of consciousness from en-soi, 
which is pure identity. But consciousness, if we may use 
a queer expression, is a differentiating difference.
In the pre-reflective consciousness, there is no ego. 
But in the reflective consciousness, the ego appears. Where 
does it come from? Only in the reflective consciousness 
do we become conscious of the ego. But the ego is never 
complete at any moment of our experience. It grows out 
of our experiences of the different stages of our life,
our consciousness of the body, different states and quali- 
22ties. It is going towards the ultimate ideal to achieve 
23completion. But we can understand by the ego the unity 
of all the experiences achieved up to the present. In this 
way the ego lives through consciousness of the moment.
How, then, are we to understand the relation between 




to be understood as opposed to in-itself in terms of its 
project. That which for-itself seeks to realize is the 
self or value. It is the ideal of in-itself-for-itself,
24though, according to Sartre, it is an unrealizable ideal.
But the for-itself is constantly going towards that ideal, 
and only this ideal gives an objective unity to the world.
The for-itself cannot realize the ideal, unless it is con­
sciousness. Only consciousness has the virtue of denying 
the present of things to realize the future ideal. So 
for-itself is consciousness, if we understand it in terms 
of its character of nothingness. But consciousness cannot 
work unless it is the consciousness of a concrete individu­
al which develops through the different conscious experiences 
Ego is never complete. To be complete, it has to realize 
the ideal of consciousness as for-itself. We can say that 
the experience of the present is consciousness, and that 
an individual experiening the consciousness is ego; and 
as the ideal to be realized, the ego is towards self through 
consciousness, but the ideal as concieved from the point 
of view of consciousness is for-itself. So, the ego is 




Does this description of Sartre's theory of conscious­
ness need the opacity or passivity of the ego? If we 
think of the ego as activating the consciousness, it may 
be opaque. But we understand the ego as lived through con­
sciousness and achieving its nature through different con­
scious states, though it is not actually so. The ego of 
the present has been achieved through the result of past 
experiences, but in the consciousness of the present this 
achieved unity of past experience is active or living.
The present experience will, perhaps, reconsitute the ego 
and in this way, the ego is constantly made and remade.
But it is never complete, until and unless the final unity 
is realized. So, consciousness retains its spontaneity 
and the ego realized through conscious experiences, though 
it loses the spontaneity to some extent, has a borrowed 
spontaneity. In so far as the unity of the ego represents 
the unity of the experiences, it is "me;" but when it is 
actively experiencing something or is working in the world,
it is "I." As Sartre says, the "me" and the "I" are the
2 5two sides of the same unity.
^^T.E. , p.60
CHAPTER IV
CONSCIOUSNESS AND TEMPORALITY IN RELATION 
TO HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND MERLEAU-PONTY
In this chapter, we shall try to analyze Sartre's idea 
of temporality, while the next chapter will be devoted to 
a consideration of his notion of existential freedom. As 
there are important phenomenological studies on the exper­
ience of time in Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, we 
want also to show how Sartre shares their views in many 
points and how he develops his own point of view, in h ar­
mony with his ontology.
1. Husserl's view on time-consciousness
Husserl speaks of "the lived experiences in which the 
temporal in the objective sense arrears."^ He first of all 
criticizes the explanation of time-consciousness offered by 
Brentano and others who conceive of temporal succession per­
ceived as several nows, since it is really a puzzle how these 
separate nows can establish the unity and continuity of an 
experience like a melody. As the sound is given, I exper-
^E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Inner Time Conscious­
ness , Midland Book, Indiana University Press, Second Edition, 
1966, p . 24
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ience it as now, but I am also conscious of the contin­
uity of phases as "before". As Husserl says, "I am con­
scious of the sound and the duration which it fills in a 
continuity of modes in a 'continuous f l u x ' As I hear 
a sound, every moment a new now presents itself, but each 
now is changed into something that has been. This is 
called "retention", and every consciousness undergoes a 
modification, because the 'now' changes continuously from 
retention to retention. As the sound continues, we have 
a series of retentions going back to the point of origin. 
Such retention is called by Husserl "primary remembrance".^ 
If we try to understand the experience of a temporal 
event, we find that part of the 'same' tone which was 
originally given as now, is in the second moment given 
as "having been heard just now". Husserl calls this type 
of retention also a mode of original giveness. If we use 
the term "impression" for perception, we may say that an 
impression of a temporal event must contain a retention. 
Again when a new part of the same "tone" is also given 
as now, that part which was given in a retention is also 
retained - but in a retention of retention. When this 
retention of the retention takes place, that which was
2 l b i d . , p . 4 4
3lbid., p.88
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given in an impression is now given in a retention itself. 
The impression of the third part of the tone is given 
together with the retention of the second and the retention 
of the retention of the first, etc. In this way every 
perception of something given as something in time implies 
a series of retentions.
Husserl points out that every awareness of a temporal 
event contains, apart from an awareness of what has been, 
at the same time an awareness of what is to come. When 
we try to recollect a forgotten tone, we find that the 
recollection cannot be a literal reproduction of the 
original experience. It will always be tinged by the mem­
ory of what followed, when we heard the part originally.
When I hear something for the first time, I do not know
what I am going to hear the next moment. But we cannot 
reproduce literally this "not knowing" in reproduction.^
Let us suppose that when we heard the last part of the 
tone "a", it suddenly broke off. I did not expect it to 
break off in the next moment. I expected it to continue, 
and this expectation is a positive character of the original 
act of hearing. But in recollection of the original exper­
ience, I know already that it will break off in the next
moment. Thus, when I hear a certain part of a tone.
'̂ P. Merlan, Time Consciousness in Husserl and Heideg­
ger, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.8, 
1947-48, p.24
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I know in a way that either the tone will become stronger 
or weaker and the possibilities I can think of character­
ize my expectation - an expectation that belongs to the 
essence of the perception of the present event. The expect­
ation is rather vague. But in recollection, the expecta­
tion is already determined, and this change in expectation 
is a change of the original impression. Expectation 
constitutes a link by which each part of the tone is con­
nected to the part yet to be perceived. The expectation 
is fulfilled by the subsequent act. We can say that 
every perception of a temporal event necessarily contains 
an expectation and is fulfilled, due to subsequent parts.
Due to the vague character of expectation, Husserl calls 
it "protention". Thus, retention, protention and fulfill­
ment are essential in the structure of acts in and by 
which something is perceived as a temporal event.
Husserl understands the nature of time-consciousness 
as a fact of experience being constituted in the flux of 
consciousness. First, he shows how the perception of the 
now is constantly being modified by the retentions of what 
has been and the protentions of what is to come. Time- 
consciousness is thus a unity growing out of the inseparable 
relation between the different phases. This unity is 
better understood if we look to the flux of consciousness 
which cannot he divided onto different phases, for to
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speak of a division of the flow of consciousness is absurd. 
Husserl is not interested to show what gives consciousness 
a unity. Materai object has also unity, but Husserl says 
that the unity of the material object is a meaning intended 
by consciousness. The unity of consciousness is not under­
stood at all, unless we understand consciousness as some­
thing of the nature of a project. Because consciousness 
is a project, it has unity, and that explains thoroughly 
the unity of time-consciousness. This point is the main 
theme of Heidegger's notion of temporality in his analysis 
of Dasein, and we shall see afterwards that Sartre is 
influenced both by Husserl and Heidegger, when he speaks 
of temporality as an ek-static unity of the nature of 
consciousness.
2. Heidegger's analysis of Temporality
Heidegger understands that "Dasein is an entity for 
which, in its Being, that Being is an issue".^ We can 
understand the phrase "is an issue" if we remember that 
Dasein is a self-projective Being towards its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. This means that in each case 
Dasein is already ahead of itself in its Being. But 
this Being-ahead-of-itself does not signify an isolated
^M. Heidegger, Being and Time, (Trans. Macquarrie, 
J. and E. Robinson), Harper and Row Publishers, New York 
and Evanston, 1962, p . 76
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tendency in a subject outside the world. This expresses 
the fact that Dasein has already been thrown into a world. 
The true characteristic of Dasein is thus ahead of itself- 
being-already-in-the-world. This whole way in which Dasein 
is concerned with the world, other beings, and its own 
fate is ontologically a basic structure of Dasein and is 
termed by Heidegger Care (Sorge) .
Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-being-a- 
whole; and as death is the end for-being-a-whole, Heidegger 
first of all shows that authentic Being-towards-death is 
anticipation. He has also pointed out that Dasein's 
authentic potentiality-for-being can be designated exis- 
tentially as resoluteness. He wants to analyze the nature 
of resoluteness phenomenologically to show that resolute­
ness in its ordinary manner points forward to "anticipatory 
resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility".& Heideg­
ger points out that "Temporality gets experienced in a 
phenomenally primordial way in Dasein's authentic Being-
7a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness".
This understanding of temporality is not accessible to 
the ordinary notion of time. Rather, the primordial 
phenomenon of temporality throws light on the way time is 
ordinarily understood. As Heidegger understands, Dasein
^ Ibid., p . 349
^Ibid., p . 351
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becomes essentially Dasein in that authentic existence 
which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness.
That which is projected in the primordial existential 
projection of existence is revealed as an anticipatory 
resoluteness. This anticipatory resoluteness is Being 
one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This 
is possible only because Dasein can come toward itself in 
its ownmost possibility as a possibility in letting itself 
come toward itself. This is the primordial phenomenon of 
the future as coming toward itself.
As Being-towards-death is Dasein's possibility, it 
is possible as something futural. The "futural" is the 
coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for- 
Being, comes toward itself. Anticipation makes Dasein 
authentically futural and in such a way that the anti­
cipation is possible only in so far as Dasein is coming 
toward itself, in its Being. Anticipatory resoluteness 
has to understand itself by taking over the throwness of 
Dasein. Only in so far as Dasein is an "I-am-as-having 
been" can Dasein come towards itself, futurally. In anti­
cipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility one 
comes back understandingly to one's ownmost "been". The 
character of "having been" arises, in a certain way, from 
the future. Anticipatory resoluteness has to be concerned 
with what is ready-to-hand in the enviroment. Dasein
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can have a resoluteness of being-alongside what is ready- 
to-hand in a situation by making such an entity present.
The character of "having been" arises from the future and 
in such a way that the future which is in the process of 
having been releases from itself the present. This pheno­
menon having the unity of a future which makes present in 
the process of having been is designated "temporality". 
Temporaluty révélas the being of C are.
■Dasein's totality of Being as Care means, "ahead-of-
itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside
8(entities encountered within-the-world)". D a s e i n 's 
"Being-ahead-of-itself" is grounded in the future. Being- 
already-in-the-world indicates the character of having 
been. Being-alongside is n^g|gg|g^^n making present the . 
entities with which the situation.
the
an entity would
become something p r e s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ R e f o r e "  and "ahead" 
indicate the future w h i c i ^ ^ ^ m ^ ^ ^ o s s i b l e  for Dasein to 
be such that its potentiality-for-Being is an issue. "Self" 
projection upon the 'for-the-sake-of-oneself' is grounded
®Ibid., p . 2 36
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in the future and is an essential characteristic of 
existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality 
is the future.^ Similarly, "already" refers to the exist­
ential temporal meaning of the Being that has been thrown. 
As long as Dasein factually exists, it is always in the 
sense of "I-am-as-having-been". But the tern "past" is 
used with reference to things that are no longer present- 
at-hand. Dasein finds itself as an entity which it still 
is and already was - that is to say, "which it constantly 
is as having been".^^
The future, the character of having been, and the 
present reveal the phenomenal characteristics of the "tower 
oneself", "the back-to" and the "letting-oneself-be- 
encountered-by". These phenomena of the future, the char­
acter of having-been, and the present are called by Hei­
degger the "ek-stases" of temporality. He thinks that in 
enumerating the ek-stases, the future is to be mentioned 
first, because the future has a priority in the ek-statical 
unity of primordial and authentic temporality. Such tem­
porality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic 
future and in such a way that in its orientation towards 
the future it first of all awakens the present.
^I b i d ., p . 376
^^ïbid., p . 376
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can have a resoluteness of being-alongside what is ready- 
to-hand in a situation by making such an entity present.
The character of "having been" arises from the future and 
in such a way that the future which is in the process of 
having been releases from itself the present. This pheno­
menon having the unity of a future which makes present in 
the process of having been is designated "temporality". 
Temporaluty révélas the being of Care.
D a s e i n 's totality of Being as Care means, "ahead-of-
itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside
8(entities encountered within-the-world)” . Dasein ' s 
"Being-ahead-of-itself" is grounded in the future. Being- 
already-in-the-world indicates the character of having 
been. Being-alongside is possible in making present the 
entities with which Dasein is concerned in the situation. 
Though "ahead" includes the notion of "before", and "already" 
includes the notion of "earlier". Care is not conceived as 
an entity which runs its course in time, becouae then the 
Being of an entity having the character of Dasein would 
become something present-at-hand. The "before" and "ahead" 
indicate the future which makes it possible for Dasein to 
be such that its potentiality-for-Being is an issue. "Self" 
projection upon the 'for-the-sake-of-oneself is grounded
^Ibid., p.2 36
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in the future and is an essential characteristic of
existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality 
gis the future. Similarly, "already" refers to the exist­
ential temporal meaning of the Being that has been thrown.
As long as Dasein factually exists, it is always in the 
sense of "I-am-as-having-been". But the term "past" is 
used with reference to things that are no longer present- 
at-hand. Dasein finds itself as an entity which it still 
is and already was - that is to say, "which it constantly 
is as having been".^^
The future, the character of having been, and the 
present reveal the phenomenal characteristics of the "toward- 
oneself", "the back-to" and the "letting-oneself-be- 
encountered-by". These phenomena of the future, the char­
acter of having-been, and the present are called by Hei­
degger the "ek-stases" of temporality. He thinks that in 
enumerating the ek-stases, the future is to be mentioned 
first, because the future has a priority in the ek-statical 
unity of primordial and authentic temporality. Such tem­
porality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic 
future and in such a way that in its orientation towards 




The true understanding of the past is possible, when 
Dasein adopts the responsible acceptance of throwness 
which is possible only because of one's future. Dasein 
can be its own "as it already 'was'". Dasein can move 
towards itself in the mode of the "future" only by going 
backwards towards its past at the same time. For the 
temporality of Dasein the future is somehow the "guiding" 
and dominant mode. Only when the Dasein "runs forward" to 
its inmost potentiality can it really move backward in 
"understanding" to its own past. Only in so far as Dasein 
is of the future can it authentically be of the past. The 
"resolve running forward" discloses the concrete given 
situation in such a way that "Existence" acts with circum­
spection in its care of what is "Zuhanden". The resolute 
Being-concerned-with-what-is "Zuhanden" in such a concrete 
given situation is possible, only when this "Zuhanden" 
is rendered present.
The nature of temporality as analyzed so far helps us 
to understand the characteristics of the structural unity 
of Care. The Being-ahead-of-itself of Care is grounded 
in the future. The "future" makes it possible for Dasein 
to be concerned about its potentiality of Being and to 
"project" itself towards its innermost possibility. Thus, 
the inner possibility of "Existentiality" as such is the 
"future". Being-already-in-the-world is grounded in the
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past, and the primary meaning of "facticity", with its 
throwness, is the past. Being-alongside the world is 
grounded in the present. It refers essentially to "render­
ing present" and the "Verfalien" or falling which is embed­
ded in the future and the past. The resolute Dasein brings 
itself out of the "Verfalien" to establish its authentic 
being in a disclosed situation to live in the moment of 
vision (Augenblick). Another important thing to remember 
in this connection is that temporality is not at all any­
thing that is in the sense of a "being". It, rather, pro­
duces Time. Temporality is, as Heidegger emphasizes, the 
original and fundamental "outside itself" in and for itself. 
As has been noted earlier, "Future", "Past", and "Present" 
are thus termed the ek-stases of Temporality.
3. Sartre's analysis of Temporality
In coming to Sartre's analysis of Temporality, we find 
that he makes use of Husserl's phenomenological investiga­
tion of time, inasmuch as he understands time as the unity 
of past, present, and future. The three phases are under­
stood in relation to one another. Sartre, like Heidegger, 
tries to show that the being of human reality is itself 
time, though he disagrees with Heidegger about the nature 
of ultimate project. Heidegger points out that the Being 
of Dasein is grounded in Temporality, for the human self
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is Care. But Sartre's definition of consciousness emphasizes 
more clearly that we can not be conscious without being 
temporal. The nature of Dasein is brought out more clearly 
if we remember that Dasein can have a project because the 
Being of Dasein is consciousness, essentially different 
from the other things which Heidegger includes in "Zuhanden" 
and "Vorhanden".
Sartre tries to understand Temporality "... as the 
structural moments of an original s y n t h e s i s T e m p o r ­
ality is to be approached as a totality which dominates 
the secondary structures and confers meaning on them. He 
first of all proceeds to analyze the being of the different 
phases of time.
About the past, the question always arises : what is 
the being of the past being? Some say that it is no longer, 
in which case the being is attributed to the present alone.
It is suggested that the past persists by virtue of a pre­
sent modification of our being. Thus everything is present - 
the body, the present perception, and the past as present 
modification of the brain process. This raises a problem - 
if everything is present, how c&n we explain the passivity 
of memory? In memory, consciousness transcends the present 
inc-order to aim at the event back there where it was. We are 
not able to get out of the present to direct ourselves
l^B/N., p.107
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toward the past. Sartre is of the opinion that if the past 
is not given in some manner, then no intellectual operation 
with reference to the "social contexts" can recreate it.
Sartre wants to attack the problem of the past in 
the perspective of intra-mundane being. The law of intra- 
mundane being is that Being is and such Being wholly exhausts 
itself in Being, and it cannot have any connection with 
what is no longer. If the past is considered as something 
in the world or something as present, then it is being- 
in-itself. Sartre thinks that the past is first of all m^ 
past. It is bound to a present and to a certain future, 
to both of which it belongs. The "myness" is an ontologi­
cal relation which unites the past to the present. The 
past is never isolated and it is originally the past of 
this present. When we remember that Paul in 1920 was a 
student, we have to admit a recollecting synthesis which 
stems from the present in order to maintain its cotact with 
the past.^^ The past always is the past of something or 
somebody; one has a past. It is not that first there is 
a universal past which becomes particularized in the con­
crete parts. On the contrary, the particular parts are 
discovered first, and we have to see how these individual 
pasts are united to form the past. It may be said that
^^Ibid., p.Ill
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the past can be understood with reference to the person 
who still "exists", but how can we understand the past in 
the case of a man who is dead? How can we say of the 
deceased Pierre that he loved music? It cannot be in rela­
tion to a universal present which is a pure affirmation 
of being; it must be then the past of my actuality, for 
Pierre has been for me and his existence formed a part of 
a present "in the world, for me, and for-others" which was 
my present during Pierre's life-time - a present which I 
have been. The concrete objects which have disappeared 
are past as they form a part of the concrete past of a 
survivor. We have to understand that death reduces the for- 
itself-for-others to the state of simple for-others.
Sartre remarks, "Today I alone am responsible for the Being
13of the dead Pierre, I in my freedom".
Sartre explains that one could nof'have" a past, as 
one "has" an automobile or a racing stable. The past can­
not be possessed by a being in the present which remains 
external to it. Because of this, an in-itself whose p re­
sent is what it is can not "have" a past. The past is 
possible only for a present which cannot exist without 
being its past. Sartre makes it clear that "was" means 
that the present being has to be in its being the founda­
tion of its past while being itself this past. Sartre
13lbid., p . 112
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points out that the term "was" indicates an ontological 
leap from the present into the past and represents an 
original synthesis of these two temporal modes. The term 
"was" is a mode of being, and in this sense I am my past.
We are responsible for our past. The past has come 
into the world by me. It is because I am my past that it 
enters into the world, and it is in terms of its being-in- 
the world that I can represent it to myself. The past is 
that for which I have to assume responsibility, but it is 
without possibility of any sort. I have to be the past 
with no possibility of not being it.
Though I have to be my past, and though I am also 
my past, it is also true that I am not my past. I am not 
it because I was it. The truth of my existence is that I 
have to be my past in order not to be it and I have not to 
be it in order to be it. If I am not what I was, it is 
because I am related to my being in the mode of an internal 
bond of non-being. The for-itself is always beyond that 
which it is by the very fact that it is for-itself and that 
it has to be it. The past is the in-itself which I am, 
but I have to go beyond this in-itself.
Sartre holds that the past as it is, at the same time 
resembles value, for it represents a certain synthesis of 
the Being which is what it is not and is not what it is - 





cannot be at rest "in-itself". So, the present can be 
only the presence of the for-itself to being-in-the-itself. 
This table can be present to that chair in a world which 
human reality haunts as a presence. The for-itself is 
defined as presence to being. Beings are found as co­
present in a world where the for-itself unites them:;.with 
its own blood by that total ek-static sacrifice of the self 
which is called presence. The question arises: what is 
this presence? Originally the for-itself is presence to 
being in so far as the for-itself is to itself its own 
witness of co-existence. It is present being if it is 
intentionally directed outside itself upon that being. The 
for-itself has an adherence to being due to the fact that 
it realizes its birth in an original bond with being; "it 
is a witness to itself of itself as not being that being. 
Due to this fact it is outside that being, upon being, and 
within being as not being that being.
The following conclusions as the meaning of presence 
can be deduced: "Presence to a being implies that one is 
bound to that being by an internal bond; otherwise no 
connection between present and being would be possible.
About the future Sartre says that it is only by human 
reality that the future arrives in the world. In itself
I S i b i d ., p . 122 
I G i b i d . , p . 122
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it is an actually. The future is possible only to a
being which is its own future. There is no moment in my
consciousness which is not defined by an internal relation
to future. "When I write, when I smoke, when I drink,
when I rest, the meaning of my consciousness is always at
17a distance down there, outside." The future is what I 
have to be insofar as I can not be it. The for-itself 
flees the present towards its being; that is, toward the 
self which it will be by coincidence with what it lacks.
The. future is revealed to the for-itself as that which the 
for-itself is not yet insofar as it makes itself be as a 
project of itself outside the present toward that which it 
is not yet. The future cannot be without this revelation.
This world has meaning as future only insofar as I am 
present to it as another who I will be, in another position, 
physical, emotional, social, etc. Future as the future 
presence of a for-itself to a being drags being-in-itself 
along with it into the future. I give to the world its 
own possibilities in terms of the state in which I apprehend 
it. But the future is not solely the presence of the for- 
itself to a being situated beyond being. It is something 
which waits for the for-itself which I am, because I project 
myself toward the future in order to merge there with that
l^Ibid., p.125
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which I lack. The project of the for-itself toward the 
future which it is, is a project towards the in-itself.
But the "reuniting" of the for-itself with what it lacks 
is purely ideal; it is not really operative. The future 
does not allow itself to be rejoined; it slides into the 
past as a bygone future, and the present for-itself is 
revealed as the foundation of its own nothingness, and 
once again as the lack of new future.
Temporality is possible as the intra-structure of a 
for-itself. Temporality is the being of the for-itself 
insofar as the for-itself has to be its being ek-statically. 
Temporality is not, but the for-itself temporalizes itself by 
existing. And there is no ontological priority of for- 
itself over temporality. This conclusion is demonstrated 
by the phenomenological study of the past, the present, 
and the future.
Sartre points out that the for-itself rises into being 
as the nihilation of the in-itself, giving rise thereby to all 
the possible dimensions of nihilation. It introduces multi­
plicity at the heart of being. The in-itself is neither 
diversity nor multiplicity, and in order to receive multi­
plicity as the characteristic of being-in-the-midst-of- 
the world, "a being must arise which is simultaneously
18present to each in-itself isolated in its own identity."
^^Ibid., p . 137
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In the first dimension the for-itself has to be its 
own being, as that which it is without being the foundation 
of it. This being is there, opposite it, but a nothingness 
separates it from being. The for-itself as the foundation 
of its nothingness is separated from the original contin­
gency in that it can neither get rid of it nor merge with 
it. This is the unconditional necessity of for-itself, for 
it is in one certain sense. But because it is for-itself, 
it is never what it is. What it is is behind it as .the past 
and is a necessary structure of the for-itself. It can 
exist only as a nihilating surpassing, and this implies 
that something is surpassed. Sartre thinks that the for- 
itself, because it has to be its past, comes into the world 
with a past. The relation of pastness is primitive, which 
is a relation between the for-itself and the pure in-itself. 
The original being of the for-itself is this relation to a 
being which is not consciousness, which exists in the total 
night of identity and which the for-itself is nevertheless 
obliged to be, outside and behind itself. The in-itself is 
what the for-itself was before. We can think of a solidarity 
with the foetus, in-itself, which we can neither deny nor 
understand. We can understand birth as an ek-static rela­
tion of being to the in-itself which it is not, because to 
be for-itself is to be born. It is through the for-itself 
that the past in general can exist, and it is from the stand-
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point of the for-itself that the past can be established.
As the in-itself is made co-present with the for-itself, a
world arises instead of isolated cases of in-itself. There
is a sense in which the for-itself appears as being born
from the world, for the in-itself from which it is born is
in the midst of the world. It is in terms of the world that
a for-itself arises which did not exist before and which has
been born. But in another sense, it is the for-itself which
causes the existence of a before in general, and there arises
a series of co-presents united in the unity of one past
world. Through the birth of the for-itself a past appears
in the world. We can point out here that "consciousness is
a being which rises to a being beyond an unalterable which
it is, and this unalterable inasmuch as it is behind the
19for-itself in the midst of the world, is the past."
In the second dimension, the for-itself experiences 
itself as a lack. It is both the lack and the lacking, for 
it has to be what it is not. When I am drinking, I am this 
drinking which I have to be and which I am not. In the third 
dimension, the for-itself is dispersed in the perpetual game 
of reflection-reflecting and escapes itself in the unity of 
one and the same flight. Being is everywhere and nowhere 
and as one tries to seize it, it has disappeared. Thus, the
19 Ibid., p . 140
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for-itself disperses its being in three dimensions and is 
temporal, because it nihilates itself. None of these dim­
ensions has ontological priority over another, but in spite 
of this Sartre puts emphasis to the present ek-stases and 
not to the future.
Sartre calls the past a fatality in reverse. The for-
itself can make itself what it wishes, but the past is a
for-itself which has fallen into the midst of the world.
What I have to be I am as a presence to the world which I
am not but which I was. "The for-itself falling into the
past as an ex-presence-to-being becomes in-itself, becomes
a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world and the world is retained
in the past dimension as that in the midst of which the past
20for-itself is in-itself." Sartre compares this situation 
of the for-itself to the Siren whose human body is completed 
in the tail of a fish. The for-itself is completed behind 
itself as a thing in the world. In the past the world sur­
rounds me and I am lost in the universal determinism, but 
I can transcend my past toward the future to the extent that 
"I was i t ."
The for-itself not only changes, but also endures. If 
it did not endure, it might remain a negation of the trans­
cendent in-itself, but it would be a given and would esquire 
the contingency of the in-itself. The for-itself would cease
20Ibid., p.146
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to be the foundation of its own nothingness. It would no
longer be as having to be, but it would simply be. As
Sartre remarks, "The flight of the for-itself is the refusal
of contingency by the very act which constitutes the for-
itself as being the foundation of its nothingness." The
for-itself being always in the flight, the totality is never
achieved, and it is a totality which is refused and which
flees from itself. Sartre concludes with this remark,
"Thus the time of consciousness is human reality 
which temporalizes itself as the totality which 
is to itself its own incompletion; it is nothing­
ness slipping into a totality as a detotalizing 
ferment... There is never an instant at which 
we can assert that the for-itself is, precisely 
because the for-itself never is. Temporality, on 
the contrary, temporalizes itself entirely as the 
refusal of the instant."21
Sartre's idea of temporality agrees essentially with 
that of Heidegger in the sense that in both human reality 
in its basic character is temporality. Heidegger makes a 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic being and tries 
to point out that authentic existence lies in adopting the 
resolute nature of realizing the true nature of Dasein, which 
is oriented towards death. Dasein has to be ahead of itself 
in order to understand its ultimate possibility. Because 
death lies in the future and Dasein has to remain in the resol­
uteness of anticipation with reference to death, Dasein has 
to be temporality. Sartre also speaks of the ultimate possib­
i l i t y .  , p.149
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ility d£ for-itself which is to be for-itself-in-itself 
and because for-itself is on the path towards the ideal, 
for-itself is temporal. In Heidegger's thought the ultimate 
possibility, though uncertain about the time of its reali­
zation, is the most certain to be actualized. Thus, there 
is a difference about the actualization of the ultimate 
possibility between Heidegger and Sartre. But this differ­
ence does not affect the fact that human reality is a p r o ­
ject and is ahead of itself to realize its ideal. As p ro­
ject, it is the future which gives meaning to the life of 
the present and the past. There is difference in emphasis 
on the phases of temporality, even though both Sartre and 
Heidegger agree that temporality is an ek-static unity in 
which each phase has to be understood in relation to the 
other, as each is unsubstantial without the other phases. 
Sartre calls such relationship between the phases an original 
synthesis. Heidegger thinks that Dasein is in the world 
with a past and Dasein's yet to be can be understood, because 
it has already been. Again, the future project of the Dasein 
makes the repetitions of the past intellegible. In the p re­
sent, Dasein renders itself present to the environment with 
an anticipatory understanding of the future. Heidegger also 
speaks of the guilt of the Dasein in the stage of having 
been from which it has to be awakened. But it is not always 
clear from his analysis what exact relation the past bears
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to the present. In that respect, Sartre is much more 
emphatic on the existential significance of the past, when 
he says I am my past, and the present is always haunted by
the past, as it has to be responsible for the past.
Sartre gives more emphasis to the present, because it 
is in the present that the for-itself feels that it is a 
lack; only in the future can it be what it is. In Heidegger's 
thought, the future is already definite, because every Dasein 
is in its ultimate nature being towards death. So, the pre­
sent is only the stage of preparing the Dasein, and the
adoption of the resoluteness derives its meaning from the 
future which makes the present dependent on future. Sartre 
does not say that the future determines the present, though 
the future gives a pre-outline of what the for-itself is to 
be. But the for-itself has the freedom not to realize the 
possibility. It is not clear what Sartre means by this 
ideal of the for-itself-in-itself, but by its nature it is 
a self-contradictory ideal. It may mean that the for-itself 
becomes in-itself, but that is not possible; for the for- 
itself, by its nature always escapes the situation. So, 
the future ideal can give the present an impetus, but it is 
the present which understands itself as the possible.
Sartre does not speak about authentic and inauthentic 
existence in the sense of Heidegger, but he makes a distinction 
between pure and impure reflection. It is pure reflection
148
which makes for-itself aware of temporality and, at the 
same time, recover its temporalization, as reflection can 
never grasp the for-itself as it is or in-itself. But in 
impure reflection, the flow of the for-itself is arrested 
and is transformed into a succession of "nows" that gives 
rise to the psychic objects. Psychic temporality is what 
we understand by the life of the ego in which the past, 
the present, and the future are gathered together in a sort 
of artificial unity. Though it is not clearly expressed, 
it seems sure that through this projection of psychic tem­
porality, we come to understand everyday time, which Heid­
egger calls "public time" or the "time of Zuhanden and Vor- 
handen." Sartre speaks of the for-itself as historciity, 
but he never shows the relation between historicity and 
history, as Heidegger does. Yet the nature of the for-itself, 
consisting in temporalization, makes it clear that only with 
the birth of the for-itself the sense of time enters into 
the world. Thus, history, being a record of temporal events 
connected with the life of the for-itself, must have its 
foundation on the temporalizing of the for-itself.
Thus, Husserl and Heidegger's analysis have helped us 
understand Sartre's notion of temporality, for him, tempor­
ality is both a flow of consciousness and a project. Sartre's 
understanding of the for-itself is brought out clearly by 
the notion of temporality, for it is not that consciousness
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lives in time, but rather that consciousness ^  time. It 
is not the apriori form of consciousness; rather conscious­
ness manifests itself in the different phases of what we 
call the past, the present, and the future. We have tried 
to show consciousness as a temporal unity, as Sartre's idea 
of consciousness is always in the process to not be what 
it is in order to be what it is not. And this is best mani­
fested in Sartre's understanding of temporality. We shall 
close this discussion with a brief reference to Merleau- 
Ponty, whose ideas on temporality may throw some light on 
Sartre's notion.
4. Merleau-Ponty's notion of temporality
Merleau-Ponty states that if we look at the things 
themselves, there are no successive events. "When I say 
that the day before yesterday, the glacier produced the 
water which is passing at this time, I am tacitly assuming 
the existence of a witness tied to a certain spot in the 
world and I am comparing his successive views."^2 But in 
the world itself, there is simply one indivisible changeless 
being. Time is, therefore, not an actual succession that I 
am keeping record of. It arises from my relation to things. 
Neither is the theory of the psychologists that time is in 
consciousness satisfactory, because they try to explain the
2 2 Î. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p.411
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memory of the past by means of physiological or psychic 
preservation. But the truth is that the traces them­
selves do not refer to the past; rather the sense of 
the past comes from myself, because what is past in 
my life has a significance for me.
It is the field of presence which is the primary 
experience in which time and its dimensions make their 
appearance. It is here that we see a future sliding 
into the present and on into the past. These dimensions 
are not given to us through discrete acts; my day weighs 
upon me with all its weight, it is still there. In the 
same way, I do not think of the evening to come and 
its consequences, and yet it is there, like the back of 
a house of which I can see only the facade. The pro­
tentions and retentions run from my perceptual field 
itself, "which draws along in its wake its own horizon
of retentions and bites into the future with its pro- 
23tentions." With every new moment, its predecessor 
undergoes a change. Though I have it in hand and it is 
still there, it is already sinking away below the 
level of presents. When a third moment arrives, the 
second undergoes a new modification; from being retention 
it becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of 
time between it and me thickens.
Z^ibid., p. 416.
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Merleau-Ponty says that the past and the future 
exist only when a subjectivity is there to disrupt the 
plenitude of being-in-itself. A past and a future spring 
forth when I reach out towards them. I am not, for myself, 
at this very moment; I am also at this morning or at the 
night which will soon be there. My present is this 
instant, but it is equally this very day, this year 
or my whole life. There is no external synthesis 
which binds together the tempora into one single time, 
because each of the tempora includes, beyond itself, 
the whole open series of other tempora, in internal 
communication with them, because the "cohesion of life" 
is given with its ek-stase. The passage of one present 
to the next is not a thing which is conceived by me nor 
it is perceived by me as an onlooker. I perform it.
This is not to say that time is for someone, but rather 
that time someone. We have to understand time as 
the subject and the subject as time. Primordial tem­
porality is not a juxtaposition of external events, as 
it is the power which holds them together, while keeping 
them apart. "In my present, if I grasp it while it is 
still living and with all that it implies, there is 
an ek-stase towards the future and towards the past which 
reveals the dimensions of time not as conflicting, but 
as inseparable."^^ Subjectivity lives through time
9 AIbid., p. 422.
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and merges with the cohesion of life.
Consciousness is the very action of time - 
creation or temporalization - a self-anticipatory 
movement, a flow which never leaves itself. Time is the 
"affecting of self by self;" what exerts the effect is 
time as a thrust and a passivity towards future; what 
is affected is time as an unfolded series of presents.
The affecting agent and affected recipient are one.
This ek-stase is subjectivity. Time is a spontaneity 
which perpetuates itself in virtue of its being acquired. 
Time without its roots in a present and thence a past 
would not be time, but eternity. Heidegger's his­
torical time, flowing from the future has its future in 
advance and rescues itself from disintegration. But it 
is impossible within the context of Heidegger's thought 
itself. If time is an ek-stase, if present and past are 
two results of this ek-stase, how can we stop seeing 
time from the point of view of the present and how ig it 
possible to escape from the inauthentic? We are always 
centered in the present, and our decisions start from 
there. They can always be brought into relationship with 
our past, and they have to be subsequently carried 
forward. Time is the foundation and measure of our 
spontaneity and the power of outrunning and of "neantiser" 
which dwells within us and is ourselves. We are wholly 
active and passive, because we are the upsurge of time.
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According to Merleau-Ponty, "the world is inseparable
from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing
but a project of the world, and the subject is insepa-
25rable from the world which projects itself." The 
subject is being-in-the-world and the world remains 
"subjective" since its style and the articulations are 
indicated by the s u b j e c t  movement of transcendence. 
Merleau-Ponty thinks that his analysis of time has con­
firmed this new notion of significance and understanding.
The points of agreement between Sartre and Merleau- 
Ponty lie in both of their giving emphasis to the present. 
Merleau-Ponty does not speak about any ultimate possi­
bility, like Heidegger and Sartre, but rather understands 
the subject as project. Insofar as the individual is a 
project, time is generated by the life of the subject.
This does not mean that there was no time before the 
existence of human subject, but that time cannot be 
contemplated without reference to the subject and his 
cultural world. Merleau-Ponty mentions a close connection 
between the subject and the world, as both are insepa­
rable from each other and the subject can have a project 
by being-inbthe-world, for the project of the subject 
is to mould the world. Sartre wants to give the subject
25 Ibid., p. 4 30
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more freedom and therefore his subject, though living 
in the world, is never bound by it. It refuses to be 
limited by the in-itself. But Sartre would not deny that 
the in-itself remains an unavoidable facticity in the 
life of the subject, due to which his life is contingent. 
It seems that the difference between Sartre and Merleau- 
Ponty is one of emphasis, for Sartre does not think that 
consciousness is actually separate from the in-itself; 
only consciousness can understand itself as different 
from the object and thus the project of the human subject 
has no meaning, if it is thought of as isolated from the 
world. Both Heidegger and Sartre speak of an authentic 
or original temporality on the basis of which there is 
inauthentic or psychic temporality. But for Merleau- 
Ponty the subject always being inseparably connected 
with all other things of the world, it does not make 
any sense to talk of a pure subject or authentic subject, 
for being-in-the-world is the concrete existence of the 
subject. Only when we make abstractions from the con­
crete life, as done by sciences, do we have an inauthentic 
picture. But Merleau-Ponty does not try to show how the 
conception of time as understood by the sciences is de­
pendent on the nature of the human project.
CHAPTER V 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND FREEDOM
1. The Cartesian Notion of Freedom
The nature of consciousness, as Sartre under­
stands it, is to go beyond itself, to be what it is 
not and not to be what it is. In this sense, con­
sciousness exists in temporal dimensions. Temporali­
zation of consciousness is possible because conscious­
ness is free. We say rather that freedom is the in­
ternalization of temporalization. That consciousness 
exists in the ek-static unity of past, present, and 
future is possible, because consciousness is freedom. 
This is made apparent by Sartre when he s a y s ,
Man does not exist first in order to be 
free subsequently; there is no difference 
between the being of man and his being- 
free . 1
Sartre points out that the question of freedom 
was basically understood by Descartes. For him, free­
dom depended on the rational understanding of the 
universe. Man, being finite, could not have the free-
^B .N., p. 25.
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dom of production - "ex nihilo." He had the freedom 
to accept the necessary order of the world by his under­
standing. But this was not all. He had the power to 
say "no" if in some cases, his reason was not satisfied 
with the evidence to give his assent to what was thought 
to be necessary. This refusal to accept something which 
would be considered false is the essence of Cartesian 
freedom. Man's nature, being finite, had the freedom 
to agree with the divine order of things. Of course, 
he did it with his power of reason. This freedom also 
includes the fact that the truths discovered by man are
possible by the freedom of understanding.
Descartes was more interested in affirming the 
responsibility of man in the presence of the true. Be­
fore I make a judgment, in which I adhere to my will and
make a free commitment of my being, there exist only
neutral and floating ideas which are neither true nor 
false. Sartre says,
"Man is thus the being through whom truth appears 
in the world. His task is to commit himself 
totally in order that the natural order of 
existents may become an order of truths.
Descartes shows that freedom does not come from 
man as he is, as a fullness of existence among other 
fullnesses in a world without lacunae, but rather from
^Sartre, "Cartesian Freedom," Literary and Philo­
sophical Essays, chapter 12, Collier Books, New York, 
1955, p. 182.
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man as he is not, from man as a finite, limited being.
But he did not push his theory of negativity to the 
limit, for truth consists in being and falsehood in 
non-being. Man's power of refusal lies only in saying 
"no" to non-being. We are able to withhold our assent 
to the works of the evil spirit, because they are not, 
insofar as they relate falsely to objects that do not 
exist. Cartesian freedom wavers between the identifi­
cation of freedom with
1. negativity or negation of being, and
2. the conception of free will as a simple 
negation of negation.
It is a strange freedom, as it ends by decomposing into 
two phases. At first, it is a negative one and autono­
mous, but its activity is confined to refusing our assent 
to error or confused thought. In the second, it is a 
positive adherence, but the will then loses its auto­
nomy. The perfect clarity of understanding penetrates 
and determines the will. But it cannot be denied that 
Descartes had a true intuition of freedom, which he was 
forced to reduce to a merely negative power. Its func­
tion consisted merely in denying itself until it finally 
yielded and abandoned itself to the divine solicitude.
The Cartesian ideal of freedom - that human freedom 
is autonomous and its nature consists in negating being - 
finds its fulfillment in Sartre. According to him, the
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rise of man in the midst of being causes a world to be 
discovered. The most important element of this rise is 
negation, and "Man is the being through him nothingness
3comes into the world.". Freedom of man is the reason
why there is nothingness in the world. in other words,
the being that conditions the appearance of nothingness
is freedom. The condition due to which human reality
can deny the whole or part of the world is that human
reality carries within itself the nothingness which
separates its present from the past. Consciousness
constitutes itself in relation to its past as separated
from the past by a nothingness. Sartre expresses this
condition in his metaphorical language;
"Freedom is the human being putting his 
past out of play by secreting his own 
nothingness. Consciousness continually 
experiences itself as the nihilation of 
its past being.
2. Analysis of Action
In what follows we shall try to give an exposition 
of Sartre's idea of freedom, as it expresses the onto­
logical dimension of consciousness. Sartre thinks that 
freedom can be best understood by analyzing the structure
^B.N. , p. 24.
*Ibid., p. 28.
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of action. Any act is a projection of the for-itself 
toward what is not, and what is can in no way determine 
by itself what is not. No factual state can determine 
consciousness so as to define it. A factual state is 
grasped only by means of the nihilating power of the 
for-itself. It is only by a pure wrenching away from 
himself and the world that the worker, for example, can 
understand his suffering as unbearable and, as a result, 
can make of it the motive of his revolutionary action. 
Consciousness has the permanent possibility of effecting 
a rupture with its past, of wrenching itself away from 
the past so as to be able to confer on it the meaning 
which it has in terms of the project of a meaning which 
it does not have.
The deterministsargue that there is no action with­
out a cause, while the proponents of free will are con­
cerned to find decisions for which there exists no prior 
cause. But actually, every action must have an end, 
and the end in turn is referred to a cause. The end 
of my future implies a cause; it points toward my past, 
and the present is the upsurge of the act. To speak of 
an act without a cause is absurd. Sartre writes:
"The essential question in fact lies beyond
the complex organization 'cause-intention-
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act-end;' Indeed we ought to ask how 
a cause (or motive) can be constituted 
as such.
In order to be a cause, the cause must be experi­
enced as such. This means that the for-itself must 
confer on the cause its value as cause or motive. The
motive can be understood only by the end; that is, by
the non-existent. If I accept a low-paying job out 
of fear, fear is a motive. But it is fear of dying 
from starvation, and thus fear has meaning outside it­
self in an end ideally posited. It is understood only 
in relation to the value which I implicitly give to 
life. It is referred to the hierarchical system of ideal 
objects which are values. Thus the motive is understood 
as what it is by means of the ensemble of beings which 
"are not" and by the future. The future turns back on 
the past and the present in order to elucidate them. 
Similarly, it is the ensemble of my projects which turns
back in order to confer upon the motive its structure
as a motive. The act, the motive, and the end are all 
constituted in a single upsurge. Each of these three 
structures claims the two others as its meaning. But 
the organized totality of the three is not explained by 
any particular structure, and the upsurge as the pure 
temporalizing nihilation of the in-itself is freedom.
^Ibid. , p . 437.
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Sartre has already pointed out that if negation 
comes into the world through human activity, the latter 
must be a being capable of realizing a "nihilating rup­
ture with the world and with himself." The permanent 
possibility of this rupture is freedom. This implies 
for man a particular type of existence such that human 
reality is its own nothingness, and for it to be is to 
nihilate the in-itself which it is. It is because of 
this that the for-itself has to be what it is not and,
"to say that it is what it is not, while not being what 
it iŝ  is to say that in it, existence precedes essence."^
All this means the same thing: to be aware that
man is free. There is no limit to my freedom and "I 
am condemned to be free."^ If the for-itself wishes to 
hide its own nothingness from itself and to incorporate 
the in-itself as its true mode of being, it tries to hide 
freedom from itself. This is what happens in the deter- 
minist's attempt to explain the human action as an 
unbroken chain of causes. But nothing can compel a hu­
man action, and freedom cannot be stifled under the weight 
of being.
Sartre states that human reality is free, because 




expresses in other wordsf that it is not enough. As
man is incomplete, man has a possibility and he has the
power to choose. As Sartre says,
"Freedom is precisely the nothingness 
which is made to be at the heart of man 
and which forces human reality to make 
itself, instead of to be."®
For human reality, to be is to choose oneself. Thus
freedom is not a being; it is the nothingness of being.
Sartre makes an emphatic statement,
"Man cannot be sometimes slave and 
sometimes free; he is wholly and 
forever free or he is not free at a ll.
3. Nature of Freedom
Sartre, in analyzing the relation between cause,
motive and end, points out that the cause is characterized
as the objective appreciation of the situation. Sartre
means by cause the objective appreciation of the situation,
It is an ensemble of factors that are utilized by the
agent. For example, in Macbeth's murder of the king, the
factual conditions were such as Macbeth could make use
of them. But the objective situation could be considered
as cause only in the light of an end. Sartre says,
"We shall therefore use the term cause for 
the objective appreciation of a determined 
situation as the situation is revealed 
in the light of a certain end as being 
able to serve as the means of attaining 
this end.
®Ibid., p. 440.
^Ibid. , p. 441.
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The motive, on the contrary, is generally con­
sidered as a subjective fact. It is the ensemble of the 
desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to accom­
plish a certain act. It is true that the cause is objec­
tive, as the state of contemporary things revealed to 
a consciousness. But this state of affairs can be re­
vealed only to a for-itself, since in general the for- 
itself is the being for which there is a world. The 
objective situation can be cause, when it is possible to 
transcend toward a particular potentiality. This poten­
tiality is revealed only if the situation is surpassed 
towards a state of things that does not yet exist. Thus 
the cause, instead of determining the action, arises only 
in and through the project of an action. It is now p o s ­
sible to understand the relations of these three terms: 
causes, motives, and ends.
"Just as it is the upsurge of the for-itself which 
causes there to be a world, so here it is the very being 
of the for-itself - insofar as this being is a pure pro­
ject toward an end - which causes there to be certain 
objective structure of the world, one of which deserves 




itself is the consciousness of this cause. But this is 
a positional consciousness which is at the same time a 
non-thetic consciousness of itself as project toward an 
end. In this sense, it is a motive, as it experiences 
itself non-thetically as a project at the very moment 
at which it reveals the organization of the world as 
causes. Cause and motive are the correlatives, just as 
the non-thetic self-consciousness is the ontological 
correlate, of the thetic consciousness of the object.
It has been pointed out that freedom is actually 
the being of for-itself. It is free to the exact extent 
that it has to be its own nothingness. It becomes its 
own nothingness, first, by temporalizing itself - i.e., 
by remaining at a distance from itself, so that it can 
never let itself be determined by a past to perform this 
or that act: by rising up as consciousness of something
and (of) itself, and finally by being a transcendence, 
i.e., a project. But this does not mean that every act 
is capricious. Each of my acts is entirely free in the 
sense of being understood in the light of the project 
of the for-itself. But this does not mean that my act 
can be anything whatsoever or that it is unforseeable.
A choice is free when it is such that it could have 
been other than what it is. In starting out on a hike,
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I become fatigued and I give up the journey. Someone 
can point out that I was free and so could have succeeded 
in resisting my fatigue. The problem is to be formu­
lated like this: Could I have done otherwise without
perceptibly modifying the organic totality of the pro­
jects which I am?
The fatigue by itself could not provoke my decision. 
Fatigue is the way in which I exist "my body," and it 
is the very facticity of my consciousness. As I hike 
across the country, the surrounding world that is re­
vealed to me is the object of my consciousness. To the 
extent that I appreciate the country side with my eyes, 
my legs, etc. - I have a non-positional consciousness 
of this body which directs my relations with the world 
and establishes my engagement in the world, in the form 
of fatigue. As I suffer the fatigue, it appears tolerable 
or intolerable. It is the reflective for-itself which, 
rising up, suffers the fatigue as intolerable. What 
decision I take under the condition of fatigue is to 
be understood in the perspective of a larger choice. My 
companions are also fatigued, but if they decide to go on, 
their fatigue is lived in a vaster project of sweet 
mastery and appreciation of nature. It is only by means 
of this project that the fatigue will be understandable 
and that it will have meaning for them.
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Like Freud, Sartre thinks that an act cannot be
limited to itself; it refers to more profound structures.
The act, for Freud, is symbolic. It expresses a more
profound desire which, can be interpreted only in terms
of an initial determination of the subject's libido.
But Freud, though he avoids the theory of interpreting
the action by mere antecedental circumstances, aims at
constituting a deeper determinism. The ultimate cause
in Freudian psychology being the libido, it seems that
Freud has freed himself from what is known as horizontal
determinism in which each action is determined by the
previous circumstances, just as in the case of natural
events. But the libido being dependent on the historical
situation remains rooted in the horizontal determinism.
Freud explains all actions in terms of the past complexes,
and so the dimension of the future does not exist for
psycho-analysis. Sartre wants to understand every act
"integrated as a secondary structure in a global struc-
12ture and finally in the totality which I am." Every 
pattern of behavior, such as an inferiority complex, is 
a free and global project, the way in which I choose 
to assume my being-for-others. Every project is compre­
hensible as a project toward a possible.
12I b i d ., p . 456
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Let us return to the question which was asked 
earlier: Could I have done otherwise than yielding to
fatigue? Sartre answers that the act was not gratuitous, 
because it has to be interpreted in terms of an original 
project of which it formed one integral part. Thus it 
is evident that the act could not have been modified with­
out at the same time supposing a fundamental modification 
of my original project. "Thus this possible - to stop - 
theoretically takes on its meaning only in and through 
the hierarchy of the possibles which I am in terms of 
the ultimate and initial p o s s i b l e . T h i s  does not 
mean that it is necessary for me to stop, but merely 
that I can refuse to stop only by a radical conversion 
of my being-in-the-world.
4. Project and Freedom
The choice we make is injustifiable, and we realize 
this in our anguish. Choice is not derived from any prior 
reality; rather, it serves as the foundation for the 
ensemble of significations that constitute reality. Our 
existential freedom perpetually eats away the project, as 
we realize that we are what we are by means of the future; 
yet we do not have a grip on this future which remains
^^Ibid., p. 464,
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alwêijs possible. Thus we are all the time threatened 
by the nihilation of our choice and perpetually threatened 
with choosing ourselves other than we are. But the 
original choice creates all causes and motives that guide 
us to particular actions. It also arranges the world 
with its meaning, instrumental complexes, and its co­
efficient of adversity. The original choice is to be 
conceived as unfolding time and as one with the unity of 
the three ek-stases. To choose ourselves is to cause a 
future to come to make known to us what we are by con­
ferring a meaning on our past. Sartre says, "Thus free­
dom, choice, nihilation, temporalization are all one 
and the same t h i n g .
Sartre points out that the relation between the 
secondary possibles and the fundamental possible is that 
the meaning of the former always refers to the total 
meaning which I am. But other possibles can replace the 
present one without altering the total meaning. In the 
ontological order of realization, they could just as well 
have been projected as the means of attaining the totality 
and in the light of this totality. This means that the 
global project which I have chosen as my ultimate p ro­
ject does not account for the choice of one possible 
rather than another. Again, each "act" appears on the
l^Ibid. p. 465
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ground of the world and my facticity, but neither of these 
makes it possible to understand why I grasp this glass, 
rather than the inkwell. These are all indifferent 
in relation to our freedom, and these free choices are 
all integrated in the unity of my fundamental project.
Sartre comes to conclude that the for-itself is 
free and causes there to be a world because the for- 
itself is the being which has to be what it was in the 
light of what it will be. As the for-itself never exists 
as anything but a choice in the making and as choice is 
made without a support, choice is absurd. But the choice 
is absurd not because it is without reason, but because 
there has never been any possibility of not choosing one­
self. The choice is absurd because it is that by which 
all foundations and reasons come into being, and only by 
it does the notion of the absurd receive a meaning.
According to Sartre, the free project is foundation­
al because it is my being. Ambition, passion, inferiority 
are not fundamental projects; rather, they have to be 
understood in terms of a primary project which can no 
longer be interpreted in terms of any other project and 
which is total. The explicit study of this original 
project is treated by Sartre in the study of existential 
psycho-analysis. This fundamental project is my total 
being-in-the-world; and as the world itself is revealed
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in the light of an end, this project posits as its end 
a certain relation which the for-itself wills to adopt. 
The choice must be a choice in the world. The project 
of the for-itself must be constantly renewed. We have 
to remember also that other choices are possible. This 
possibility of other choices is lived in the feeling of 
unjustifiability. This expresses the absurdity of 
choice and the being of for-itself. I am free and so I 
project my total possibility, but thereby I posit that 
I am free and I can always nihilate the first project 
and make it past.
Thus freedom is conceived only as the nihilation 
of a given and to the extent that it is an integral ne­
gation, it participates in the necessity that conscious­
ness is consciousness of something. Freedom is the 
freedom of choosing, and not to choose is to choose not 
to choose. As the choice is the foundation of being 
chosen, it is absurd. There again we are referred to 
a given which is the very facticity of the for-itself. 
Lastly, the global project which illuminates the world 
in its totality can be made specific on the occasion of 
this or that element of the situation and on the basis 
of the contingency of the world. This brings up the 
relation of freedom to facticity.
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5. Facticity and Freedom
Sartre, even though he advocates absolute freedom, 
understands that there are many things which handicap 
our exercise of freedom. Such obstacles to freedom can 
be categorized under five heads: my place, my past,
my environment, other human beings, and my death.
The for-itself becomes free by negating the in- 
itself and the given is that nihilated in-itself. The 
body of the for-itself is a point of view on the world, 
and its past is the essence which the for-itself was.
The given, the body, and the past are designations of a 
single reality. By the choice of its end, freedom causes 
the given or the datum to be revealed in this or that 
way. The given or the datum is never revealed as a 
brute existent in-itself, and it is discovered as a 
cause since it is revealed in the light of an end which 
illumines it. The for-itself finds itself "as engaged 
in being, hemmed in by being, threatened by being; it 
discovers the state of things which surrounds it as the 
cause for a reaction of defense or attack. This
shows that the situation, which is a product of contin­
gency and the in-itself and of freedom, is something 
ambiguous in which it is impossible to separate the
^^Ibid. , p . 481,
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contribution of freedom from that of the brute existents.
Whether the rock is a resistance or not depends on whether
I have a desire to scale it. To a traveler who passes
over the road, it is neither scalable or not-scalable;
it is, perhaps, either beautiful or ugly. Thus the paradox
of freedom is this:
"There is freedom only in a situation, 
and there is situation only through freedom.
Human reality everywhere encounters 
resistance and obstacles, which it has 
not created but these resistances and 
obstacles have meaning only in and 
through the free choice which human 
reality is."^®
6. My Place
"My place" refers to the present place I occupy, 
but it presupposes another place until the first p l a c e , 
the place of my birth, is received. It is from this 
original place that I move to other places. This seems 
to restrict my freedom, and the determinist points out 
that the choice of a certain place excludes other pos­
sibilities and thus restricts my freedom. The advo­
cates of free will suggest that although I am in this 
spot, I am always free to go to another place.
According to Sartre, both these views are mis­
taken. Place and space can be said "to be" only through
l^ibid., p. 489.
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humanity, as the occupation of a place is the result 
of my organizing the world. While I consider several 
this-es - like my city, the walls of the room, my table, 
chair - I separate myself in a continual and multiform 
negation, and thus I situate myself as a this among 
other thises. Thus I constitute my place. The place 
as my place can only be realized by a being who, although 
here, is able to go beyond his place and to reach another 
place which is there. One is here only because one can 
be aware of a there. It is therefore, a human being 
alone who can speak of a place. Being-in-itself is in 
a place, if a for-itself takes up the attitude of world 
organization and considers it as a certain "this" and 
locates it.
7. My Past
According to Sartre, freedom means to be free 
from all deterministic influences of the past. This 
does not mean that freedom is possible without the 
past. If I prepare myself for a particular profession, 
it is always possible that I will join that particular 
profession. Of course, I can always change it or I 
can regret the acceptance of a particular job. But all 
this presupposes the past.
The meaning of the past is strictly dependent on 
my present project. This does not mean that I can make
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the meaning of the past anyway I choose. Rather, it
means that "the fundamental project which I am decides
absolutely the meaning which the past I have to be can
17have for me and for others." I preserve the past 
with me by projecting toward certain ends and I decide 
its meaning by my action. Whatever I do, like the 
educational aspect of a trip, the sincerity of a p r o ­
fession of love, or the purity of a past intention, 
can be illuminated according to the ends I choose. It 
is the future which decides whether the past is living 
or dead. The past is originally a project, and to the 
extent it is a project, it is an anticipation. If the 
past slips wholly into the past, its absolute value 
depends on the validation or invalidation of the p ro­
ject which it anticipated. The force of the past comes 
from the future. I can evaluate my past only in the 
light of a project of myself toward the future.
8. My Environment
My environment consists of the things which sur­
round me with their coefficient of adversity and utility 
The tools have their value and resistance. But it is 
my free will which organizes this world. I may plan to
l?Ibid., p. 448.
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use my bicycle on a rough road in the hot sun to conquer 
the "brute résistants." I may also act in a different 
way and come back. But in all this, there is the exis­
tence of a free choice. Some relation develops between 
the for-itself and the in-itself. Without the in-itself 
there would be no choice or action. To be free means 
to-be-free-in-the-world, or to-be-free-in-order-to-act.
I am born into a world which has already been 
organized by others. Thus, there is a world-in-the- 
presence-of-the-other. My existence among others has 
a concrete and precise form. For example, I am an In­
dian, a Calcuttan, and a middle-class person. It is 
evident that the fact of belonging to such a class and 
to such a country puts me in a category of beings I 
did not choose.
Sartre compares the relation between the individual 
and a nation with the relation between grammar and lan­
guage. The big mistake is to put the grammar before the 
language, to separate the language from the spoken and 
the living word and to divorce the spoken word from the 
concrete situation. All the linguistic frameworks by 
themselves are "unselbstandig" and are meaningful only 
when incarnated in the living world and as such main­
tained by a free will. This is true of all human tech-
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niques. We can make a scheme for certain things, but 
the scheme exists only in the materialization of the 
concrete act of the for-itself.
There is no human species, according to Sartre, 
prior to the concrete situations or incarnation in some 
individual. The for-itself thus is not dependent upon 
the human species or the nation. Instead, the for- 
itself in choosing itself presents us with the possibility 
of elaborating a scheme which is the human species or the 
national collectivity. It is because we accept our­
selves as belonging to some nation, that there is a 
nation. As the for-itself is responsible for the existence 
of the human species, each individual through the fact 
that he admits of being a certain national, constitutes 
the nation.
It may be objected that language or any other 
technique is ready made for an individual when he is born 
into the world. Sartre thinks that there is indeed a pre­
given "datum," which I cannot prevent. When I came into 
the world, the world was already organized, measured, etc. 
And yet, it is still my task to transform it into my own 
world. Once a technique has been interiorized, it is no 
longer a technique, but something incarnated and conducted 
by my free will towards an aim. My freedom masteB and 
exploits the technique in its own way. About the idea of
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the nation., it is true that I cannot be a person with­
out belonging to one form or another, but all these 
characteristics have nothing "substantial" about them.
It is my personal world in its concrete form, and to be
in a middle-class family is only a means of being myself.
That which exists, according to Sartre, is the individual. 
The categorization of the individual comes later and is 
merely a human work.
9. The Other
It is true that the other limits my freedom through 
his presence, and thus, freedom is only restricted by
freedom - in this case, my freedom by the freedom of the
other. Appearance in the world as freedom before others 
implies that this freedom appears as object for the other 
and is thus in a certain sense alienated. But this 
alienation is unconscious. At the same time, I become, 
through him, conscious of my freedom. In this sense, I 
recover my freedom.
If the other claims that I am ugly, I ought to 
assume it, even when I myself do not see it. There are 
many such "unrealizables" in life. I have to assume them 
in pain or pleasure, in hate or joy. It is the view of 
the other on me, which in a certain sense restricts my 
freedom - not in its internal or essential dimension.
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but as some external limitation through the power of 
the other. Sartre thinks that these external limits of 
freedom, precisely because they are external and are 
interiorized only as unrealizables, will never be a real 
obstacle for a freedom or a limit to be suffered.
10. My Death
The last obstacle to freedom is my death. The 
question that arises is how far can death be considered 
as a real obstacle? Heidegger's Dasein is a project 
towards death. Death is not merely one of the possibi­
lities of the Dasein; it is even the possibility "par 
excellence," the most personal and the most unavoidable 
possibility. Sartre does not agree with Heidegger in 
his conception of death, as he thinks that in Heidegger's 
argument there is a circularity. Heidegger begins with 
the understanding of death as the individualizing of the 
death of each and then uses it to individualize the Dasein, 
But death can be one individual's, because he is first 
of all an individual. If death is taken as the ultimate 
subjective possibility, then it is evident that nobody 
can die for me. But this can be true for any of my 
possibilities. Again, death is not some thing to be 
awaited for, for we can 'wait for' only determined event. 
Such an event is the result of equally determined pro-
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cesses. In that respect, I can wait for a train, as I 
know that it has left the earlier station. Also one 
cannot wait for death, because we have every chance of 
dying before we have accomplished our task.
Further, death cannot confer meaning on life from 
the outside; a meaning can come only from subjectivity. 
But death does not appear 'on' the foundation of our 
freedom; rather, it removes all meaning from life. Death 
is absurd, as it is not only the always possible nihila­
tion of my possibles; it is also the triumph of the 
point of the other point of view which I have toward 
myself. So long as the for-itself is "in life," it 
surpasses its past towards its future, and the past is 
that which the for-itself has to be. When the for-it­
self dies, the past is not thereby abolished; it is 
engulfed in the in-itself. The difference between life 
and death is that life decides its own meaning, because 
it is always in suspense; while death represents a 
total dispossession. The fact of death gives the com­
plete and final victory to the point of view of the 
other by suddenly suppressing one of the combatants.
As death is always the possible nihilation of my 
possibles, it is outside my possibilities and therefore 
I cannot wait for it; that is, I cannot thrust toward 
it as toward one of my possibilities. Thus, death can-
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not belong to the ontological nature of the for-itself.
So, Sartre concludes as against Heidegger that 
death, far from being my peculiar possibility is a 
contingent fact which as such on principle escapes me 
and originally belongs to my facticity. Death is as 
pure a fact as birth, and Sartre thinks that it comes 
to us from outside and it transforms us into an object.
It is in no way distinguishable from birth in this respect 
and it is the identity of birth and death, which Sartre 
calls facticity.
Death is a permanent limit of my projects, and as 
such this limit is to be assumed. It is an exteriority 
which remains such even through the attempt of the for- 
itself, to realize it. It is the unrealizable to be 
realized. Death is a limit in a sense similar to that 
in which the for-itself chooses to be a freedom limited 
by the fact of other's freedom. Death is the limit of 
everything and in that sense it is the limit of my 
situation. I am not "free to die," but I am a free being 
who is mortal. As death is always beyond my subjectivity, 
there is no place for it in my subjectivity.
By the description of such circumstances as my 
place, my past, my environment, my death, and my fellow 
men, Sartre has attempted to give a clearer conception of
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the "situation." He now proceeds to formulate more pre­
cisely what he understand by being-in-situation.
11. Situation
First, I am an existent in the midst of other 
existents. My position in the world is defined by the 
relation between the instrumental utility or adversity 
of the objects and my facticity. I discover the world 
in the light of a radical nihilation of myself and of a 
radical internal negation of the in-itself - all effected 
from the point of view of a truly posited end. This 
is what is meant by the situation.
Secondly, the situation exists only in correlation 
with the surpassing of the given toward an end. The 
situation is neither subjective nor objective. It is not 
subjective, because it is not the sum or the unity of the 
impressions which the things make on us. It is the things 
themselves and myself among things, for my upsurge into 
the world causes there to be things, but it adds nothing.
But neither can the situation be objective in the sense 
that a pure given would be, with which the subject is 
in no way engaged. In fact, the situation by the very 
meaning of the given reflects to the for-itself its 
freedom. The situation is a relation of being between 
a for-itself and the in-itself which the for-itself nihilates
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Sartre expresses this relation in his beautiful literary 
s tyle,
C'est cette route poussiéreuse et montaine, 
cette soif ardente que ce refuse des gens 
de me donner K boire parceque, je n'ai pas 
d'argent ou que je ne sui pas de leur 
race; c'est mon délaissement au milieu 
de ces population hostiles, avec cette 
fatigue de mon corps qui m'empêchere 
peut-être d'atteindre le but que je 
m'etais fixe' Mais c'est précisément 
aussi ce but, non en tant que je le 
formule clairement et explicitement, mais 
en tant qu'il est la partous ces faits, 
ce qui les organise en une totalité 
descriptible au lie d'en faire un couche- 
mar en désordre.^®
Thirdly, as the for-itself is nothing other than 
its situation, it follows that being-in-situation defines 
human reality by accounting both for its being-there 
and for-its-being-beyond. Each of the objects in a 
situation takes on its meaning only from the for-itself 
in a situation and in terms of the free choice of its 
e n d s .
Fourthly, as the situation is illumined by the 
ends which are projected only in terms of being-there, 
it is perceived as concrete. The concreteness of the 
situation is revealed by the fact that the for-itself 
never aims at ends which are fundamentally abstract and 
universal. The end of the for-itself is lived and pur­
sued by the project. By it the for-itself surpasses and
l^E.N., p. 634; B . N . , p. 549.
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founds the real and it is revealed in its concreteness 
to the for-itself as a particular change in its own 
situation.
Fifthly, the situation is neither the result of a 
freedom nor the ensemble of the constraints to which I 
am subject. 'It stems from the illumination of the 
constraint by freedom which gives to its meaning as con­
straint.
Sixthly, the for-itself is a temporalization, which 
means that it makes itself. It should be noted that 
the free perseverance in a single project does not 
imply any permanence; it is really a perpetual renewal 
of my engagement. But the realities illuminated by a 
project present the permanence of the in-itself, and it 
frequently happens that we take their permanence for our 
o w n .
Finally, the changes in a situation can never pro­
voke a change of my project, but on the foundation of 
my freedom they can effect a simplification or compli­
cation of the situation.
The relation between facticity and freedom makes 
it clear that though freedom is always in a situation, 
it is freedom which gives meaning to the situation.
This seems to be an apparent paradox, as in one case it 
gives rise to a theory of absolute freedom, while on
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in-itself-for-itself.
Desire is relative to a brute, concrete existent 
which is the object of desire. It may be anything - a 
slice of bread, or an automobile, women, or an object not 
clearly defined. Thus the structure of each desire expresses 
man's relation to one or many objects in the world. It is 
one of the aspects of Being-in-the-world. Desire can be 
either a wish to possess something or to do something 
or to be someone; indeed the three categories of human 
existence are to have, to do, and to be. In desire, 
there is an attempt to appropriate the object. But this 
appropriation is impossible.
The impossible synthesis of assimilation and an 
assimilated that maintains its integrity has close con­
nection with basic sexual desire. The lover's dream is 
to identify the beloved object with himself and still 
preserve its own identity as individual being. This is 
similar to scientific research also, as the known object 
is within me, assimilated, transformed into myself; yet 
at the same time, it remains outside. The known object 
is my thought as a thing, and the desire to know is a 
form of appropriation. But in the desire to play, a 
man is not concerned with possessing a being-in-the- 
world. His goal is to attain a certain being - namely, 
his own being. The desire to do in the play is the desire
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the other hand, it makes freedom dependent on the situ­
ation. We shall try to see later whether Sartre is really 
involved in a paradox or whether the charge of the critics 
that he is advocating a theory of absolute freedom is 
justifiable. The intimate relation between situation 
and freedom has also made it clear that the for-itself 
never exists isolated and apart from the objective realm. 
For-itself is truly a being-in-the-world in which case 
there is always a dialectical relation between the for- 
itself and the in-itself.
12. Analysis of Desire
Sartre points out that each desire expresses all 
human reality and that concrete desires manifest 
structures from which we can understand the nature of 
human being. Desire is a lack of being, and it is sup­
ported by the being of which it is a lack. This being 
is the in-itself-for-itself, consciousness-become-sub- 
stance-as-cause-of-itself. But originally, the being 
of man is not a substance which is some complete being; 
it is a lived relation between the for-itself and the 
in-itself. The in-itself-for-itself is the ideal of 
the for-itself. Man is neither the in-itself nor the
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to be. The task of the act in play is to make manifest 
to itself the absolute freedom of the person. Thus, a 
desire can be only the desire to be, or the desire to 
have. Though play is a desire to be, there is always 
in it an appropriation-component of transforming the 
worldly environment into an element of action. This 
makes play like a creative art.
In the relation of appropriation, the possessor and 
the possessed are united by an internal relation. They 
constitute ideally a unique reality. To possess is 
to be united with the object in the form of appropriation 
Thus the desire to have is at bottom reducible to the 
desire to be related to a certain object in a certain 
relation of being. In the project of possession, there 
is a for-itself which is "unselbs tandig," separated by 
a nothingness from the possibility. This possibility 
is the possibility of appropriating the object. We 
meet in addition a value which stands as the ideal indi­
cation of the total being to be realized by the union 
of the possible and the for-itself. Thus appropriation 
would be a relation of being between a for-itself and 
a concrete in-itself.
In possession, I am my own foundation insofar as 
I exist as in-itself. But this is the project of the
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in-itself-for-itself. This "ideal being is defined as 
an in-itself which for-itself, would be its foundation, or 
as a for-itself whose original project would not be a 
mode of being, but a being precisely the being-in-itself 
which it i s . Appropriation is thus the symbol of the 
ideal of the for-itself. What we fundamentally desire 
to appropriate in an object is its being, and the ulti­
mate object of desire is the appropriation of the world.
I search behind the phenomena to possess the being of 
the phenomena.
We can now define the relation which unites the 
two categories, to be and to have. Desire to be bears 
directly on the for-itself and has the project of con­
ferring on itself, the dignity of in-itself-for-itself.
The desire to have aims at the for-itself in and through 
the world. It is by the appropriation of the world that 
the project to have aims at realizing the same value 
as the desire to be. These two desires are inseparable, 
since it is impossible to find a desire to be which is 
not accompanied by a desire to have, and conversely.
These are the two ways of looking at the same situation, 
the one tending to confer being on the for-itself without 
any intermediary, the other inserting the world between 
the for-itself and its being. AS for the original situ­
ation, it is the lack of being which I am. But the 
being of which I make myself a lack is individual and
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concrete. It is the being which exists already and in 
its midst I arrive as being its lack. The very nothing­
ness which I am is individual and concrete, as being 
this nihilation.
According to Sartre, every for-itself is a free 
choice and each of its acts expresses this choice.
This is our freedom, and our choice is a choice of being, 
either directly or by the appropriation of the world 
or rather by both at once.
13. Misinterpretation of Sartre's Theory
Sartre's theory of freedom has often been charac­
terized as absurd, because if man is absolutely free, 
undetermined by any conditions, then he would be capable 
of doing anything. But as this never happens, there is 
something wrong in the theory. The critics of Sartre are 
more or less agreed in their opinion that Sartre's theory 
of freedom is paradoxical, because it promises something 
which it cannot achieve.
It has been pointed out by Norman Mcleod that Sartre
20uses the word "freedom" in three different senses.
The first is existential freedom, the concept at the 
basis of Sartre's ontology in Being and Nothingness - the 
radical gap at the foundation of consciousness. In this
^^Mcleod, "Existential Freedom," Dialogue, vol. VII, 
no. 1, 1968, p. 27.
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sense, all men are always free, everywhere, and in 
every situation. To be human is to be free. Existential 
freedom is the freedom which releases us from the causal 
chain, defines us as the arbiter of every choice. The 
second sense is one in which Sartre exhorts us to realize 
our freedom, and here "freedom" is synonymous with 
"authenticity." It is the lucid awareness of our exis­
tential freedom and the governing of our lives without 
the guidance of an absolute value. In his political 
works, Sartre speaks of freedom in a way more akin to 
the commonsense use of the word, it is the power to do 
what we choose to do, which can be called "political 
freedom." In Being and Nothingness, he stresses the 
idea that man's freedom is the freedom to choose. Actu­
ally, this freedom to choose follows from the basic 
structure of human reality. If human reality is for-it­
self and consciousness, its nature must be different 
from entities like material objects.
Another justification for Sartre's conception of 
freedom is his theory of consciousness. According to 
him, consciousness is pure transparency, and there is 
nothing in it that can weigh down consciousness. Whether 
or not such a theory of consciousness is acceptable is 
a different issue. But if we start from Sartre's idea 
of consciousness, that it is only a revealing intuition
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and a pure nothingness, then we have to accept the con­
clusion that consciousness is not limited by anything, 
for it is not anything.
The question is not whether there are conditions 
that determine man's free choice. Sartre would not deny 
that there are factual givens which constitute the back­
ground against which we have to make a decision. But 
the relation between the given and human being is not 
unilateral, rather bi-lateral. An object is not my 
obstacle or aid, unless I consider it in relation to my 
end. So, it is difficult to separate in a given situation 
the element of human contribution and the element of the 
brute existent. Rather, the situation is something am­
biguous, in which man understands the world in relation 
to his end. Once the significance of the situation is 
clear, it is understood that objective causes as such 
do not determine us, but that when they are illumined 
in the light of our ends, they constitute the motive 
for our action. But human nature being what it is, there 
is no necessity that the motives selected and decided 
upon will inevitably produce the expected result. I 
may change my decision the next moment, because I can
invent a new end which will (or may) cancel the first
choice. This is the reason why Sartre calls our choice
absurd, which is another way of saying that our choice
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does not have the necessity it should have. This is, 
perhaps, nothing new, because all philosophers from Plato 
to Hume agree that choice of a human being does not have 
the necessity of logical or mathematical propositions.
But most often human beings forget this existential 
freedom, for, according to Sartre, freedom is a burden. 
When I understand in the crises of my life that it is 
I who have to make a choice, I do not know whether my 
choice will necessarily produce the result I expect.
As a result I am the victim of anguish. In all cases 
of free choice, this anguish is present, and it reveals 
the absurd character of freedom. Therefore very often 
we try to hide this feeling of anguish, the uncom­
fortable consciousness of freedom. We think that we 
are determined by objective conditions. This acceptance 
of ourselves as being determined by the force of cir­
cumstances is also a free choice, but we do not recog­
nize it. Sartre calls this bad faith, but he points out 
also the failure of bad faith, because we cannot remain 
in the condition of in-itself for a long time, as our 
consciousness is all the time nihilating the nature of 
our being as it is in-itself. Sartre's dramas often 
give illustrations of characters who act in bad faith, 
like the only male character in Huis Clos and Franz in 
Les Séquestres d'Altona. But the character of Oresetes
192
in the Flies (Les Mouches), pursued by the Furies, 
is the noble example of a free hero who realized authen­
tic existence in the anguished experience of freedom 
and who is not afraid to bear the burden of respon­
sibility .
Sartre's existential freedom is not a freedom 
in the sense that we can realize whatever we choose.
It actually gives us very little. It only makes us 
aware that whatever be the circumstances, the decision 
is ours. If we ignore this awareness, we are in bad 
faith and we are no longer true to the nature of our 
consciousness which is always in the movement to be 
what it is not, by not being what it is.
It has been pointed out by some critics, specially 
by Herbert Marcuse^^ in his critical review of L 'Etre 
et le Néant, that Sartre's analysis of desire shows that 
something very opposite of what he wants to establish 
is true. Desire is a lack of being and appropriation.
In the case of concrete desires, the for-itself wants 
to appropriate its object, but in the course of appropr- 
ation, its nature is also affected. The desired object 
in its turn transforms the for-itself because unless the 
identification between the object and the for-itself is 
established, desire is not fulfilled. Thus, in desire 
the for-itself is reduced to in-itself. This does not
^^Marcuse, "Existentialism," Philosophy and Pheno­
menological Research, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 325-329.
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appear to be a true representation of Sartre's analysis 
of desire, for Sartre says that the object of desire, 
though appropriated by the for-itself, has at the same 
time an independent existence. It is like the case of 
a work of art, in which situation the for-itself in 
appreciation enters into a synthetic relation with it, 
but in which the work of art retains its own existence.
So the independence and the nihilating character of 
the for-itself are not affected at all.
Sartre points out also that in every case of desire, 
there is a frustration, because a complete, permanent uni­
fication between the in-itself and the for-itself is not 
possible. Marcuse thinks this idea that the for-itself 
should be identified with the in-itself is misleading, 
because it seems to suggest that for-itself realizes the 
object of desire only by assuming the nature of the in- 
itself. It is not sure whether Sartre intends this to be 
the aim in the case of concrete and particular desires. 
What he wants to say is, perhaps, that the for-itself 
should be identified with the in-itself in the case of 
concrete desires but at the same time should be free 
from the in-itself to maintain its independence. But 
Sartre speaks of another desire which is the ultimate 
desire in which the for-itself wants to be identified 
with the in-itself to become a for-itself-in-itself. But
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this ideal is never fulfilled, for it requires that the 
for-itself be identified with the totality of in-itself 
and yet remain nothingness. The problem is that if the 
for-itself becomes identified with the whole world, then 
there is nothing it can negate and so, its existence 
becomes meaningless. Thus the ultimate desire is only 
an ideal - an ideal for which man strives in vain. Sar­
tre calls man's ideal God, for only God can be immanent 
and transcendent inasmuch as the whole world does not 
limit God.
If we try to understand the distinction between 
the two kinds of desires - ultimate and concrete - we 
will realize that Sartre's doctrine of freedom is not 
inconsistent with what he says about desire. Man wants 
to realize his possibility through his desire; and as one 
object of desire is appropriated by him, he nihilates 
the present object to proceed to the next object of 
desire. Thus, though every desire produces an identi­
fication with the in-itself, for-itself is not it, because 
it is free. But the ultimate desire is to realize all 
the possibilities, to become the foundation of the world 
and yet to go beyond it. This is an ideal, because we 
can never think of the situations in which all the possi­
bilities are realized and yet have a possibility remain­
ing. So the desire to be for-itself-in-itself and yet
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to remain a conscious, free project is unrealizable. If 
we try to understand Sartre's analysis of desire and 
freedom in this way, we can see that freedom is the nature 
of for-itself and that to be free is the same thing 
to be a for-itself. Thus freedom like temporality is 
another dimension of the for-itself which reveals to us 
what for-itself really represents.
CHAPTER VI 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
In the earlier chapters, we have tried to explain 
Sartre's phenomenological method, his ontological con­
ceptions, his notions of temporality and freedom. We 
have attempted an interpretation that Sartre's basic 
concept is Being-in-the-world, while Being-for-itself 
and Being-in-itself are abstractions. We have argued 
that Sartre's conclusions are phenomenologically based.
In this chapter, we want to examine some of Sartre's 
conclusions and wish to find out whether Sartre's investi­
gations are satisfactory. We will try to point out the 
ambiguities in one of Sartre's fundamental notions, 
namely, nothingness. The concluding section of the 
chapter will be devoted to a comparative study of Sar­
tre's ideas with the philosophical thoughts of the major 
schools of Indian Philosophy.
1. The Problem of "Knowing" Consciousness
Sartre is interested in man in the concrete. He 
gives us an analysis of man as a being-in-the-world.
But in establishing the nature of consciousness, he
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starts with the epistemological situation. He makes a 
distinction between the knowledge of object and the 
consciousness (of) self. Sartre thinks that the con­
sciousness (of) self is not knowledge proper. He calls 
it apprehension or "a non-cognitive relation of the 
self to itself." This relation can be described as the 
lived awareness of the self. This analysis shows that 
consciousness can never become an object. But Sartre 
reaches an opposite conclusion, when he clarifies how 
consciousness is "known."
In the pre-reflective level consciousness knows an 
object. Such consciousness which is also consciousness 
(of) self becomes an object of knowledge at the reflective 
level. The important fact about knowledge is that the 
known cannot be identified with the knowing. Yet Sartre 
often suggests that nothing separates the object from 
consciousness. At the same time Sartre establishes that 
consciousness is not an object. What Sartre means to 
say is that when consciousness knows an object, it is 
identified with the object. But as consciousness is not 
the object, it is not identical with the object. This 
interpretation about the relation between the knowing 
and the known raises no problem in the case of the know­
ledge of an object of the external world. It is not clear 
why it will hold true in the case of "knowing" consciousness
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Sartre says that when consciousness "knows" belief, 
consciousness (of) belief and belief cannot be iden­
tified with one another. This means that consciousness 
and belief are absolutely different from each other, 
like consciousness and object. But there is a differ­
ence between the knowledge of object and the "knowledge" 
of consciousness. Sartre says that consciousness is not 
an object. But the consciousness known by another con­
sciousness is reduced to an object. On the other hand, 
consciousness by nature is such that it can never be 
reduced to an object.
If consciousness is aware of itself, it is not 
necessary to know it by a second consciousness. We 
may make explicit what is in such awareness by an act 
of reflection. But as we cannot know something dif­
ferent from what we are aware of, the "knowledge" of 
consciousness at a second level is redundant.
2. Problem of the Relation with the Other
Sartre's notion of the other is that the other is 
known directly. He introduces the notion of shame in 
connection with our knowledge of the other. We know 
ourselves as objects, when we are ashamed before the 
other. Sartre thinks that the other is known either 
as a subject or as an object. If I know myself as an 
object, I know the other as a subject. When I think my­
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self as a subject, I know the other as an object. But 
the relation between myself and the other is never a 
subject to subject relation. Sartre's analysis of the 
concrete relations with the other illustrate his notion.
The unity between two subjects is, however, possible 
before a third person.
This is what happens in "NO Exit" when two charac­
ters are united against the critical look of the other.
It is true that oppression forges a unity among the 
oppressed, but that is the unity of "us" and not the 
unity of "we". Sartre neglects so much the bright 
side of life that he selects only the sad facts. But 
if he takes into account all the concrete facts, he 
can surely understand that 'joy, common ideals, etc.'are 
the moments when human beings are united with one another 
as subjects. It is not true that the unity is over, 
when the common ideals are realized. It may be that be­
cause human beings shared in a common ideal, the memory 
of a glorious past would closely knit together the bond 
of friendship.
Sartre speaks of the dialectics in human relation­
ship in which human beings are always in conflict with 
one another. This is not something based on the experi­
ence of history. What Sartre says goes against the finding 
of the psychologists that animals, including men, have
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both a self-preservative and a gregarious instinct. It 
is not possible to explain the gregarious instinct on 
the basis of self-preservation instinct, for there are 
many cases where man works for a social ideal while 
sacrificing his own personal gain. Sartre might say 
that the individual in that case was not explicitly 
aware of his personal gain. But we cannot deny that 
there are ideals of friendship and unity in which human 
beings recognize themselves as individuals. If all 
men are free in the Sartrean sense, and each of them has 
a need, it is quite possible that they can freely choose 
an ideal that would promote social harmony. Conflict 
between individuals may be there, but that is not the 
whole story. This only prompts us to say that Sartre 
has not made full use of the phenomenological method, 
although his conclusions are based on the phenomenological 
analysis of some of the concrete aspects of life.
3. Problem of Freedom
Sartre's analysis of freedom, as we have noted 
earlier, brought forth the strongest criticism, which we 
think rests on a misunderstanding. But we are not 
quite sure whether the word "freedom" is used in the 
sense Sartre understands his existential freedom to be. 
Instead of saying that in existential freedom, a man
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has always the capacity to make a new choice, he could 
have said something else. He might have said that he 
was giving an analysis of the factors of human existence 
in the realm of action. When a human being acts, he 
acts with reference to an end. The end is selected by 
him on the basis of the objective situation. But the 
situation is not the same as we find in the area of 
natural events. This would be an analysis of the exis­
tential human situation. This shows that in all cases 
human beings act with a purpose. Even when the situation 
is such that it does not offer many choices, man tries 
to adjust himself to the environment. This is a funda­
mental truth of human life, and if it means that human 
being is condemned to life of its own choice, it is nothing 
wrong. But this is saying something totally different 
from what Sartre in fact says. To say that human being 
is absolutely free is something very different from the 
statement that human being has always to make choice.
At least Sartre could have made it clear that he was 
using the word "freedom" in a totally new sense.
My freedom to choose, or existential freedom, is 
not at all affected, if I recognize that there are some 
objective factors that orient me to a particular end.
It is encouraging to note that Sartre has realized the 
importance of both these factors of end and situation in
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his Critique of Dialectical Reason, where he speaks 
of both a "a horizontal and a vertical dialectics" 
in the case of human choice.** It is true that there 
are historical and natural conditions which predispose 
the individual to a certain choice, but it depends 
on the individual how he will interpret the objective 
conditions in the light of his further projects.
4. Problem of the Analysis of Desire
One of the most important stumbling-blocks in 
the philosophy of Sartre is his analysis of desire.
We have tried to distinguish between two kinds of 
desire - particular concrete desire and ideal desire.
It is not clear what Sartre means by the ideal desire for- 
itself-in-itself. The usual criticism against him is 
that he creates an irréconciliable dialectic between 
consciousness and the world, for in his opinion conscious­
ness aspires to become the foundation of the world and 
at the same time to retain its capacity of "néantisation." 
This is impossible, since once consciousness is absorbed 
in the world, its translucency is destroyed. There re­
mains no longer what we understand to be consciousness.
**By horizontal causation Sartre refers to the objective 
conditions of a historical situation, and by vertical 
dialectic he means the goals of the men living under 
those conditions. His idea is that in any situation
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The question that is raised is: is this ideal a
plausible one? Sartre defines desire as a lack; to 
desire for him is to possess or to appropriate. But 
when an object of art is appropriated, the work retains 
its existence outside, even though consciousness appro­
priates it. If the world is outside me and I want to 
possess it in the form of appropriation, it is possible 
that it continues to exist outside even after the appro­
priation by consciousness. Both consciousness and the 
world may remain outside each other and yet the appro­
priation be possible. Sartre's illustration of love to 
show that such an appropriation is impossible rests on 
a misunderstanding of the nature of love. Sartre thinks 
that the object of love is an in-itself and that if it 
becomes a subject, the relation is lost. But another 
alternative is possible. In love the object of love is 
both subject and object at the same time. Love is not 
just a passive relation, but an active-passive relation 
in which two persons are involved. The model on which 
Sartre establishes his ideal of desire is based on his 
inaccurate understanding of the nature of love.
As we have pointed out earlier, if the ideal desire 
means the realization of all possibilities and yet having
these two aspects react on one another. This is developed 
in the first part of the Critique.
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a possibility/ then we cannot conceive of such a situa­
tion. In that sense/ the ideal is unrealizable/ because 
it is self-contradictory. But the ideal can be inter­
preted in the sense of desire in which the desired object 
is appropriated/ yet at the same time it has an existence 
of its own. The for-itself which desires is also in­
dependent of the object of desire. The world/ being the 
object of desire/ can be appropriated, yet it can be 
independent of the for-itself, in the theoretical sense, 
though the practical realization is doubtful.
We can try to understand the ideal in three dif­
ferent senses.
1. For-itself-in-itself in which the for- 
itself is the foundation of the world 
in which it finds itself to cause its 
own being. Such an ideal is impossible 
to be realized, for the for-itself 
arises in the world as being the 
negation of the in-itself.
2. The ideal may mean the realization of 
all the possibilities and the possi­
bility of there being some other pos­
sibility. This is also impossible for 
if all possibilities are realized, it 
is inconceivable how there can still 
be another possibility.
3. The ideal may mean the same thing as
a concrete particular desire, in which 
the object of desire, though appro­
priated, remains independent of the 
person who desires and the person too 
exists independent of the object of 
desire. In this sense the for-itself 
may try to appropriate the world, yet 
retain its own independence. This 
ideal is theoretically conceivable.
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but Its practical realization i s , 
perhaps, impossible.
It is not clear which of the these senses of the
ideal Sartre has in mind, but we can always point out
that at least in one sense the ideal can be conceived
to be possible. It thus appears that Sartre has not
carried out the existential implications of the desire
to be for-itself-in-itself, though he tries to give a
phenomenological analysis of desire.
5. Problem of Dualism
The next controversial question in Sartre's 
philosophy is his dualism. His treatment of the for- 
itself and the in-itself as two ontological entities 
suggests that he is a dualist. At the same time, when 
he has to describe the for-itself as an ontological 
entity, he also points out that it is nothing. If he 
is then a dualist, he is dualist of a peculiar type in 
which nothing is one entity of the ontology, while 
the other part is occupied by being.
Sartre tries to analyze the question of dualism 
in the concluding chapter of Being and Nothingness.
He says that we have discovered two types of being; 
Being-for-itself, which has to be what it is not, and 
Being-in-itself, which is what it is. Has the discovery
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of these two types of being resulted in establishing a 
hiatus that would divide being into two regions between 
whom there is, and can be, no communication? Sartre 
answers that both "for-itself" and "in-itself" are reunited 
by a synthetic connection which is the same as for-itself, 
as it is nothing but the nihilation of the in-itself.
By this nihilation an upheaval happens to the in-it­
self, and that is the world. The for-itself is not nothing­
ness in general, but is the nihilation of an individual 
and particular in-itself. From the beginning, it 
refers to the thing. For consciousness there is no 
being other than the revealing intuition of something.
It has a borrowed existence relative to the in-itself, 
though it is constituted by an internal negation.
Sartre thinks that consciousness has a borrowed being, 
as non-being is other than being. But insofar as con­
sciousness is relative to in-itself, it is affected with 
facticity. But it makes itself and so it is absolute.
Thus, the for-itself is an absolute Unselbstandig, and 
its reality is purely interrogative, because it is 
always in question.
Ontology, according to Sartre, teaches us two 
things.
1. If the in-itself has to found itself, 
it could do so only by making itself 
consciousness.
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2. Consciousness is in fact a project
of founding itself, that is, of attaining 
to the dignity of for-itself-in-itself.
Ontology shows that through the for-itself the possi­
bility of a foundation comes to the world. It limits 
itself to declaring that "everything takes place as if 
the in-itself in a project, to found itself gave it­
self the modification of the for-itself."^ But it 
is up to metaphysics to form the hypotheses which will 
allow us the possibility of unifying the givens of 
ontology.
If the in-itself and for-itself are two modalities
of being, is there not a hiatus at the core of being?
Sartre answers the question by pointing out that the
in-itself and the for-itself are not merely "juxtaposed."
On the contrary, "the for-itself without the in-itself
is an abstraction; it could not exist any more than
a color could exist without form or sound without pitch 
2and timbre." Consciousness is bound up with the in- 
itself by an internal relation which constitutes a tota­
lity, and this totality can be called being. The for- 
itself is in a priori unity with the in-itself. But 




cisely the nothingness of this in-itself, which one of 
the two shall we call real? The pure in-itself of the 
in-itself surrounded by that shell of nothingness which 
has been designated by the name "for-itself?"
For Sartre, an existent which is to be considered 
as a totality must be such that the diversity of its 
structures be held within a unitary synthesis in such 
a way that each of them considered apart is only an 
abstraction. It is true that consciousness considered 
apart is an abstraction, but the in-itself has no need 
of the for-itself in order to be. "The phenomenon of 
the in-itself is an abstraction without consciousness," 
but its being is not an abstraction.
Sartre points out that it is the perpetual failure 
to reach a unity which explains both the indissolubility 
of the in-itself and of the for-itself and at the same 
time their relative independence. The totality we are 
considering is in perpetual disintegration and "it is 
in the form of a disintegrated ensemble that it presents 
itself to us in its ambiguity - that is, so that one can 
ad libitum insist on the dependence of the beings under 
consideration or on their independence. There is here 
a passage which is not completed, a short c i r c u i t .
3 l b i d . , p .  6 2 3 .
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This idea leads to the notion of detotalized 
totality. The characteristic fact is that the for- 
itself makes itself other in relation to the in-itself, 
but that the in-itself is in no way other than the for- 
itself in its being; the in-itself is precisely and simply 
is. In this internal negation, the relation is not 
reciprocal, and I am both one of the terms of the 
relation and the relation itself. I apprehend being and 
I am the apprehension of being. But the being does 
not apprehend me in turn. Its being also does not 
coincide in any way with being-apprehended. "The question 
of the totality does not concern ontology, for which the 
only regions of being which can be elucidated are those 
of the in-itself, of the for-itself, and the ideal region 
of the self-cause."^ It is the task of metaphysics to 
consider whether it shall deal with a being with two 
dimensions of in-itself and for-itself. Ontology can 
only point out that it can make use of the notion of 
disintegrated totality both in terms of imminence and 
transcendence.
Sartre has introduced here mainly two concepts -
1. an idea of a totality and
2. the idea of a detotalized totality.
^Ibid. , p. 624.
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The first can be described as the ideal towards which the 
for-itself is striving but can never achieve. On the 
other hand, the actual existent is a detotalized totality 
in which the for-itself is nihilating an in-itself to 
cause the world to rise. Sartre is concerned with the 
ontological elucidation of the phenomenologically given, 
which consists in systematizing and generalizing the 
concrete facts of experiences. Human experience reveals 
two things :
1. it is conscious only insofar as it is 
related to something, and
2. there is a primordial unity between 
the object and consciousness.
But experience also reveals that this unity is often 
broken, because consciousness has to negate the in- 
itself to become the for-itself; and the relation by 
which consciousness is related to the object is a rela­
tion of negation. Thus, for consciousness to be related 
to a thing and to negate it is one and the same thing.
This can be called the conception of the detotalized.
But in cases of knowing an object, consciousness is 
reduced to an object by being the revelation of the object. 
In such cases, consciousness and the object are united, 
and nothing separates them. This is, perhaps, what Sar­
tre has in mind when he says that in the form of a deto­
talized totality, consciousness and in-itself are in an 
ambiguous relation, either they are dependent or indepen­
dent.
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From an analysis of Sartre's viewpoint as found in 
the conclusion of Being and Nothingness, it seems more 
reasonable to designate Sartre as an advocate of "deto­
talized totality." This concept is further developed 
in Critigue of Dialectical Reason in which human being 
which is a praxis is said to be in a relation of unity 
with pratico-inerte, which can be called the given 
situation. Thus, at every step of human life, a totality 
is constituted in which the two factors are united, but 
at the same time human praxis detotalizes this totali­
zation to constitute a further totality, in which case 
there is a break or disintegration in the unity of the 
first totality. But throughout all the chapters of 
Being and Nothingness there has been such an emphasis on 
the phenomenon of disintegration that Sartre has, perhaps, 
been in an important sense called a dualist. We need not 
here go into the details of these cases of disintegration 
like the nature of for-itself, relation with others and 
freedom, but it is clear that Sartre has always been 
much preoccupied with the purity and translucency of the 
for-itself. Thus he knows full well that to treat the 
for-itself independently of the relation to in-itself is 
to make it an abstraction. He has nevertheless practi­
cally permitted himself to understand that the for-itself, 
as if it were completely independent of the in-itself.
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Sartre has spoken of both pure and impure reflection, 
and it seems that he himself has been subject to impure 
reflection.
Sartre thinks, perhaps, that consciousness being 
not what it is, is to be treated as independent of the 
in-itself, and to grasp this is the understanding of 
pure reflection. But in fact, his pure reflection turns 
out to be a case of impure reflection. If Sartre would 
accept the data of phenomenological analysis, he could come 
to a theory of the for-itself related to the in-itself 
in which the for-itself undertakes a project on the basis 
of the in-itself to go beyond it to establish a new 
totality. The in-itself modifies the unity, but what is 
established as a totality depends on the free undertaking 
of the for-itself in consideration of the situational 
unity of the in-itself and for-itself. Such a unity may 
be ambiguous, but it need not be absolutely equivocal 
like the participation of for-itself in Being in the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. What Sartre vaguely hints 
at in Being and Nothingness, finds its concrete realiza­
tion in Critique of Dialectical Reason.
Sartre's philosophy, we have commented earlier, 
has a phenomenological justification for the development 
of two ontological entities from the unity in which both 
are related to each other. This is evident from Sartre's
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idea of being-in-the-world, and we have tried to. suggest
that the concept of being-in-the-world, which Sartre
borrows from Heidegger, represents the idea of lived
experience, comparable to Husserl's "Lebenswelt" and
Merleau-Ponty's "lived reality." This idea of Sartre's
is most clearly evident in his analysis of "situation"
and man's experience of his body. Sartre in recent years,
specially from the time of Critique of Dialectical Reason
onwards has come closer to the conception of "lived
reality." In an interview with the New Left Review reprinted
in New York Review of Books Sartre says,
"... The individual interiorizes his 
social determinations; he interiorizes the 
relations of production, the family of 
his childhood, the historical past, the 
contemporary institutions, and he then 
re-exteriorizes these in acts and options 
which necessarily refer us back to them.
None of this existed in L'Être et le 
Néant."
He says further that in a way his first philosophical 
treatise itself should have been the beginning of a 
discovery of this power of circumstances, since he had 
already been made a soldier when he had not wanted to 
be one. His aim is to give man both his autonomy and
^Sartre's interview in New York Review of Books, 
vol. XIV, no. 6, March 26, 1970.
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his reality among real objects, avoiding idealism without 
lapsing into a mechanical materialism. He points out,
"In my present book on Flaubert I have replaced my earlier 
notion of consciousness (although I use the word a l o t ) , 
with what I call le vécu - lived experience."® Sartre 
describes this lived experience as precisely the ensemble 
of the dialectical process of psychic life, insofar as 
this process is obscure to itself, because it is a 
constant totalization which cannot be conscious of what 
it is. One can be conscious of an external totaliza­
tion, but one cannot be conscious of a totalization which 
also totalizes consciousness. Lived experience in this 
case is perpetually susceptible of comprehension, but 
never of knowledge. The conception of "lived experience," 
as Sartre s ays, marks his change since Being and Nothing­
ness . His early work, he thinks, was a rationalist 
philosophy of consciousness. His notion of "lived 
experience" represents an effort to preserve that p re­
sence to itself which is indispensable for the existence 
of any psychic fact, while at the same time this presence 
is so opaque and blind before itself that it is also 
an absence from itself. "Lived experience is always
^ I bid., p. 25
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simultaneously present to itself and absent from it­
self."?
We may agree with Sartre's main contention that 
in Being and Nothingness, he was more concerned with a 
philosophy of consciousness and that the concept of 
"lived experience" was not present. But we may also 
point out that Sartre's phenomenological studies had 
revealed to him many of the aspects of what he now calls 
"lived experience," but he could not always carry out 
their implications. As has been pointed by Alphonse 
de Waelhens in his book on Merleau-Ponty Une Philo-
y QSophie d'ambiguité, Sartre's phenomenological studies 
are often in conflict with his ontological conclusions.
The two notions we may consider in this connection 
are Sartre's concept of the situation and the body.
The word "situation" does not mean simply the brute 
given existents into which human reality is thrown.
In fact, the environment in which the for-itself tries 
to realize his project is the brute given world modified 
by the meaning contributed by the individual. It seems 
to us that in Being and Nothingness, Sartre has gone to 
one extreme in his understanding of the relation between 
the for-itself and the in-itself, while Merleau-Ponty
?Ibid., p . 30.
®A. de Waelhens, Une Philosophie d'ambiguité, 
L o vaine: Editions E. Nauwlaerts, 1958, p. 5.
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represents the other extreme. In Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy, the for-itself is so enmeshed in the imma­
nence of being that it is difficult for it to establish 
its own independence. Perhaps, the correct position 
would be one in which it cannot be denied that the 
situation in which the for-itself is trying to realize 
its project is ambiguous, but at the same time, the hu ­
man reality is such that it can negate the situation 
to create a new one. Our earlier analysis of Sartre's 
concept of the situation brings out one important 
point: his distinction between the. for-itself and the
in-itself as abstractions in the form of two entities 
has its basis in the lived experience of the situation 
in which the two are related in an ambiguous and unstable 
unity.
Thus it becomes clear that though Sartre speaks 
of two ontological entities, at bottom they are united 
in a fundamental Being and that Being is Being-in-the- 
world.
Perhaps the best illustration of Being-within- 
the-world is Sartre's conception of embodied consciousness. 
As has been shown earlier, Sartre does not raise the 
question, how body and consciousness come to be united 
in the human reality; for according to Sartre, we
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are, in fact, our body, and our consciousness of the
body is not a kind of knowledge of an external object,
rather it is a lived experience.
Body as the lived reality is the natural unity
of the for-itself and in-itself and, as Sartre points
out, the body is the contingency or the facticity of the 
for-itself. There are different dimensions of the body 
like the body-for-itself, the body-for-others, and the 
body-I-exist-for-myself as known by the other. These 
three dimensions have already been analyzed, and it can 
be pointed out that consciousness living as a body is 
the lived existential reality in which the two regions 
of reality come to meet. But here again Sartre is not 
deeply aware of the existential implications of the 
lived body, for if the body and consciousness are united 
in a living relationship, they are in mutual participation. 
Instead, he thinks that consciousness can negate the 
participation in the body totally and surpass the body.
How far this surpassability can go can be a matter of 
investigation, but Sartre thinks that though conscious­
ness is in a living bond with the body, still it can be 
not the body. There is no doubt a dialectic between 
the body and consciousness in which one modifies the 
other. But Sartre's idea is to give consciousness an
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absolute power to transcend the limitations of the body. 
It is, perhaps, for this reason that Merleau-Ponty has 
accused Sartre of a theory of all-seeing consciousness, 
a kind of cosmic seer, which is not affected by parti­
cipation in the body.
We thus see that though Sartre's conclusions have 
a phenomenological basis, in each case, perhaps, he 
has gone beyond the phenomenological evidence. This 
has led many to conclude that Sartre is a covert ra­
tionalist and in fact, we have found that Sartre has 
also agreed with this charge in the New York Review 
interview referred to earlier. We have pointed out 
already that this accusation overlooks the important 
fact that Sartre is an existentialist. The phenomeno­
logy of Husserl is a rationalistic attempt to recon­
struct the essential from the actually given with the 
help of rational intuition. But an existentialist 
need not be bound by the rationalist norms. On the 
other hand, he is concerned with the individual's 
crisis, feelings of tragedy, hopes, and fears. In his 
everyday life, the individual realizes that though 
he is born into the world, there is no rational connec­
tion between his life and the world. Thus, when Sartre 
finds that consciousness has to be responsible for the
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world into which it is thrown and consciousness has 
always to make its own choice, for there is nothing 
rational in the order of the event, he realizes the 
unhappy and absurd nature of consciousness. It is such 
that though consciousness is in the world, yet it is not 
bound to the world by anything necessary. The absolutely 
contingent character of human reality, perhaps, sharpens 
the feeling that consciousness is alone in the world in 
which it has to build up its own fate. Thus even though 
we are not always sure of the phenomenological order of 
the conclusions. Sartre reaches, his theory can have a 
justification if we try to understand his ideas both 
existentially and phenomenologically.
6. Different Senses of Nothingness
Much criticism has been made against Sartre's 
conception of consciousness as nothingness. The logical 
Positivists like Ayer have pointed out that Sartre 
misuses the word "not," which is a logical sign indi­
cating the absence of something, transforming it into 
some sort of entity. Whether that criticism is justi­
fiable or not is another issue, but when Sartre speaks of 
consciousness as "nothingness", he-.seems to be saying so 
many things that it is difficult to distinguish in which 
sense he understands consciousness as a nothing. At
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least the following senses of nothingness can be dis­
tinguished :
1. Consciousness is not an object.
2. Consciousness is empty.
3. Consciousness is not a substantial
unity.
4. Consciousness is the nihilation of 
its object.
5. Consciousness is not what it is.
Let us try to see if we can discover some common 
meaning in these different ideas of nothingness. When 
it is said that consciousness is not an object, what 
Sartre has in mind is, perhaps, that consciousness 
is distinguished from an object, because an object is 
what it is, like an ink-well is always an ink-well, but 
consciousness being a project or a possibility is always 
changing. It is going to be something. This sense of 
nothingness implies that consciousness is different from 
an object. Of course, difference is a sort of negation; 
but when we try to understand "different" in the sense 
that a thing is not that from which it is different, we 
are making an emphatic use of the word "not".
In the second sense, consciousness is nothing 
because it does not have any content in it. In Sartre's 
theory, consciousness is revealing-intuition of things 
like a searchlight. It falls upon things and illumines 
them. It enters directly into the world, and there is 
no intermediate entity between the object and consciousness
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Consciousness is not a container. If consciousness is 
obscured by the presence of contents, then consciousness 
loses its translucent character and becomes weighed 
down by things that destroy its direct relation with 
the world, as well as its nihilating power. This sense 
of nothingness makes one point clear, namely, that 
consciousness has nothing in it and it is the direct 
illumination of things. It sometimes leads Sartre to 
say that consciousness being nothing, there is nothing 
between consciousness and objects. Consciousness is 
constituted of objects of which it is conscious. As 
Sartre sometimes puts it, nothing separates consciousness 
from the objects. This actually may mean that conscious­
ness being not, there is only being. This is really a 
strange use of the word "nothing." It may also be pointed 
out that from the fact that consciousness has nothing 
in it, it does not follow that consciousness is nothing.
The third sense is a criticism of the substantial 
or transcendental ego theory. Sartre has pointed out 
both in his Transcendence of the Ego and Being and 
Nothingness that consciousness does not issue forth 
from an eternal and massive source. The reason is that 
our first consciousness is of the objects and not of 
an "I." The "I" is constituted out of the different 
experiences of states, qualities and actions. Thus con­
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sciousness does not depend on any ego, rather an ego 
depends on consciousness. Sartre makes consciousness a 
non-substantial absolute, but in this sense also negation 
takes on the sense of difference, because consciousness 
is not an ego, but absolutely different from it.
The fourth sense is the sense of destruction. 
Consciousness may in one moment of existence be identified 
with what it does or what it knows. For example, the 
cafe waiter through play-acting by bad faith may identify 
himself with the waiter itself. But any moment he can 
refuse to identify himself with such a situation and 
declare his independence. The best illustration of con­
sciousness becoming an object is the status of conscious­
ness in the eyes of the other. In an act of shame, the 
other metamorphoses me into an object. But this meta­
morphosis can not be permanent, for consciousness is by 
nature - nihilating, and thus consciousness in turn makes 
the other an object by nihilating its condition as an 
object.
Sartre raises the question; how does negation or 
nothingness arrive in the world? His answer is such 
that nothingness arrives in the world by a being whose 
nature is nothingness. Such a being is an upsurge in 
the plenum of being and not only by its appearance there 
is negation, but by negation there is also the world. 
Practically, Sartre would think that affirmation and
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negation at bottom are one, for by affirming I have 
to say about an object that it is different from another 
and similarly, in the case of negation, I have to say 
that a thing is not such and such. Thus, consciousness 
not only produces negation, but it is also nothingness, 
because it is always destroying the present state of 
things. In this sense, practically, two things are 
included - one, implies that consciousness is always 
changing and so its nature is destructive or negative; 
further, consciousness understands every object in relation 
to other things from which it is different. The idea 
of difference which is a sense of negation is the basis 
of affirmation, while a judgmental sense of negation 
also involves negation. Thus, this sense of negation is 
a complex notion of destruction, difference and absence.
The last sense of negation lies in the definition 
of consciousness which suggests that consciousness is 
not like a material object. Consciousness has a possibility 
and its existence is at issue. The true nature of con­
sciousness lies in future which is yet to be. This nature 
of consciousness is, perhaps, best illustrated by Sartre 
when he says that consciousness is a lack and that to do 
away with the lack consciousness has to move from what 
is to what it is not. This sense of consciousness as a 
lack of something to be realized is the possibility of
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consciousness. To say that consciousness is a possibility 
is to indicate that it is free, capable of negating 
the present state to bring about the future.
Thus, the idea of negation includes the ideas of 
"difference," "emptiness," "destruction," "nihilation," 
and "lack." But all these different senses, perhaps, 
depend on the fundamental sense, which, in our opinion, 
is lack. Consciousness being a lack must try to realize 
what it lacks. This accounts for its character as a 
possibility and as a free project. The different senses 
of negation may be traced back to this one sense.
The point is that though lack is a negative term, 
is it to be understood merely negatively? When it is 
said he lacks; the question immediately arises, what does 
he lack? As Sartre has pointed out, "A lack pre-supposes 
a trinity; that which is missing or the 'lacking,' that 
which misses, what is lacking, or 'the existing,' 
and a totality which has been broken by the lacking and 
which would be brought back by the synthesis of 'the 
lacking' and 'the existing.'"® Thus, a lack presupposes 
that something or some form of the totality is existing, 
though it is not complete. From this we can only point 
out that consciousness is not a self-complete, permanent
®B.N., p. 86.
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thing like the plenum of being, but it is a broken 
totality which it is trying to repair. Now to call 
such an incomplete and broken totality "nothing" 
is to work with a presupposition that something unchan­
ging is real being, while that which changes all the time 
is nothing. It is true that change cannot come into 
existence without negating the totality, or the totality 
cannot be restored unless there is a lack. But in 
either case, we have to take into account the present 
state of things from which we have to start. It thus 
seems to us that Sartre is using a very strange word to 
explain the meaning of change and lack, and these perhaps 
can be explained without using a negative terminology.
In fact, Shrtre uses on many occasions positive des­
criptions of consciousness like possibility and freedom. 
It may be that these words are more negative in their 
real meaning, yet it cannot be denied that we understand 
something definite by these words. Sartre does not want 
to label consciousness as something definite and deter­
minate, and therefore he has selected words that do not 
describe anything definitely.
It is true that consciousness has such an ambiguous 
character, but then Sartre could have pointed out that 
the nature of consciousness moves between two dialectical 
poles of affirmation and negation in which affirmation
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is negation and negation is affirmation. This is in 
accord with one of the definitions of consciousness 
that he has given: consciousness, first of all, is
what it is not and again, consciousness is not what it 
i s . This is not a negative description, nor an affir­
mative one, but both in one.
7. Sartre and Indian Philosophy
Sartre's ontology of consciousness has interesting 
parallels with some of the basic ideas of the major 
schools of philosophy in India. Such a comparative study 
itself could be the subject for an elaborate discus­
sion. (Being brought up in the traditions of Indian 
Philosophy, I think it may help my understanding of 
Sartre's philosophy, if it is possible to discover 
some parallels between Sartre's ideas and some of the main 
thoughts of the major schools of Indian Philosophy.)
The schools between which such comparisons are sought 
to be established are the Advaita Vedanta of Samkara, 
the Samkhya-Yoga and the philosophy of Buddhism.
In Advaita Vedanta of Samkara, consciousness is 
the ultimate reality^^ and the world that we experience
^^S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, 
Macmillan, George Allen, 1962, p. 562.
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or the objects that we encounter in our everyday life
are projections due to i g n o r a n c e . T h i s  consciousness
is self-revealing, and when in the state of ignorance
we experience objects, it reveals or illumines the 
12objects. The self-revealing character of consciousness 
is its true nature and the other-revealing character is 
illusory. In the language of Sartre, it can be said 
that to be aware of consciousness does not need a separate 
act, because consciousness is self-illuminating, translucid 
or transparent. In criticism of the Nyâya thinkers who 
hold that a second consciousness is needed for knowing 
the first consciousness, a Vedantin would answer that 
in that case the second consciousness would need a third, 
the third a fourth, so on ad infinitum, but this would 
lead to the fallacy "anabasthLa" or infinite regress.
Of course, the Vedantin would not object to the contention 
that consciousness itself can be a subject for reflection. 
The major difference between Samkara and Sartre lies, 
perhaps, in the concept of intentionality. For Sartre, 
consciousness is always consciousness of something.
That means, the positing of the world is of primary impor­
tance, but for Samkara, consciousness by itself is not
H lbid. , p. 562.
^^Ibid. , p. 478.
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intentional. Only in the level of Vyâvahârika or practi­
cal experience, which is, of course at the level of 
illusory existence, consciousness is consciousness of 
something and then surely, consciousness in knowing an
object is consciousness of itself. I am not entering
into a detailed study of the knowledge situation in 
Vedanta philosophy, but one thing that strikes us here is 
that like Sartre, the Vedantin would say that conscious­
ness is empty of contents; and consciousness in the 
empirical level is out in the world, where the contents 
are identified with objects or assume the shape of the 
objects. The Vedantin, of course, would say that conscious­
ness is empty of contents; and consciousness in the
empirical level is out in the world, where the contents 
are identified with objects or assume the shape of the 
objects. The Vedantin, of course, would say that con­
sciousness need not always be conscious of something,
13for in susupti or dreamless sleep there is conscious­
ness but there is no consciousness of object. It appears 
therefore, that Sartre's theory of consciousness accords 
well with the Vedlnta theory of consciousness of the 
empirical level. Another difference that may be pointed 
out is that for Sartre, consciousness is not a substance, 
though it is in itself an absolute. On the other hand, 
the Vedantin would say that consciousness is eternal.
l^Ibid., p. 478.
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true being, and as suchy is a substance or is the only
14true substance which is the locus of the whole universe. 
Though the Vedantin would deny any content in conscious­
ness, he would not say that consciousness is nothing.
He would rather say that the realization of consciousness 
is the realization of a positive existence and bliss. 
Perhaps, these differences are due to the difference in 
the background of the two philosophical trends.
Again, for Sartre a man lives authentic existence 
only when he realizes that he is free, and to be free 
and to be conscious being one and the same thing, for 
Sartre authentic existence means to be aware of one's 
consciousness. For the Vedantin, in our everyday life, 
we forget our true existence which is the realization 
of pure consciousness. Thus authentic existence, for 
the Vedantin which he calls paramarthika satta or ulti­
mate existence is the realization that one is pure 
consciousness, which is pure d e l i g h t . T h e  word "pure" 
introduces a great deal of difference between Samkara 
and Sartre, for Sartre will never say that only conscious­
ness is the ultimately real entity, though he wants to 
distinguish between the world, consciousness, and the 
body in which consciousness exists. However, both 
Sartre and Samkara would deny complete identification
l^Ibid. , p. 573.
l^Ibid., p. 626.
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of consciousness with a material object, or physical 
object, for, according to Sartre, consciousness is not 
the world, nor the body, but it nihilates both of them.
If we consider the goals of life, we find a great dif­
ference between Samkara and Sartre, for according to 
Samkara, the ultimate goal of life is moksa or libera­
tion which can come only with the realization of the 
identity between the finite consciousness and the infinite 
consciousness, which in other words, means realization 
of the truth which is existence, consciousness, and 
bliss. This ideal is completely different from Sar­
tre's, according to whom our ultimate project is to 
be for-itself-in-itself, but the ideal itself is un­
realizable, because it is self-contradictory. For Sar­
tre it is, of course, difficult to conceive of a con­
sciousness which is so pure that it regards the material 
object as illusory. Sartre wants to maintain both the 
independence of consciousness as well as its dependence 
on material object.
Perhaps the closest expression of Sartre's philo­
sophy can be found in Samkhya-Yoga metaphysics. In 
SSmkhya, there are two independent realities, Purusa 
or consciousness and Prkriti or^® material world. The
IGlbid., p. 280.
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world is that which serves the purpose of Purusa, but
without the appearance of Purusa, the world will not
17evolve into the series of the objects. Sartre also 
understands the basic dimension of man in terms of 
consciousness. He points out that consciousness by 
its nature implies that there is something which is 
not itself. It is pure subjectivity which in itself can 
never be an object. The world in itself is a solid 
being, and all distinctions and differentiations occur 
when consciousness arises. Thus there are, according 
to Sartre, two basic kinds of being: the for-itself and
the in-itself. A further similarity between SSmkhya 
and Sartre is that for Samkhya, Purusa is something like 
the simple fact of consciousness stripped off all thought, 
ego-sense, etc. For SSmkhya, the ego-sense is a later 
product, just as Sartre would say, at the pre-reflective 
level, there is no ego; the ego appears on the reflective 
level. Of course, in Samkhya, we do not discover such 
distinctions of the levels of consciousness, as Sartre 
understands. Samkhya understands consciousness as a 
witness, and through its witnessing function, the world 
evolves. Due to ignorance, Purusa appears as identified 
with the world which it is not.^® But this is in a
l^I b i d ., p. 266.
IGlbid., p. 267.
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sense necessary, because only after such identification, 
the Purusa is able to remove its ignorance and to
19realize that it is not the world.
Samkhya views conform to Sartre's theory of in­
tentionality, because, according to it, Purusa can 
only be aware of what it is not. Though this is some­
what stretching the idea of intentionality, it cannot 
be denied that some sort of a theory of intentionality 
can be worked out in the conceptual framework of 
Samkhya. The approximate idea of intentionality can 
be found in Nyâya school of Indian philosophy, according 
to which the nature of consciousness is to reveal an 
o b j e c t . T o  return to the concept of consciousness 
as witness, Sartre also says, "... the for-itself realizes 
its birth in an original bond with being; it is a wit­
ness to itself of itself as not being that being. Due
to this fact it is outside that being, upon being and
21within being as not being that being." Neither Vedanta 
nor Samkhya would say that consciousness is nothing, 
but in facing difficulties about describing the nature
l^Ibid., p. 313.
20ibid., p. 151. 
21B .N # f P» 122,
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of consciousnessf they have often suggested that con­
sciousness is nothing. specially, when the VedSntin 
says that the ultimate reality is such that for it every 
determination is negation. Perhaps, such a characteri­
zation of Sartre's idea of consciousness is not inaccu­
rate, as Sartre in many cases points out that conscious­
ness is not a thing or nothing. We have pointed out 
that for Samkhya, the whole manifest world functions 
for the sake of the Purusa: Purusartha. In the same
way, Sartre's interest in the world is from the p er­
spective of individual consciousness.
The ultimate purpose of the SSmkhya is to remove 
or eliminate the fact of suffering in man's life. 
Similarly, Sartre discovers the life in the world as 
suffering. Samkhya states that suffering is a result 
of Purusa not distinguishing itself from Prkriti or 
appearing as what it is not - i.e., as bound up and 
determined by the world. When man realizes this dis­
tinction between Purusa and Prkriti, he is able to be 
free; because there is this split and the split is often 
confused as identity, man suffers. Sartre's notion 
of suffering is based on his notion of duality.
"The being of human reality is suffering, 
because it rises in being as perpetually 
haunted by a totality which it is without 
being able to be it; precisely because
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it could not attain the in-itself without 
losing itself as for-itself. Human reality 
therefore is by nature an unhappy con­
sciousness with no possibility of sur­
passing its unhappy state.
For Samkhya, the end of suffering comes through 
viveica-jîTana or intuitive discrimination, which gives 
one the knowledge that leads to salvation. Such reali­
zation that consciousness is completely free from the 
bindings of the materialization leads to moksa. Sartre 
also realizes that the freedom of the individual and 
his consciousness exist apart from the determinations 
of the worldly factors and man's own past. He says,
"To say that the for-itself has to be what 
it is, to say that it is what it is not, 
while not being what it is, to say that 
in it existence precedes essence and 
conditions essence - all this is to say 
one and the same thing: to be aware
that man is free."^^
But we must remember a fundamental difference between
SSmkhya and the thought of Sartre. Sartre could
never allow the possibility that consciousness could
exist in a state of isolation, apart from what it is
conscious of. There is for Sartre ho way out of
Z^I bid., p. 90.
Z^Ibid., p. 439
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suffering. Man's freedom consists in discrimination 
or realization that his consciousness is not determined 
by the world, but this freedom cannot exist apart from 
the world. Thus suffering is the basic unalterable 
fact of existence, and man is condemned to be free 
within this suffering. Man is, as Sartre would say, 
a useless passion. Thus though there are some similari­
ties between the analysis of human existence in SSmkhya 
and Sartre's phenomenological ontology, nevertheless 
they are quite different with respect to the solution 
of the basic problem.
Sartre's ideas about consciousness can also be
interestingly compared with the Buddhist theory of
consciousness. All schools of Buddhism object to the
theory of a permanent soul substance, on the ground that
the existence of such a substance is not certified by
our experience. The Buddhist believes in a continuity
of the states of consciousness, as in the case of the
24flame of a candle or the current of a river. Each 
flicker of the flame of a candle is different from the 
successive one or each wave of the stream is a different 
wave. So what we call consciousness is a process from 
the past to the present and then to the future. The
Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. I,
p. 373,
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previous theories of consciousness, as advocated by 
Vedanta and SSmkhya give us an idea of eternal conscious­
ness like the transcendental ego that has often been 
criticized by the Buddhists. The Buddhists reject the 
theory of a permanent consciousness on the ground that 
for anything to exist, it must have a capacity to p ro­
duce an effect, and if something exists for more than 
a moment, then it is either producing an effect in the 
second moment or it is not producing. If it does not 
produce anything, then it does not exist, and if it 
produces an effect, then it undergoes a change, for
to produce an effect while remaining unchanged is 
25impossible. Thus, everything of the world is involved 
in a creative process, and every moment something is 
produced which on its part produces something else.
This is the character of every object in the world 
including consciousness, and the Buddhists call this 
theory "Kshanikata-vada" or the doctrine of momentari­
n e s s . I t  is important to note that the doctrine of
momentariness is dependent on another doctrine known as 
— 27"Pratityasamutpada" or the doctrine of dependent
^^I b i d ., p. 373. 
ZGl b i d ., p. 372. 
27lbid., p. 410.
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origination. According to this later doctrine, all
objects of the world are causally determined by the
previous moment and the Buddhists give a twelve-membered
chain of causation which traces the suffering or duksa
of our life to our birth and subsequently to trsna or
2 0desire, or thirst, and then to ignorance. The 
Buddhists thus come close to Sartre's characterization 
of consciousness as temporalization. But there are 
fundamental differences between the Buddhist idea of 
time and the phenomenological-existential analysis of 
time. Though the ideal of human life is the end of 
suffering or Nirvana, it cannot be clearly stated what 
would be the relation between "Artha-kriySkâritâ" or 
the capacity to produce an effect and the ultimate p ro­
ject of life. But it cannot be denied that the Buddhist 
idea of the capacity to produce an effect is not incom­
patible with Sartre's idea that consciousness is always 
on the path to realize a possibility.
What Sartre calls human reality is an embodied 
consciousness in which the psychological states, quali­
ties, dispositions, and temeraments are hypostasized 
along with the corporeal factors. Sartre speaks of a 
"constitution of ego" which is a combination of the
2®lbid., p. 412.
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different factors of our experience. The Buddhist 
idea of self as a combination of the five factors known 
as the five "skandhas", or groups of psychical elements 
is similar to Sartre's idea of the constitution ego.
One important difference from Sartre's philosophy 
would, perhaps, be the idea of universal causation.
In the Buddhist thought every event is causally deter­
mined by the previous event. But the interesting fact 
is that this entire causal process has its beginning in 
the individual's desire and ignorance. This shows that 
it is the individual who can so determine his desire 
that there will be suffering or there will be cessation 
of suffering. Sartre will not object to this kind of 
causal determinism where individual's desire determine^ 
or initiates everything. But he may not agree to the 
rigidity in which desire seems to operate in the Buddhist 
system. Desire being the first in the chain of causation 
may also be called unreasonable or unjustifiable, and 
it is from desire, according to Buddhism, springs all 
suffering, Sartre can also say that our desire being 
absurd, points to the absurdity of our whole life. But 
all Indian philosophy ends with an optimistic note and 
similarly, the Buddhist philosophers will say, when 
desire is destroyed, there will be no longer suffering.
It is difficult to understand whether Sartre can con-
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ceive of an existence without desire, because for him, 
to be human being and to be free to choose are syno­
nymous. If a human being has no desire, he does not
have the freedom to choose and such an existence is, 
perhaps, super-human.
These are some ideas that may strike one in 
studying the philosophy of Sartre. One may wonder 
that Sartre does never mention anything about Oriental 
philosophy and yet he seems to speak often in the lan­
guage of the mysterious East. The reason may be found 
in the existential quest of the contemporary human 
being of whom Sartre is a major representative.
It is the Vedic philosophers who first of all 
raised the question, "Who am I?" and tried to realize 
the answer in the spiritual revelation of the identi­
fication between the finite and the infinite - in the 
truth "That thou art" or "I am He." The same quest
has stirred the minds of the modern philosophers of
the Existentialist school. Though the philosophers of 
India moved on a different plane, modern existentialism 
is concerned with all the levels of human existence.
But each existentialist thinker has concentrated on a 
particular aspect. Sartre's search has been the authentic 
existence of the human individual through his essential
240
characteristics of freedom and consciousness. We 
have tried in our discussion to unravel the different 
dimensions of this consciousness.
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